Thatās exactly what I said. Uncertainty is a big issue here. But that doesnāt mean one is justified in not offsetting the impact oneās dietary choices have on wild animals, simply because a handful of people have put forward the hypothesis of net negative lives.
Are you suggesting that all non-vegans offset the impact on wild animals? How does one do that, even if it were agreed that wild animals had net positive lives?
Of course not. At this point it simply isnāt possible.Which is exactly what I argued:
Unless we possess solid data on wild animal welfare ranges and how feed production affects them, we have no way of knowing how to offset a non-vegan dietās impact on wild populations, or what the true cost would be.
I would argue, however, that vegans have less impact on wild animals which is precisely why framing welfare campaigns as an āoffsetā for a non-vegan diet strikes me as misleading. I have broader reservations about the concept of offsetting animal suffering altogether, but if such offsetting is to be meaningful in any real sense, it should focus on projects that reduce the consumption of animal products in order to replicate these effects.
Okāso if one believes that wild invertebrate lives are net positive, then offsetting with animal welfare interventions means more feed is required, resulting in fewer wild invertebrates (and more deaths from pesticides, but I think this is small compared to the impact on the population of soil invertebrates of farming more land), meaning less utility overall. So this person would prefer an offset that is a scalable way of convincing people to go vegan. Though this may seem contradictory, I think there is a large variation in difficulty of going vegan (taste preferences, opportunity cost of time, impact on health, etc), so it is most effective if the people for whom it is easier to go vegan are exposed to the arguments. However, if the person thinks that wild invertebrates lives are net negative, they would prefer the animal welfare interventions offset, because not only would that help the farmed animals, but it would also reduce the bad utilities of wild invertebrates lives.
ā¦ then offsetting with animal welfare interventions means more feed is required, resulting in fewer wild invertebrates
There are two main effects. Higher welfare standards generally mean fewer animals are raised, since they and their products become more expensive. But those that are raised require more feed. As far as I know there is no consensus on which effect dominates.
However, if the person thinks that wild invertebrates lives are net negative, they would prefer the animal welfare interventions offset, because not only would that help the farmed animals, but it would also reduce the bad utilities of wild invertebrates lives.
They may prefer this kind of intervention and consequently donate to the relevant charities, but the amount they are supposed to pay to offset should stay the same. Since offsetting is generally framed around conservative estimates, it makes no sense to pay less just because you believe in something.
Though this may seem contradictory, I think there is a large variation in difficulty of going vegan (taste preferences, opportunity cost of time, impact on health, etc), so it is most effective if the people for whom it is easier to go vegan are exposed to the arguments.
I totally agree. However, Iām not aware of a single charity that turns people who had no inclination of becoming vegan into vegans. That would be an almost impossible achievement, unless you paid them to do so and set up control mechanisms to make sure they stood true to their word.
Charities like Veganuary are targeted specifically at people who are already motivated to go vegan in the first place. So if someone turns vegan during the challenge itās impossible to know whether the donor was counterfactual. For all we know the person could have become vegan two months earlier but chose to wait for the challenge. So we may want to use Shapley values. There is also a broader principle at play here: there is general consensus that the same outcome cannot be claimed multiple times for offsetting purposes. This is precisely how certificate trading works, whether for carbon or anything else. So, if we assign some weight to the person who invented the challenge, some weight to the staff who work for below market rates, some weight to every organisation who had previously influenced the person who eventually went vegan, and of course the main weight to that person themselves, little value is left for the donor.
Without access to the relevant data it is hard to say anything definitive, but it seems worth asking whether the cost per outcome would look quite different if conservative estimates were applied more rigorously.
There is huge uncertainty once you consider wild animalsāmore feed could increase wild animal welfare.
Thatās exactly what I said. Uncertainty is a big issue here. But that doesnāt mean one is justified in not offsetting the impact oneās dietary choices have on wild animals, simply because a handful of people have put forward the hypothesis of net negative lives.
Are you suggesting that all non-vegans offset the impact on wild animals? How does one do that, even if it were agreed that wild animals had net positive lives?
Of course not. At this point it simply isnāt possible.Which is exactly what I argued:
I would argue, however, that vegans have less impact on wild animals which is precisely why framing welfare campaigns as an āoffsetā for a non-vegan diet strikes me as misleading. I have broader reservations about the concept of offsetting animal suffering altogether, but if such offsetting is to be meaningful in any real sense, it should focus on projects that reduce the consumption of animal products in order to replicate these effects.
Okāso if one believes that wild invertebrate lives are net positive, then offsetting with animal welfare interventions means more feed is required, resulting in fewer wild invertebrates (and more deaths from pesticides, but I think this is small compared to the impact on the population of soil invertebrates of farming more land), meaning less utility overall. So this person would prefer an offset that is a scalable way of convincing people to go vegan. Though this may seem contradictory, I think there is a large variation in difficulty of going vegan (taste preferences, opportunity cost of time, impact on health, etc), so it is most effective if the people for whom it is easier to go vegan are exposed to the arguments.
However, if the person thinks that wild invertebrates lives are net negative, they would prefer the animal welfare interventions offset, because not only would that help the farmed animals, but it would also reduce the bad utilities of wild invertebrates lives.
There are two main effects. Higher welfare standards generally mean fewer animals are raised, since they and their products become more expensive. But those that are raised require more feed. As far as I know there is no consensus on which effect dominates.
They may prefer this kind of intervention and consequently donate to the relevant charities, but the amount they are supposed to pay to offset should stay the same. Since offsetting is generally framed around conservative estimates, it makes no sense to pay less just because you believe in something.
I totally agree. However, Iām not aware of a single charity that turns people who had no inclination of becoming vegan into vegans. That would be an almost impossible achievement, unless you paid them to do so and set up control mechanisms to make sure they stood true to their word.
Charities like Veganuary are targeted specifically at people who are already motivated to go vegan in the first place. So if someone turns vegan during the challenge itās impossible to know whether the donor was counterfactual. For all we know the person could have become vegan two months earlier but chose to wait for the challenge. So we may want to use Shapley values. There is also a broader principle at play here: there is general consensus that the same outcome cannot be claimed multiple times for offsetting purposes. This is precisely how certificate trading works, whether for carbon or anything else. So, if we assign some weight to the person who invented the challenge, some weight to the staff who work for below market rates, some weight to every organisation who had previously influenced the person who eventually went vegan, and of course the main weight to that person themselves, little value is left for the donor.
Without access to the relevant data it is hard to say anything definitive, but it seems worth asking whether the cost per outcome would look quite different if conservative estimates were applied more rigorously.