How much do you think that having lots of mostly or entirely identical future lives is differently valuable than having vastly different positive lives? (Because that would create a reasonable view on which a more limited number of future people can saturate the possible future value.)
Bostrom discusses things like this in Deep Utopia, under the label of ‘interestingness’ (where even if we edit post-humans to never be subjectively bored, maybe they run out of ‘objectively interesting’ things to do and this leads to value not being nearly as high as it could otherwise be). I don’t think he takes a stance on whether or how much interestingness actually matters, but I am only ~half way through the book so far.
How much do you think that having lots of mostly or entirely identical future lives is differently valuable than having vastly different positive lives? (Because that would create a reasonable view on which a more limited number of future people can saturate the possible future value.)
Bostrom discusses things like this in Deep Utopia, under the label of ‘interestingness’ (where even if we edit post-humans to never be subjectively bored, maybe they run out of ‘objectively interesting’ things to do and this leads to value not being nearly as high as it could otherwise be). I don’t think he takes a stance on whether or how much interestingness actually matters, but I am only ~half way through the book so far.