Because modeling this involves several judgment calls and would make the analysis much more complex (and harder to understand), we decided it’s better not to include it in the quantitative model and instead just mention it in the text.
I also think this is unlikely to change the numbers by more than 10%. I think it would take several fairly strong assumptions to change that, such as you think that Zurich’s marginal budget is used effectively in an important cause area such as global catastrophic risk research funding.
Some brainstorming ideas for how to model this cost:
You could model a tax increase as a reduction in income for Zurich residents (using data on per-capita GDP in the city of Zurich, this is available) and compare that to an increase in the income for the average development cooperation recipient (taking into account that some funding is used for Swiss development cooperation staff compensation). The line of reasoning from this article (also linked above) could be helpful to then translate this into welfare changes.
You could try to better understand spending cuts by looking at the budget items and which ones tended to be cut during past cuts, then try to estimate how they compare to development cooperation (or the things Zurich residents usually spend money on).
You could model a tax increase as a reduction in income for Zurich residents (using data on per-capita GDP in the city of Zurich, this is available) and compare that to an increase in the income for the average development cooperation recipient
This would make sense if we model the result of the ballot initiative as a move by nature and treat all humans symmetrically. However, when the decision is made by a mechanism that can be influenced (such as a legislative body), then under a variety of moral views, it matters very much how the decision was made. A voluntary donation, a donation resulting from social pressure, a donation using stolen money, and a donation funded via taxation can all be treated differently.
For example, under views particularly critical of taxation, taxation is equated to theft and one might consider foreign aid via increased taxation unacceptable regardless of the effectiveness of aid. Philosopher Michael Huemer has defended such a view starting from common sense morality.
A similar issue exists for budget cuts (when the recipient of public expenditure is no longer taxed).
Right, a non-consequentialist analysis might lead to different conclusions in this case. Thanks for pointing that out!
I think there’s still a pretty strong case to be made that in the case of development cooperation, it’s not quite as straightforward because developed countries have harmed developing countries in many ways (colonialism, tax havens, agricultural export subsidies, etc.). Thomas Pogge has argued along these lines IIRC, so one could look at his views on this.
More generally, we live in a highly globalized world, we routinely interact with these countries through trade, etc., such that it seems plausible that we do have some responsibilities towards them. And we’re talking about one of the very wealthiest cities in the world (with a per-capita GDP of $180,000!) giving a relatively small additional amount. So if there is one particular case where Huemer’s arguments appear particularly implausible, it is probably this one.
Overall, I don’t think it’s obvious whether the case for development cooperation becomes weaker or stronger if we take into account various non-consequentialist perspectives.
Minor point: I think consequentialism vs non-consequentialism is one relevant distinction, but that distinctions between consequentialist views which value different things (not just utility) are also relevant. E.g., I imagine a person could be a consequentialist who primarily valued negative liberty, which might lead to being very concerned about taxation.
Reasons this is a minor point:
Just valuing “liberty” might leave this initiative looking positive, as global health and development work probably increases positive liberty substantially.
Even a focus on negative liberty might still leave this initiative looking positive, if it turns out that increasing taxation in Zurich to pay for more global health and development work causes a net increase in negative liberty. E.g. by helping lead to more democratisation. (I’m not saying that this is the case; just that it seems plausible.)
I haven’t actually heard anyone endorse a consequentialist view which emphasises negative liberty. Though it’s possible that that’s a good way to interpret some libertarians’ views.
(Also, nice work on this ballot initiative, and thanks for the write-up!)
Thanks for the input!
Because modeling this involves several judgment calls and would make the analysis much more complex (and harder to understand), we decided it’s better not to include it in the quantitative model and instead just mention it in the text.
I also think this is unlikely to change the numbers by more than 10%. I think it would take several fairly strong assumptions to change that, such as you think that Zurich’s marginal budget is used effectively in an important cause area such as global catastrophic risk research funding.
Some brainstorming ideas for how to model this cost:
You could model a tax increase as a reduction in income for Zurich residents (using data on per-capita GDP in the city of Zurich, this is available) and compare that to an increase in the income for the average development cooperation recipient (taking into account that some funding is used for Swiss development cooperation staff compensation). The line of reasoning from this article (also linked above) could be helpful to then translate this into welfare changes.
You could try to better understand spending cuts by looking at the budget items and which ones tended to be cut during past cuts, then try to estimate how they compare to development cooperation (or the things Zurich residents usually spend money on).
Hi Jonas, I appreciate the response.
This would make sense if we model the result of the ballot initiative as a move by nature and treat all humans symmetrically. However, when the decision is made by a mechanism that can be influenced (such as a legislative body), then under a variety of moral views, it matters very much how the decision was made. A voluntary donation, a donation resulting from social pressure, a donation using stolen money, and a donation funded via taxation can all be treated differently.
For example, under views particularly critical of taxation, taxation is equated to theft and one might consider foreign aid via increased taxation unacceptable regardless of the effectiveness of aid. Philosopher Michael Huemer has defended such a view starting from common sense morality.
A similar issue exists for budget cuts (when the recipient of public expenditure is no longer taxed).
Right, a non-consequentialist analysis might lead to different conclusions in this case. Thanks for pointing that out!
I think there’s still a pretty strong case to be made that in the case of development cooperation, it’s not quite as straightforward because developed countries have harmed developing countries in many ways (colonialism, tax havens, agricultural export subsidies, etc.). Thomas Pogge has argued along these lines IIRC, so one could look at his views on this.
More generally, we live in a highly globalized world, we routinely interact with these countries through trade, etc., such that it seems plausible that we do have some responsibilities towards them. And we’re talking about one of the very wealthiest cities in the world (with a per-capita GDP of $180,000!) giving a relatively small additional amount. So if there is one particular case where Huemer’s arguments appear particularly implausible, it is probably this one.
Overall, I don’t think it’s obvious whether the case for development cooperation becomes weaker or stronger if we take into account various non-consequentialist perspectives.
Minor point: I think consequentialism vs non-consequentialism is one relevant distinction, but that distinctions between consequentialist views which value different things (not just utility) are also relevant. E.g., I imagine a person could be a consequentialist who primarily valued negative liberty, which might lead to being very concerned about taxation.
Reasons this is a minor point:
Just valuing “liberty” might leave this initiative looking positive, as global health and development work probably increases positive liberty substantially.
Even a focus on negative liberty might still leave this initiative looking positive, if it turns out that increasing taxation in Zurich to pay for more global health and development work causes a net increase in negative liberty. E.g. by helping lead to more democratisation. (I’m not saying that this is the case; just that it seems plausible.)
I haven’t actually heard anyone endorse a consequentialist view which emphasises negative liberty. Though it’s possible that that’s a good way to interpret some libertarians’ views.
(Also, nice work on this ballot initiative, and thanks for the write-up!)
Nice addition and caveats, thanks! :)