You said “Ruling out Z first seems more plausible, as Z negatively affects the present people, even quite strongly so compared to A and A+.” The same argument would support 1 over 2.
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
Then you said “Ruling out A+ is only motivated by an arbitrary-seeming decision to compare just A+ and Z first, merely because they have the same population size (...so what?).” Similarly, I could say “Picking 2 is only motivated by an arbitrary decision to compare contingent people, merely because there’s a minimum number of contingent people across outcomes (… so what?)”
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people. Since in both cases not creating anyone is not an option. Unlike in Huemer’s three choice case where A is an option.
I think ignoring irrelevant alternatives has some independent appeal.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. The paradox arises because we seem to have a cycle of binary comparisons: A+ is better than A, Z is better than A+, A is better than Z. The issue here seems to be that this assumes we can just break down a three option comparison into three binary comparisons. Which is arguably false, since it can lead to cycles. And when we want to avoid cycles while keeping binary comparisons, we have to assume we do some of the binary choices “first” and thereby rule out one of the remaining ones, removing the cycle. So we need either a principled way of deciding on the “evaluation order” of the binary comparisons, or reject the assumption that “x compared to y” is necessarily the same as “x compared y, given z”. If the latter removes the cycle, that is.
Another case where IIA leads to an absurd result is preference aggregation. Assume three equally sized groups (1, 2, 3) have these individual preferences:
x≻y≻z
y≻z≻x
z≻x≻y
The obvious and obviously only correct aggregation would be x∼y∼z, i.e. indifference between the three options. Which is different from what would happen if you’d take out either one of three options and make it a binary choice, since each binary choice has a majority. So the “irrelevant” alternatives are not actually irrelevant, since they can determine a choice relevant global property like a cycle. So IIA is false, since it would lead to a cycle. This seems not unlike the cycle we get in the repugnant conclusion paradox, although there the solution is arguably not that all three options are equally good.
There are some “more objective” facts about axiology or what we should do that don’t depend on who presently, actually or across all outcomes necessarily exists (or even wide versions of this). What we should do is first constrained by these “more objective” facts. Hence something like step 1.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first. As I said, this is the strategy of solving three choices with binary comparisons, but in a particular order, so that we end up with two total comparisons instead of three, since we rule out one option early. The question is why doing this or that binary comparison first, rather than another one, would be better. If we insist on comparing A and Z first, we would obviously rule out Z first, so we end up only comparing A and A+, while the comparison A+ and Z is never made.
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are “unfair” to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think you’d want to adjust your argument, replacing “present” with something like “the minimum number of contingent people” (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of “ethics being about affecting persons”. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasgupta’s approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people.
But it’s not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. They’d have no grounds for complaint. If you can’t tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. ”… so what?”)
Stepping back, I’m not saying that wide views are wrong. I’m sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasgupta’s view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the “extra” persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. (...)
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do what’s best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including “irrelevant options”, then you’re close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasgupta’s view does in the first step.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first.
It is constrained by “more objective” impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems you’re being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
I’m not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but it’s one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you don’t find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
We’d still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we can’t infer much from it.
Well, there is a necessary number of “contingent people”, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people. Since in both cases not creating anyone is not an option. Unlike in Huemer’s three choice case where A is an option.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. The paradox arises because we seem to have a cycle of binary comparisons: A+ is better than A, Z is better than A+, A is better than Z. The issue here seems to be that this assumes we can just break down a three option comparison into three binary comparisons. Which is arguably false, since it can lead to cycles. And when we want to avoid cycles while keeping binary comparisons, we have to assume we do some of the binary choices “first” and thereby rule out one of the remaining ones, removing the cycle. So we need either a principled way of deciding on the “evaluation order” of the binary comparisons, or reject the assumption that “x compared to y” is necessarily the same as “x compared y, given z”. If the latter removes the cycle, that is.
Another case where IIA leads to an absurd result is preference aggregation. Assume three equally sized groups (1, 2, 3) have these individual preferences:
x≻y≻z
y≻z≻x
z≻x≻y
The obvious and obviously only correct aggregation would be x∼y∼z, i.e. indifference between the three options. Which is different from what would happen if you’d take out either one of three options and make it a binary choice, since each binary choice has a majority. So the “irrelevant” alternatives are not actually irrelevant, since they can determine a choice relevant global property like a cycle. So IIA is false, since it would lead to a cycle. This seems not unlike the cycle we get in the repugnant conclusion paradox, although there the solution is arguably not that all three options are equally good.
I don’t see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first. As I said, this is the strategy of solving three choices with binary comparisons, but in a particular order, so that we end up with two total comparisons instead of three, since we rule out one option early. The question is why doing this or that binary comparison first, rather than another one, would be better. If we insist on comparing A and Z first, we would obviously rule out Z first, so we end up only comparing A and A+, while the comparison A+ and Z is never made.
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are “unfair” to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think you’d want to adjust your argument, replacing “present” with something like “the minimum number of contingent people” (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of “ethics being about affecting persons”. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasgupta’s approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
But it’s not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. They’d have no grounds for complaint. If you can’t tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. ”… so what?”)
Stepping back, I’m not saying that wide views are wrong. I’m sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasgupta’s view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the “extra” persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do what’s best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including “irrelevant options”, then you’re close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasgupta’s view does in the first step.
Or we can just accept cycles.[1]
It is constrained by “more objective” impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems you’re being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
I’m not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but it’s one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you don’t find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
We’d still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
Or rejecting full aggregation, or aggregating in different ways, but we can consider other thought experiments for those possibilities.