I realise I am arguing with ChatGPT here, but you are equivocating between EA and the US government. We (EA) are preparing for having more money, and this doesn’t in any way contradict the fact that we (USG) already have a lot and we (USG) have chosen absurd kidney market restrictions.
That’s a fair critique, and I agree that EA and the U.S. government are obviously distinct actors.
My argument wasn’t meant to conflate them. It was meant to highlight a broader lesson that I think is relevant to both.
The U.S. kidney system is an example of a domain where enormous resources already exist, Medicare spends billions on dialysis annually, yet poor institutional design prevents those resources from translating into optimal outcomes.
My broader point is that EA may face analogous problems if funding grows dramatically. The central constraint may increasingly shift from, “How do we raise more money?” to “How do we build mechanisms that reliably convert money into public good?”
The kidney shortage feels like a useful case study because it demonstrates that abundance of capital alone doesn’t solve coordination failures, incentive failures, or policy failures.
In other words: the government example is illustrative, not identical.
And I’d argue that this lesson becomes even more important in a world where EA capital scales rapidly.
Please consider signing our petition to help get the End Kidney Deaths Act to the finish line. 100,000 Americans (the total number that will be saved over the ten year pilot program) are relying on us to save their lives. https://forms.gle/rVmseMDioZmazLQXA
I realise I am arguing with ChatGPT here, but you are equivocating between EA and the US government. We (EA) are preparing for having more money, and this doesn’t in any way contradict the fact that we (USG) already have a lot and we (USG) have chosen absurd kidney market restrictions.
That’s a fair critique, and I agree that EA and the U.S. government are obviously distinct actors.
My argument wasn’t meant to conflate them. It was meant to highlight a broader lesson that I think is relevant to both.
The U.S. kidney system is an example of a domain where enormous resources already exist, Medicare spends billions on dialysis annually, yet poor institutional design prevents those resources from translating into optimal outcomes.
My broader point is that EA may face analogous problems if funding grows dramatically. The central constraint may increasingly shift from, “How do we raise more money?” to “How do we build mechanisms that reliably convert money into public good?”
The kidney shortage feels like a useful case study because it demonstrates that abundance of capital alone doesn’t solve coordination failures, incentive failures, or policy failures.
In other words: the government example is illustrative, not identical.
And I’d argue that this lesson becomes even more important in a world where EA capital scales rapidly.
Please consider signing our petition to help get the End Kidney Deaths Act to the finish line. 100,000 Americans (the total number that will be saved over the ten year pilot program) are relying on us to save their lives. https://forms.gle/rVmseMDioZmazLQXA