Great work! In addition to providing a useful path forward for future work in this field, this shows the usefulness of applying EA frameworks to policy problems like nuclear risk management.
Of the eight explanations you list, I worry most about number 5. You write that “For example, a funder might believe that nuclear war, once begun, is almost certain to escalate to all-out war”. I don’t think you have to believe that escalation is almost certain, but instead just that the amount of escalation is unaffectable by philanthropists. This is at least plausible to me given that we know decision-makers struggle to control escalation once a war has started. I also think there are way fewer leverage points once a war has started as decision-making becomes more centralized, politicized, and stakesier.
That said, of course I think this is a useful direction to explore. I’ll be interested to see if you find funding opportunities other than research on effects of war and nuclear winter!
Thanks for the kind comment, Stephen! You’re right I phrased that wrong—it is about tractability, not probability. I agree with you that the tractability of escalation control is probably the biggest issue here, but I also think we should expect low-hanging fruit given the relative neglectedness. There are a couple of concrete projects that I am/would be be excited about:
Escalation management with North Korea -- How can we keep nuclear war limited with North Korea? As I understand it, the problem of deterrence after DPRK first use has gotten relatively little attention, despite its relevance to U.S.-China conflict. A project to study this and help the U.S. and China find guardrails, CBMs, etc. to work on this seems especially valuable. The broader class of interventions here is something like “keeping ‘smaller’ nuclear wars geographically and politically limited”;
Intrawar crisis communications projects—especially understanding China’s attitude to crisis communications. How can states better communicate the desire to terminate a war and the terms of peace once nuclear war has broken out?
Three-body escalation control—Like you, I’m concerned about a future where China has a much larger arsenal (see China Military Power Report), and the fact that U.S. planners have barely begun to think about the “nuclear three body problem” with China and Russia. A large-scale project that seeks to better understand these dynamics and what, if any, of the game theory from the Cold War applies to three-way escalation control, how different theories of limited war might interact, etc. would be valuable.
Great work! In addition to providing a useful path forward for future work in this field, this shows the usefulness of applying EA frameworks to policy problems like nuclear risk management.
Of the eight explanations you list, I worry most about number 5. You write that “For example, a funder might believe that nuclear war, once begun, is almost certain to escalate to all-out war”. I don’t think you have to believe that escalation is almost certain, but instead just that the amount of escalation is unaffectable by philanthropists. This is at least plausible to me given that we know decision-makers struggle to control escalation once a war has started. I also think there are way fewer leverage points once a war has started as decision-making becomes more centralized, politicized, and stakesier.
That said, of course I think this is a useful direction to explore. I’ll be interested to see if you find funding opportunities other than research on effects of war and nuclear winter!
Thanks for the kind comment, Stephen! You’re right I phrased that wrong—it is about tractability, not probability. I agree with you that the tractability of escalation control is probably the biggest issue here, but I also think we should expect low-hanging fruit given the relative neglectedness. There are a couple of concrete projects that I am/would be be excited about:
Escalation management with North Korea -- How can we keep nuclear war limited with North Korea? As I understand it, the problem of deterrence after DPRK first use has gotten relatively little attention, despite its relevance to U.S.-China conflict. A project to study this and help the U.S. and China find guardrails, CBMs, etc. to work on this seems especially valuable. The broader class of interventions here is something like “keeping ‘smaller’ nuclear wars geographically and politically limited”;
Intrawar crisis communications projects—especially understanding China’s attitude to crisis communications. How can states better communicate the desire to terminate a war and the terms of peace once nuclear war has broken out?
Three-body escalation control—Like you, I’m concerned about a future where China has a much larger arsenal (see China Military Power Report), and the fact that U.S. planners have barely begun to think about the “nuclear three body problem” with China and Russia. A large-scale project that seeks to better understand these dynamics and what, if any, of the game theory from the Cold War applies to three-way escalation control, how different theories of limited war might interact, etc. would be valuable.