It is broadly agreed among economists that inflation and purchasing power-adjusted wages have not grown (much) in the past 30-40 years (known as wage stagnation), though this is not without its dissenters.
The cited links only discuss the US labour market, as far as I can see, which I think should be clarified. You’re discussing general impacts of technology here. Therefore, I think more countries than just the US should be discussed, since it’s possible that US wage stagnation is due to (e.g. political) factors unique to the US.
For instance, Sweden has seen substantial real wage growth the last 25 years (in Swedish; graph describes real wage growth). I haven’t looked at other European countries but would guess that Sweden is not wholly unique.
American economists dominate these debates, and I think they have a tendency to look too exclusively at American data. The US has many special features, so it seems to me risky to draw general conclusions about the impact of automation based on American data alone. It’s a large country, but data from large countries don’t necessarily give us that much stronger evidence about general trends than data from medium-sized countries.
Robert J. Gordon, a distinguished macroeconomist and economic historian at Northwestern, has been arguing for a long time against the techno-optimism that saturates our culture, with its constant assertion that we’re in the midst of revolutionary change. Starting at the height of the dot-com frenzy, he has repeatedly called for perspective: Developments in information and communication technology, he has insisted, just don’t measure up to past achievements. Specifically, he has argued that the I.T. revolution is less important than any one of the five Great Inventions that powered economic growth from 1870 to 1970: electricity, urban sanitation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the internal combustion engine and modern communication.
It took a surprisingly long time to find anything on real wage trends in Europe but it looks like, judging by the graphs on page 5 of this paper that Sweden, Norway, and in part the UK are exceptions to quite slow real-wage growth. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Denmark follow the wage stagnation of the US.
I very much agree though that my analysis is very focused on the US (and the discussion in general). This paper demonstrates that at least on a micro level there are demonstrated effects on wages and employment from automation in the UK. Says
I guess I’d conclude roughly that stagnation is happening in many (if not all) developed countries. I would wager that automation plays some role, though I would guess that role is relatively small in the grand scheme of things (for now).
Money in elections:
I think even if that theory were true though, I would argue that campaign techniques are improving (a la Cambridge Analytica, AgreggateIQ) such that in the near future money may be more persuasive. I don’t think we’ve really seen a campaign between two tech-savvy politicians willing to pay top dollar for voter manipulation (first one in 2020?) but if we did I would imagine campaign contributions to grow in importance. It would definitely be interesting to dive into this a bit more though.
Pace of Automation:
Yes… I agree this is a major blindspot. I haven’t looked at this literature much at all and don’t really feel qualified to make serious assessments on the quality of the many predictions. I agree there should be something there though. I will add a few sentences following the ILO’s literature review on the Future of Work to give people an idea of what is being talked about
The cited links only discuss the US labour market, as far as I can see, which I think should be clarified. You’re discussing general impacts of technology here. Therefore, I think more countries than just the US should be discussed, since it’s possible that US wage stagnation is due to (e.g. political) factors unique to the US.
For instance, Sweden has seen substantial real wage growth the last 25 years (in Swedish; graph describes real wage growth). I haven’t looked at other European countries but would guess that Sweden is not wholly unique.
American economists dominate these debates, and I think they have a tendency to look too exclusively at American data. The US has many special features, so it seems to me risky to draw general conclusions about the impact of automation based on American data alone. It’s a large country, but data from large countries don’t necessarily give us that much stronger evidence about general trends than data from medium-sized countries.
Regarding money in elections, some research suggests that while candidates with more money are more likely to win, it’s not necessarily the case that they are more likely to win _because_ they have more money. Rather, some suggest they raise more money because they’re more popular, which also makes them more likely to won. (I don’t know this area well, though.)
You don’t say much about the pace of automation, which I would say is key. Even though it’s difficult, it’s important to say something about it. On this, e.g. Robert Gordon has argued that recent growth is low actually pretty in historical comparison:
(From a review by Paul Krugman)
If that’s right, then that may make concerns about downside risks from automation less pressing. Thus it seems important to study.
Wage growth:
It took a surprisingly long time to find anything on real wage trends in Europe but it looks like, judging by the graphs on page 5 of this paper that Sweden, Norway, and in part the UK are exceptions to quite slow real-wage growth. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Denmark follow the wage stagnation of the US.
I very much agree though that my analysis is very focused on the US (and the discussion in general). This paper demonstrates that at least on a micro level there are demonstrated effects on wages and employment from automation in the UK. Says
I guess I’d conclude roughly that stagnation is happening in many (if not all) developed countries. I would wager that automation plays some role, though I would guess that role is relatively small in the grand scheme of things (for now).
Money in elections:
I think even if that theory were true though, I would argue that campaign techniques are improving (a la Cambridge Analytica, AgreggateIQ) such that in the near future money may be more persuasive. I don’t think we’ve really seen a campaign between two tech-savvy politicians willing to pay top dollar for voter manipulation (first one in 2020?) but if we did I would imagine campaign contributions to grow in importance. It would definitely be interesting to dive into this a bit more though.
Pace of Automation:
Yes… I agree this is a major blindspot. I haven’t looked at this literature much at all and don’t really feel qualified to make serious assessments on the quality of the many predictions. I agree there should be something there though. I will add a few sentences following the ILO’s literature review on the Future of Work to give people an idea of what is being talked about