I think there is one argument I really want to back, but I also want to provide a different angle: “Growing the political capital of AGI-concerned people”
I think that even when you think there are substantial odds that the EU doesn’t play an important role in regulation of AGI, having political capital could still be useful for other (tech-related) topics. Quite often I think there is a “halo-effect” related to being perceived as an tech-expert in government. That means that if you are perceived as a tech expert in government because you know a lot about AI, people will also perceive you as an expert on other technologies (where the EU might be more relevant).
This is also one of the reasons that I advise people to work in AI/tech regulation, even when it’s not (solely) on the long term consequences of AI we care about, but e.g. on short term risks or even more on the side of economic stimulus of AI development. Often it will provide EAs with the political capital and credibility to deal with long term / x-risk relevant risks later on when there is an opportunity to switch roles.
If you believe however that the EU becomes irrelevant at all (argument 5 against), all policy careers for EAs in mainland Europe become quite unappealing suddenly. This makes me think: if you believe the EU market and political environment favor AGI safety (argument 4 in favor), shouldn’t it be a priority for European EAs to keep the EU a relevant political force?
I think that’s a very indirect intervention whose cost-effectiveness is probably lower than many other priorities (given the political forces and the many other stakeholders’ strong interests, neglectedness is quite low) - but maybe I am missing something? It sounds definitely relevant as a “byproduct” of one’s career though. Would it therefore be a good principle to, ceteris paribus, push for the intervention that strengthen the EU, while working on one’s own priority?
Agreed on the halo-effect, but besides one’s prestige, I think one’s region-specific knowledge and network matter a lot and does not transfer. As a result, if the EU is less relevant, building up prestige in the EU might not be as efficient as building up prestige in China or the US, given that in parallel you’d be developing a network and region-specific knowledge that will be more helpful to be impactful overall.
(That being said, even though I wanted to avoid anchoring the reader by expressing my opinion in the post, I expect the EU to be most relevant right now for AGI governance given the institutional precedents it sets. I believe the lack of investment in EA time & money there is an unfortunate mistake. So the “if the EU is less relevant” scenario should be disregarded in my opinion.)
I think there is one argument I really want to back, but I also want to provide a different angle: “Growing the political capital of AGI-concerned people”
I think that even when you think there are substantial odds that the EU doesn’t play an important role in regulation of AGI, having political capital could still be useful for other (tech-related) topics. Quite often I think there is a “halo-effect” related to being perceived as an tech-expert in government. That means that if you are perceived as a tech expert in government because you know a lot about AI, people will also perceive you as an expert on other technologies (where the EU might be more relevant).
This is also one of the reasons that I advise people to work in AI/tech regulation, even when it’s not (solely) on the long term consequences of AI we care about, but e.g. on short term risks or even more on the side of economic stimulus of AI development. Often it will provide EAs with the political capital and credibility to deal with long term / x-risk relevant risks later on when there is an opportunity to switch roles.
If you believe however that the EU becomes irrelevant at all (argument 5 against), all policy careers for EAs in mainland Europe become quite unappealing suddenly. This makes me think: if you believe the EU market and political environment favor AGI safety (argument 4 in favor), shouldn’t it be a priority for European EAs to keep the EU a relevant political force?
I think that’s a very indirect intervention whose cost-effectiveness is probably lower than many other priorities (given the political forces and the many other stakeholders’ strong interests, neglectedness is quite low) - but maybe I am missing something? It sounds definitely relevant as a “byproduct” of one’s career though. Would it therefore be a good principle to, ceteris paribus, push for the intervention that strengthen the EU, while working on one’s own priority?
Agreed on the halo-effect, but besides one’s prestige, I think one’s region-specific knowledge and network matter a lot and does not transfer. As a result, if the EU is less relevant, building up prestige in the EU might not be as efficient as building up prestige in China or the US, given that in parallel you’d be developing a network and region-specific knowledge that will be more helpful to be impactful overall.
(That being said, even though I wanted to avoid anchoring the reader by expressing my opinion in the post, I expect the EU to be most relevant right now for AGI governance given the institutional precedents it sets. I believe the lack of investment in EA time & money there is an unfortunate mistake. So the “if the EU is less relevant” scenario should be disregarded in my opinion.)