On your second point, I think it’s true that the way I described moral uncertainty in this post applies most straightforwardly if we accept moral realism rather than antirealism. But I think much of the discussion, theories, etc. related to moral uncertainty will still be relevant given various types of moral antirealism—there’ll just need to be some adjustments in interpretation and application. (I’m not sure if this is the case for all types of moral antirealism.)
As I say in a footnote of the post:
In various places in this sequence, I will use language that may appear to endorse or presume moral realism (e.g., referring to “moral information” or to probability of a particular moral theory being “true”). But this is essentially just for convenience; I intend this sequence to be neutral on the matter of moral realism vs antirealism, and I believe this post can be useful in mostly similar ways regardless of one’s position on that matter. I discuss the matter of “moral uncertainty for antirealists” in more detail in this separate post.
For more on that, see the post linked to there.
I also don’t think it’s true that all types of moral antirealism would mean/claim that “words like ‘should’, ‘ought’ etc are either necessarily wrong or not even meaningful.” And I’ve talked to thoughtful antirealists who actively argue against such a view—if I recall correctly, this post is a good example of that (and in any case, it’s an interesting post).
On your second point, I think it’s true that the way I described moral uncertainty in this post applies most straightforwardly if we accept moral realism rather than antirealism. But I think much of the discussion, theories, etc. related to moral uncertainty will still be relevant given various types of moral antirealism—there’ll just need to be some adjustments in interpretation and application. (I’m not sure if this is the case for all types of moral antirealism.)
As I say in a footnote of the post:
For more on that, see the post linked to there.
I also don’t think it’s true that all types of moral antirealism would mean/claim that “words like ‘should’, ‘ought’ etc are either necessarily wrong or not even meaningful.” And I’ve talked to thoughtful antirealists who actively argue against such a view—if I recall correctly, this post is a good example of that (and in any case, it’s an interesting post).