I think if your sole objective is to enact a bilateral pause, then easing export controls may be the best option, or maybe not. It’s pretty unclear to me how that shakes out, I could definitely also see unilateral concessions as being quite detrimental (for reasons similar to those Peter mention in the other comment).
But I would guess most of the people you are responding to think enacting a cooperative pause is some combination of very unlikely and/or undesirable, and also that export controls help a lot in the absence of such an agreement. The main way export controls help for other plans are by giving the US more slack to (one can hope) spend on safety, and/or because superintelligence developed in the US would imo likely be safer (cf. this comment), and/or because imo US values are better, and this would likely be reflected in the AIs (cf. Claude versus Grok).
Thx for your perspective; I should be upfront that my confidence in my own case is far from ironclad. Anyway.
From the ryan_greenblatt’s article you’ve linked, I think safety plan A, based on achieving international agreement, should be tried before going for plan B, based on achieving and using a secure US lead, while in “plans” C and D it doesn’t matter whether the leading company is American or Chinese, so slowing down Chinese development is useless for those “plans” (they are in fact more like scenarios than real plans).
I do agree that the US political system is in an important sense better than the Chinese political system, but my prior is that if superintelligence is developed before, let’s say, 2050 (and that is very optimistic), it is likely to go badly completely regardless of which country it’ll come from.
I take your point about slack being potentially useful. Theoretically, I can imagine the following sequence of events: a) the US AI industry crushes Chinese competition, then b) the US government, feeling secure in the US lead, imposes sensible safety regulation on companies. If it were smart about it, it would at the same time propose an international regulatory framework that the rest of the world would be prepared to sign on to, as an alternative to unrestrained US domination. In effect, this would be tantamount to getting so much leverage over China that they would drop out of the race, and then hoping that the US government would use its advantage to push for safety, instead of using it in some other way.
However, imho this is a plan that should be pursued as a first option only in circumstances where you are really confident it’ll work, since the consequences of trying and failing are likely to be dire, as per my original post. And I am not confident it will work.
A much better order of operations would be to 1) try to negotiate with China to establish an international regulatory framework (plan A), with export control and other stuff being imposed as something that is explicitly linked to China not agreeing to that framework, in the same way sanctions on Russia are imposed explicitly because its aggression against Ukraine, and 2) only if they refuse, try to crush them (plan B).
When political will in the US to try for plan A is lacking, I think waiting until circumstances make that plan realistic while preparing the groundwork for it is a better strategy than going straight ahead for plan B.
A much better order of operations would be to 1) try to negotiate with China to establish an international regulatory framework (plan A), with export control and other stuff being imposed as something that is explicitly linked to China not agreeing to that framework, in the same way sanctions on Russia are imposed explicitly because its aggression against Ukraine, and 2) only if they refuse, try to crush them (plan B).
Maybe if you are President of the United States you can first try the one thing, and then the other. But from the perspective of an individual, you have to assume there’s some probability of each of these plans (and other strategies) being executed, and that everything will be really messy (e.g., different actors having different strategies in mind, even within the US). Softening export controls seems like something you could do as part of executing Plan A, but as I mentioned above, it’s very unclear to me whether unilaterally doing so makes Plan A more likely to be the chosen strategy, and it does likely make Plan B and Plan C go worse.
When political will in the US to try for plan A is lacking, I think waiting until circumstances make that plan realistic while preparing the groundwork for it is a better strategy than going straight ahead for plan B.
I think you’re thinking people have more control over which strategy is adopted than I think they do? Or, what circumstances do you have in mind? Because waiting seems pretty costly.
But I think maybe the cruxiest bits are (a) I think export controls seem great in Plan B/C worlds, which seem much likelier than Plan A worlds, and (b) I think unilaterally easing export controls is unlikely to substantially affect the likelihood of Plan A happening (all else equal). It seems like you disagree with both, or at least with (b)?
“But I think maybe the cruxiest bits are (a) I think export controls seem great in Plan B/C worlds, which seem much likelier than Plan A worlds, and (b) I think unilaterally easing export controls is unlikely to substantially affect the likelihood of Plan A happening (all else equal). It seems like you disagree with both, or at least with (b)?”
