I guess I have (i) some different empirical assumptions, and (ii) some different moral assumptions (about what counts as a sufficiently modest revision to still count as âconservativeâ, i.e. within the general spirit of GHD).
To specifically address your three examples:
Iâd guess that variance in cost (to save one life, or whatever) outweighs the variance in predictable ability to contribute. (iirc, Nick Becksteadâs dissertation on longtermism made the point that all else equal, it would be better to save a life in a wealthy country for instrumental reasons, but that the cost difference is so great that itâs still plausibly much better to focus on developing countries in practice.)
Perhaps it would justify more of a shift towards the âDâ side of âH&Dâ, insofar as we could identify any good interventions for improving economic development. But the desire for lasting improvements seems commonsensical to many people anyway (compare all the rhetoric around âroot causesâ, âteaching a man to fishâ, etc.)
In general, extreme poverty might seem to have the most low-hanging fruit for improvement (including improvements to capacity-building). But there may be exceptions in cases of extreme societal dysfunction, in which case, again, I think itâs pretty commonsensical that we shouldnât invest resources in places where theyâd actually do less lasting good.
I donât understand at all why this would motivate less focus on infant mortality: fixing that is an extremely cheap way to improve human capacity! I think I already mentioned in the OP that increasing fertility could also be justified in principle, but Iâm not aware of any proven cheap interventions that do this in practice. Adding some child benefit support (or whatever) into the mix doesnât strike me as unduly radical, in any case.
Greater support for education seems very commonsensical in principle (including from a broadly âglobal health & developmentâ perspective), and iirc was an early focus area of GiveWellâthey just gave up because they couldnât find any promising interventions.
So Iâm not really seeing anything âbadâ here. I agree that it could involve some revisions to standard GHD portfolios. But itâs very conservative in comparison to proposals to shift all GHD funding to Animal Welfare, as the orthodox âneartermistâ worldview seemingly recommends.
All that said: Iâm less interested in what counts as âradicalâ or âconservativeâ, and more interested in what is actually justified. The strongest argument for my reconceptualization is that all the âworldviewsâ I set out are very sensible and warrant support (IMO). I donât think the same is true of all the âorthodoxâ worldviews.
So Iâm not really seeing anything âbadâ here.
I didnât say your proposal was âbadâ, I said it wasnât âconservativeâ.
My point is just that, if GHD were to reorient around âreliable global capacity growthâ, it would look very different, to the point where I think your proposal is better described as âstop GHD work, and instead do reliable global capacity growth workâ, rather than the current framing of âletâs reconceptualize the existing bucket of workâ.
I donât understand at all why this would motivate less focus on infant mortality: fixing that is an extremely cheap way to improve human capacity!
This sounds plausible, but not obvious, to me. If your society has a sharply limited amount of resources to invest in the next generation, it isnât clear to me that maximizing the number of members in that generation would be the best âway to improve human capacityâ in that society. One could argue that with somewhat fewer kids, the society could provide better nutrition, education, health care, and other inputs that are rather important to adult capacity and flourishing.
To be clear, I am a strong supporter of life-saving interventions and am not advocating for a move away from these. I just think they are harder to justify on improving-capacity grounds than on the grounds usually provided for them.
One could argue that with somewhat fewer kids, the society could provide better nutrition, education, health care, and other inputs that are rather important to adult capacity and flourishing.
I think thatâs an argument worth having. After all, if the claim were true then I think that really would justify shifting attention away from infant mortality reduction and towards these âother inputsâ for promoting human flourishing. (But Iâm skeptical that the claim is true, at least on currently relevant margins in most places.)
I guess I have (i) some different empirical assumptions, and (ii) some different moral assumptions (about what counts as a sufficiently modest revision to still count as âconservativeâ, i.e. within the general spirit of GHD).
To specifically address your three examples:
Iâd guess that variance in cost (to save one life, or whatever) outweighs the variance in predictable ability to contribute. (iirc, Nick Becksteadâs dissertation on longtermism made the point that all else equal, it would be better to save a life in a wealthy country for instrumental reasons, but that the cost difference is so great that itâs still plausibly much better to focus on developing countries in practice.)
Perhaps it would justify more of a shift towards the âDâ side of âH&Dâ, insofar as we could identify any good interventions for improving economic development. But the desire for lasting improvements seems commonsensical to many people anyway (compare all the rhetoric around âroot causesâ, âteaching a man to fishâ, etc.)
In general, extreme poverty might seem to have the most low-hanging fruit for improvement (including improvements to capacity-building). But there may be exceptions in cases of extreme societal dysfunction, in which case, again, I think itâs pretty commonsensical that we shouldnât invest resources in places where theyâd actually do less lasting good.
I donât understand at all why this would motivate less focus on infant mortality: fixing that is an extremely cheap way to improve human capacity! I think I already mentioned in the OP that increasing fertility could also be justified in principle, but Iâm not aware of any proven cheap interventions that do this in practice. Adding some child benefit support (or whatever) into the mix doesnât strike me as unduly radical, in any case.
Greater support for education seems very commonsensical in principle (including from a broadly âglobal health & developmentâ perspective), and iirc was an early focus area of GiveWellâthey just gave up because they couldnât find any promising interventions.
So Iâm not really seeing anything âbadâ here. I agree that it could involve some revisions to standard GHD portfolios. But itâs very conservative in comparison to proposals to shift all GHD funding to Animal Welfare, as the orthodox âneartermistâ worldview seemingly recommends.
All that said: Iâm less interested in what counts as âradicalâ or âconservativeâ, and more interested in what is actually justified. The strongest argument for my reconceptualization is that all the âworldviewsâ I set out are very sensible and warrant support (IMO). I donât think the same is true of all the âorthodoxâ worldviews.
I didnât say your proposal was âbadâ, I said it wasnât âconservativeâ.
My point is just that, if GHD were to reorient around âreliable global capacity growthâ, it would look very different, to the point where I think your proposal is better described as âstop GHD work, and instead do reliable global capacity growth workâ, rather than the current framing of âletâs reconceptualize the existing bucket of workâ.
I was replying to your sentence, âIâd guess most proponents of GHD would find (1) and (2) particularly bad.â
Oh I see, sorry for misinterpreting you.
This sounds plausible, but not obvious, to me. If your society has a sharply limited amount of resources to invest in the next generation, it isnât clear to me that maximizing the number of members in that generation would be the best âway to improve human capacityâ in that society. One could argue that with somewhat fewer kids, the society could provide better nutrition, education, health care, and other inputs that are rather important to adult capacity and flourishing.
To be clear, I am a strong supporter of life-saving interventions and am not advocating for a move away from these. I just think they are harder to justify on improving-capacity grounds than on the grounds usually provided for them.
I think thatâs an argument worth having. After all, if the claim were true then I think that really would justify shifting attention away from infant mortality reduction and towards these âother inputsâ for promoting human flourishing. (But Iâm skeptical that the claim is true, at least on currently relevant margins in most places.)