[Singer]: In view of the special sense philosophers often give to the term, I should say that I use “obligation” simply as the abstract noun derived from “ought,” so that “I have an obligation to” means no more, and no less, than “I ought to.”
To me, this reads as Singer stating that, when he claims we are obligated to do something, he just means that it’s better to do so than not.
I’m not convinced by your interpretation here. I think in ordinary language, something being ‘better to do than not’ doesn’t imply we ought to do it; it might only be very slightly better, not enough to matter, or it might be supererogatory.
[Singer]: The outcome of this argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset. The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it… It may be possible to redraw the distinction between duty and charity in some other place… It is beyond the scope of my argument to consider whether the distinction should be redrawn or abolished altogether.
Thus, on the question of spending our money either on saving lives or on luxuries for ourselves, Singer does not seem to be saying that donating is our duty, as opposed to being laudable. Instead, he is saying that such a distinction cannot even be made on this issue, and he leaves open the possibility that such a distinction should be “abolished altogether”.
Similarly, this paragraph seems pretty consistent with Caplan’s argument to me. If there is no distinction between charity and duty, maybe that means there is no such thing as duty… or maybe it means that everything is duty!
(Apologies for awkward formatting, I don’t know how to do nested quotations natively)
Thanks for writing this interesting piece!
I’m not convinced by your interpretation here. I think in ordinary language, something being ‘better to do than not’ doesn’t imply we ought to do it; it might only be very slightly better, not enough to matter, or it might be supererogatory.
Similarly, this paragraph seems pretty consistent with Caplan’s argument to me. If there is no distinction between charity and duty, maybe that means there is no such thing as duty… or maybe it means that everything is duty!
(Apologies for awkward formatting, I don’t know how to do nested quotations natively)