Granted, but this example presents just a binary choice, with none of the added complexity of choosing between three options, so we canāt infer much from it.
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are āunfairā to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think youād want to adjust your argument, replacing āpresentā with something like āthe minimum number of contingent peopleā (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of āethics being about affecting personsā. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasguptaās approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
Well, there is a necessary number of ācontingent peopleā, which seems similar to having necessary (identical) people.
But itās not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. Theyād have no grounds for complaint. If you canāt tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. āā¦ so what?ā)
Stepping back, Iām not saying that wide views are wrong. Iām sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasguptaās view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the āextraā persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think there is a quite straightforward argument why IIA is false. (...)
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do whatās best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including āirrelevant optionsā, then youāre close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasguptaās view does in the first step.
I donāt see why this would be better than doing other comparisons first.
It is constrained by āmore objectiveā impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems youāre being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
Iām not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but itās one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you donāt find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
Weād still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
I can add any number of other options, as long as they respect the premises of your argument and are āunfairā to the necessary number of contingent people. What specific added complexity matters here and why?
I think youād want to adjust your argument, replacing āpresentā with something like āthe minimum number of contingent peopleā (and decide how to match counterparts if there are different numbers of contingent people). But this is moving to a less strict interpretation of āethics being about affecting personsā. And then I could make your original complaint here against Dasguptaās approach against the less strict wide interpretation.
But itās not the same, and we can argue against it on a stricter interpretation. The difference seems significant, too: no specific contingent person is or would be made worse off. Theyād have no grounds for complaint. If you canāt tell me for whom the outcome is worse, why should I care? (And then I can just deny each reason you give as not in line with my intuitions, e.g. āā¦ so what?ā)
Stepping back, Iām not saying that wide views are wrong. Iām sympathetic to them. I also have some sympathy for (asymmetric) narrow views for roughly the reasons I just gave. My point is that your argument or the way you argued could prove too much if taken to be a very strong argument. You criticize Dasguptaās view from a stricter interpretation, but we can also criticize wide views from a stricter interpretation.
I could also criticize presentism, necessitarianism and wide necessitarianism for being insensitive to the differences between A+ and Z for persons affected. The choice between A, A+ and Z is not just a choice between A and A+ or between A and Z. Between A+ and Z, the āextraā persons exist in both and are affected, even if A is available.
I think these are okay arguments, but IIA still has independent appeal, and here you need a specific argument for why Z vs A+ depends on the availability of A. If the argument is that we should do whatās best for necessary people (or necessary people + necessary number of contingents and resolving how to match counterparts), where the latter is defined relative to the set of available options, including āirrelevant optionsā, then youāre close to assuming IIA is false, rather than defending it. Why should we define that relative to the option set?
And there are also other resolutions compatible with IIA. We can revise our intuitions about some of the binary choices, possibly to incomparability, which is what Dasguptaās view does in the first step.
Or we can just accept cycles.[1]
It is constrained by āmore objectiveā impartial facts. Going straight for necessitarianism first seems too partial, and unfair in other ways (prioritarian, egalitarian, most plausible impartial standards). If you totally ignore the differences in welfare for the extra people between A+ and Z (not just outweighed, but taken to be irrelevant) when A is available, it seems youāre being infinitely partial to the necessary people.[2] Impartiality is somewhat more important to me than my person-affecting intuitions here.
Iām not saying this is a decisive argument or that there is any, but itās one that appeals to my intuitions. If your person-affecting intuitions are more important or you donāt find necessitarianism or whatever objectionably partial, then you could be more inclined to compare another way.
Weād still have to make choices in practice, though, and a systematic procedure would violate a choice-based version of IIA (whichever we choose in the 3-option case of A, A+, Z would not be chosen in binary choice with one of the available options).
Or rejecting full aggregation, or aggregating in different ways, but we can consider other thought experiments for those possibilities.