On your second point, I think itās true that the way I described moral uncertainty in this post applies most straightforwardly if we accept moral realism rather than antirealism. But I think much of the discussion, theories, etc. related to moral uncertainty will still be relevant given various types of moral antirealismāthereāll just need to be some adjustments in interpretation and application. (Iām not sure if this is the case for all types of moral antirealism.)
As I say in a footnote of the post:
In various places in this sequence, I will use language that may appear to endorse or presume moral realism (e.g., referring to āmoral informationā or to probability of a particular moral theory being ātrueā). But this is essentially just for convenience; I intend this sequence to be neutral on the matter of moral realism vs antirealism, and I believe this post can be useful in mostly similar ways regardless of oneās position on that matter. I discuss the matter of āmoral uncertainty for antirealistsā in more detail in this separate post.
For more on that, see the post linked to there.
I also donāt think itās true that all types of moral antirealism would mean/āclaim that āwords like āshouldā, āoughtā etc are either necessarily wrong or not even meaningful.ā And Iāve talked to thoughtful antirealists who actively argue against such a viewāif I recall correctly, this post is a good example of that (and in any case, itās an interesting post).
On your second point, I think itās true that the way I described moral uncertainty in this post applies most straightforwardly if we accept moral realism rather than antirealism. But I think much of the discussion, theories, etc. related to moral uncertainty will still be relevant given various types of moral antirealismāthereāll just need to be some adjustments in interpretation and application. (Iām not sure if this is the case for all types of moral antirealism.)
As I say in a footnote of the post:
For more on that, see the post linked to there.
I also donāt think itās true that all types of moral antirealism would mean/āclaim that āwords like āshouldā, āoughtā etc are either necessarily wrong or not even meaningful.ā And Iāve talked to thoughtful antirealists who actively argue against such a viewāif I recall correctly, this post is a good example of that (and in any case, itās an interesting post).