Youâve identified my two main frustrations with the book: US-centrism and the attitude that there exist no substantial objections to open borders (rather than a more measured argument that the benefits outweigh the harms). There were a few panels towards the end of the book which typify this for me:
This book contained several interesting economic arguments (e.g. âmigration good for the economy = big countries do betterâ, as you pointed out) but enough credibility-straining overconfidence that I havenât been recommending it.
You mention âItâs probably the case that the biggest harms from immigration come from people irrationally panicking about immigration, but (surprise!) people are in fact irrational.â.
From an EU-perspective, the effect seems pretty clear: After the refugee crisis 2015-2016 there have been numerous cases of populist right-wing parties gaining support or outright winning elections after running on anti-immigration platforms: to name just a few: the Lega Nord in Italy became part of the government, the FPĂ polled at their highest in 2016, and anti-immigration sentiment was at least influential for Brexit. These are arguably outcomes that substantially weaken political institutions and lead to worse governance.
This kind of backlash from some parts of the established population happens at moderate levels of immigration. We should expect it to be much stronger when immigration would be much higher under an Open Borders system, and account for the effects of that.
Youâve identified my two main frustrations with the book: US-centrism and the attitude that there exist no substantial objections to open borders (rather than a more measured argument that the benefits outweigh the harms). There were a few panels towards the end of the book which typify this for me:
I, uh, I donât think âthe only thing that stands in the way of opening the border is sheer political apathyâ. QuĂ©becois separatists were ransoming politicians within my parentsâ lifetime,and QuĂ©bec nearly separated in 1995. I donât expect most Americans to pay attention to the fragility of Canadian federalism, but itâs super frustrating to see someone be so confident that there is no possible argument against their position!
This book contained several interesting economic arguments (e.g. âmigration good for the economy = big countries do betterâ, as you pointed out) but enough credibility-straining overconfidence that I havenât been recommending it.
See prior discussion here.
You mention âItâs probably the case that the biggest harms from immigration come from people irrationally panicking about immigration, but (surprise!) people are in fact irrational.â.
From an EU-perspective, the effect seems pretty clear: After the refugee crisis 2015-2016 there have been numerous cases of populist right-wing parties gaining support or outright winning elections after running on anti-immigration platforms: to name just a few: the Lega Nord in Italy became part of the government, the FPĂ polled at their highest in 2016, and anti-immigration sentiment was at least influential for Brexit. These are arguably outcomes that substantially weaken political institutions and lead to worse governance.
This kind of backlash from some parts of the established population happens at moderate levels of immigration. We should expect it to be much stronger when immigration would be much higher under an Open Borders system, and account for the effects of that.