Questions about the neglectedness and tractability of this area
You write:
Another prominent source of funding for pro-democracy programs is the Open Society Foundations (OPF). According to their website (OpenSocietyFoundations.org), the organizationās 2020 budget of $1.2 billion included $140.5 million to improve democratic practices, along with another $77.3 million for human rights movements and institutions.
But then you also write:
With a few exceptions, democracy promotion seems to be largely neglected outside of the promotion of U.S. foreign policy interests
Do you say that because the democracy-promotion budget of the OPF and similar actors is much smaller than that of US government bodies? Or because you see the OPF and similar actors as also promoting US foreign policy interests?
Also, regarding tractability, you write:
A review essay on the efficacy of tools of external democracy promotion finds that non-coercive tools like foreign aid that is conditioned on democratic reforms and election monitoring are effective [...]
Another effective tool of democracy promotion is pro-democracy foreign aid. [...] The bulk of the recent evidence suggests that increasing pro-democracy aid may prove to be an effective intervention for EA organizationsā
Is the idea here always that pro-democracy foreign aid creates an incentive for regimes to make democratic reforms so that they get (or continue to get) that aid? Or is this sort of aid sometimes effective merely by helping prop up good institutions or things like that?
I ask because, if the benefits are always or primarily caused by the incentive effects, Iād worry about whether EA would really be able to throw enough money at this to even get noticed, when weāre talking about national budgets.
Thank you so much for this comment. The evidence from a bunch of good papers seems to suggest that itās about incentives to make democratic reforms. In terms of whether EA could contribute enough moneyāthe Carnegie and Marinov paper I cite finds small but still noticeable improvements in democracy in response to relatively insignificant increases in conditional aid from the EU (for example, going from 20 million dollars in aid to 25 million).
I was also wondering about the ability of EA to meaningfully contribute to democracy promotion. Perhaps a less costly way than funding pro-democracy foreign aid and more feasible way than election monitoring may be the promotion of the idea that democracy is good for economic growth. There is a forthcoming paper in the American Political Science Review by Scott Abramson and Sergio Montero called ā³Learning about Growth and Democracyā³ showing that autocracies are more likely to become democratic at times when democracies outperform autocracies in economic growth (unfortunately the reverse also holds). This is primarily attributed to a learning effect among political leaders who look at other countries to see what the best institutional setup for economic growth is. One takeaway of the paper is that the best way to promote democracy is to encourage economic growth within democracies. Assuming (reasonably I would say) that EA cannot meaningfully alter the economic growth trajectories of democracies, another possible takeaway from the paper is that it may be helpful to promote the idea among potential leaders or relevant civil societies in autocracies or fragile democracies that democracy is helpful for economic growth.
Questions about the neglectedness and tractability of this area
You write:
But then you also write:
Do you say that because the democracy-promotion budget of the OPF and similar actors is much smaller than that of US government bodies? Or because you see the OPF and similar actors as also promoting US foreign policy interests?
Also, regarding tractability, you write:
Is the idea here always that pro-democracy foreign aid creates an incentive for regimes to make democratic reforms so that they get (or continue to get) that aid? Or is this sort of aid sometimes effective merely by helping prop up good institutions or things like that?
I ask because, if the benefits are always or primarily caused by the incentive effects, Iād worry about whether EA would really be able to throw enough money at this to even get noticed, when weāre talking about national budgets.
What are you thoughts on that?
Thank you so much for this comment. The evidence from a bunch of good papers seems to suggest that itās about incentives to make democratic reforms. In terms of whether EA could contribute enough moneyāthe Carnegie and Marinov paper I cite finds small but still noticeable improvements in democracy in response to relatively insignificant increases in conditional aid from the EU (for example, going from 20 million dollars in aid to 25 million).
I was also wondering about the ability of EA to meaningfully contribute to democracy promotion. Perhaps a less costly way than funding pro-democracy foreign aid and more feasible way than election monitoring may be the promotion of the idea that democracy is good for economic growth. There is a forthcoming paper in the American Political Science Review by Scott Abramson and Sergio Montero called ā³Learning about Growth and Democracyā³ showing that autocracies are more likely to become democratic at times when democracies outperform autocracies in economic growth (unfortunately the reverse also holds). This is primarily attributed to a learning effect among political leaders who look at other countries to see what the best institutional setup for economic growth is. One takeaway of the paper is that the best way to promote democracy is to encourage economic growth within democracies. Assuming (reasonably I would say) that EA cannot meaningfully alter the economic growth trajectories of democracies, another possible takeaway from the paper is that it may be helpful to promote the idea among potential leaders or relevant civil societies in autocracies or fragile democracies that democracy is helpful for economic growth.