Yep, this is pretty close to my views. I do disagree with (b), since I am afraid that controls might poison the well for future Plan A negotiations. As for (a), I don’t get how controls help with Plan C, and I don’t think Plan B/C worlds are much more likely than Plan A, as of now. But I do agree with you that controls help with Plan B, so if you see it as the main hope, I understand why you are supporting them.
I think if your sole objective is to enact a bilateral pause, then easing export controls may be the best option, or maybe not. It’s pretty unclear to me how that shakes out, I could definitely also see unilateral concessions as being quite detrimental (for reasons similar to those Peter mention in the other comment).
But I would guess most of the people you are responding to think enacting a cooperative pause is some combination of very unlikely and/or undesirable, and also that export controls help a lot in the absence of such an agreement. The main way export controls help for other plans are by giving the US more slack to (one can hope) spend on safety, and/or because superintelligence developed in the US would imo likely be safer (cf. this comment), and/or because imo US values are better, and this would likely be reflected in the AIs (cf. Claude versus Grok).
Thx for your perspective; I should be upfront that my confidence in my own case is far from ironclad. Anyway.
From the ryan_greenblatt’s article you’ve linked, I think safety plan A, based on achieving international agreement, should be tried before going for plan B, based on achieving and using a secure US lead, while in “plans” C and D it doesn’t matter whether the leading company is American or Chinese, so slowing down Chinese development is useless for those “plans” (they are in fact more like scenarios than real plans).
I do agree that the US political system is in an important sense better than the Chinese political system, but my prior is that if superintelligence is developed before, let’s say, 2050 (and that is very optimistic), it is likely to go badly completely regardless of which country it’ll come from.
I take your point about slack being potentially useful. Theoretically, I can imagine the following sequence of events: a) the US AI industry crushes Chinese competition, then b) the US government, feeling secure in the US lead, imposes sensible safety regulation on companies. If it were smart about it, it would at the same time propose an international regulatory framework that the rest of the world would be prepared to sign on to, as an alternative to unrestrained US domination. In effect, this would be tantamount to getting so much leverage over China that they would drop out of the race, and then hoping that the US government would use its advantage to push for safety, instead of using it in some other way.
However, imho this is a plan that should be pursued as a first option only in circumstances where you are really confident it’ll work, since the consequences of trying and failing are likely to be dire, as per my original post. And I am not confident it will work.
A much better order of operations would be to 1) try to negotiate with China to establish an international regulatory framework (plan A), with export control and other stuff being imposed as something that is explicitly linked to China not agreeing to that framework, in the same way sanctions on Russia are imposed explicitly because its aggression against Ukraine, and 2) only if they refuse, try to crush them (plan B).
When political will in the US to try for plan A is lacking, I think waiting until circumstances make that plan realistic while preparing the groundwork for it is a better strategy than going straight ahead for plan B.
Maybe if you are President of the United States you can first try the one thing, and then the other. But from the perspective of an individual, you have to assume there’s some probability of each of these plans (and other strategies) being executed, and that everything will be really messy (e.g., different actors having different strategies in mind, even within the US). Softening export controls seems like something you could do as part of executing Plan A, but as I mentioned above, it’s very unclear to me whether unilaterally doing so makes Plan A more likely to be the chosen strategy, and it does likely make Plan B and Plan C go worse.
I think you’re thinking people have more control over which strategy is adopted than I think they do? Or, what circumstances do you have in mind? Because waiting seems pretty costly.
But I think maybe the cruxiest bits are (a) I think export controls seem great in Plan B/C worlds, which seem much likelier than Plan A worlds, and (b) I think unilaterally easing export controls is unlikely to substantially affect the likelihood of Plan A happening (all else equal). It seems like you disagree with both, or at least with (b)?
“But I think maybe the cruxiest bits are (a) I think export controls seem great in Plan B/C worlds, which seem much likelier than Plan A worlds, and (b) I think unilaterally easing export controls is unlikely to substantially affect the likelihood of Plan A happening (all else equal). It seems like you disagree with both, or at least with (b)?”
Yep, this is pretty close to my views. I do disagree with (b), since I am afraid that controls might poison the well for future Plan A negotiations. As for (a), I don’t get how controls help with Plan C, and I don’t think Plan B/C worlds are much more likely than Plan A, as of now. But I do agree with you that controls help with Plan B, so if you see it as the main hope, I understand why you are supporting them.
(btw. how does one do a proper blockqoute here?)