If you think fetuses are not of moral concern but grown persons are, then abortion is just birth control, and embryo selection affects the full life of a moral patient (because presumably the fetus will be born and become one).
I disagree on both counts, the first because while I am pro-choice, I think fetuses are worthy of moral concern by some point in pregnancy, and on embryo selection I think the non-identity problem bites and most attempts to rescue a more restrictive reproductive ethics based on things like intention and relationship violation are not well argued. Still, I kind of think some of the explanations on this page for surprising answers are kind of some version of “bioethicists are probably cartoonishly woke in some way”, rather than stepping back and thinking through the practical differences at play, and I would just caution people about that.
I don’t think the distinction you are making works, because then the decision to not abort for non-medical reasons would be impermissible, since it affects the full life of a moral patient. Yet I highly doubt that bio-ethicists believe that, while you are allowed to abort a child for ~ any reason, you are not allowed to choose to not abort them.
Perhaps I have done a poor job of getting across my objection here, so here is a short dialog to demonstrate what I see as the absurdity:
Bioethicist lab tech: Good news! We managed to fertilize six healthy embryos for you. I have their genetic results right here.
Jane: Awesome! Does it say if they have blue or brown eyes?
Bioethicist lab tech: Sure does; one has blue eyes, five have brown eyes.
Jane: Great, lets go with the blue eyed one.
Bioethicist lab tech: Sorry, I can’t let you do that. It’s immoral. Bioethicists say so.
Jane: Why?
Bioethicist lab tech: Because choosing would affect the blue eyed child.
Jane: It seems like they would probably be happy with the outcome since it would mean they get to live a happy life… please can you make an exception?
Bioethicist lab tech: I can’t do that… but, psst—there is a loophole. After you get an embryo implanted, you can get another genetic test done, and then abort them if they’re the wrong eye colour.
Jane: Urgh, that sounds gruesome!
Bioethicist lab tech: Don’t be so dramatic. Once they’re inside you, it’s just birth control.
Jane: Wait, you said choosing an embryo in vitro would be bad because it would affect the child… surely aborting them would also affect them?
Bioethicist lab tech: That’s a misconception common among those who haven’t studied bioethics. Actually, once they’re dead, they can’t be affected, simple as.
Jane: I’m not sure I follow but lets keep going. Then you’d implant the blue eyed one next?
Bioethicist lab tech: Nahh, you might have to do this several times.
Jane: What? I might have to have five abortions according to this absurd scheme? Doesn’t this seem like unnecessary medical procedures with the potential for side effects?
Bioethicist lab tech: Potentially. Also, you’ll have to wait till you get the genetic testing each time to see the eye colour, because I can’t officially tell you which one I chose—that would be too close to embryo selection, regulations don’t allow it.
Jane: That’s crazy! Surely the later in pregnancy, the worse abortion is for the baby?
Bioethicist lab tech: Oh no, it’s permissible at any point. Even if the fetus can feel pain it’s not a person, doesn’t matter one bit, no need for anesthesia. You can get rid of them at any point from week zero to week 40
Jane: Can I get rid of it before week zero?
Bioethicist lab tech: No, are you some kind of monster? That would affect the future person. You have to wait till they’re implanted. Then they’re no longer a future person, just an inconvenience.
I think basically all bioethicists who answered this combination will say that the “loophole” you discovered counts as the same category as embryo selection morally. True it is a version of having an abortion, but it isn’t the central case that the question “is it permissible to have an abortion” brings to mind, and these questions don’t provide fine-grained enough possible answers to nuance your view. Again I think this style of response fails anyway, but it’s difficult to produce a theory that doesn’t involve cramming these different decisions into categories based on things like intention more than the specific range of outcomes without implying funny things in cases like “is it okay to not have a child at all” and “is it okay to select for limblessness in embryos”.
True it is a version of having an abortion, but it isn’t the central case that the question “is it permissible to have an abortion” brings to mind,
I disagree completely. Using abortion to get rid of daughters and preferentially have sons is a major issue in India and some other countries, and presumably sex counts as a non-medical criteria here. I’m just using the first google hit as a source, but it seems the availability of prenatal sex screening was followed by major changes in the sex ratios in India:
Anecdotes in the article support the view that this was caused by sex-selective abortion, and this was the primary thing abortion was used for:
First amniocentesis in the 1970s and later chorionic villus sampling in the 1980s were openly advertised and extensively used in urban areas for sex-selective abortions.24 The effect became soon apparent. One of the earliest studies on the result of amniocentesis was carried out over a 12-month period, 1976–1977, in an urban hospital; 96% of the girls (430/450) were aborted, whereas all 250 boys, even with the risk of a genetic defect, were born.17 Results from an abortion center in Mumbai showed that almost 100% of the 15,914 abortions carried out following sex determination during 1984–1985 were of females. Another study of 6 city hospitals in Mumbai reported in 1988 found that 7,999 of the 8,000 aborted fetuses were girls.7 Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling require qualified medical and laboratory staff and expensive equipment and were, therefore, available mostly to the affluent and the well-informed part of the population in the cities.
You might be right that this is not a cognitively prominent example for most westerners, but if you are an expert on the subject you should be well aware of it. The question asked is fine grained enough to express your view—if you think it is sometimes or often morally acceptable but not in some major categories like this, you can simply select one of the intermediate responses, rather than going for the extreme one. It’s not like the non-medical-criteria selection question is the only other question conflicting with their abortion response.
I suspect you might be right, and many bioethicists would in fact disapprove of aborting people just because they’re girls. But this gets back to my original point—they are answering the abortion question in a political manner, rather than based on their actual substantive moral commitments as exposed by the less politically charged questions.
I guess to elaborate a bit: The non-identity problem means that even choices that intuitively seem very morally dire when it comes to the kind of life you give your child can turn out to be morally neutral if the choice simultaneously changes the identity of the child you bring into existence. Because the results of biting the bullet on this seem so absurd to so many people, most papers in reproductive ethics kind of treat all choices about which child you bring into existence as though they are instead choices being made for the life of a single child. The reasons given vary a good deal, and there is more consensus that this is how you ought to treat these cases than why.
This seems very simple to me:
If you think fetuses are not of moral concern but grown persons are, then abortion is just birth control, and embryo selection affects the full life of a moral patient (because presumably the fetus will be born and become one).
I disagree on both counts, the first because while I am pro-choice, I think fetuses are worthy of moral concern by some point in pregnancy, and on embryo selection I think the non-identity problem bites and most attempts to rescue a more restrictive reproductive ethics based on things like intention and relationship violation are not well argued. Still, I kind of think some of the explanations on this page for surprising answers are kind of some version of “bioethicists are probably cartoonishly woke in some way”, rather than stepping back and thinking through the practical differences at play, and I would just caution people about that.
I don’t think the distinction you are making works, because then the decision to not abort for non-medical reasons would be impermissible, since it affects the full life of a moral patient. Yet I highly doubt that bio-ethicists believe that, while you are allowed to abort a child for ~ any reason, you are not allowed to choose to not abort them.
Perhaps I have done a poor job of getting across my objection here, so here is a short dialog to demonstrate what I see as the absurdity:
Bioethicist lab tech: Good news! We managed to fertilize six healthy embryos for you. I have their genetic results right here.
Jane: Awesome! Does it say if they have blue or brown eyes?
Bioethicist lab tech: Sure does; one has blue eyes, five have brown eyes.
Jane: Great, lets go with the blue eyed one.
Bioethicist lab tech: Sorry, I can’t let you do that. It’s immoral. Bioethicists say so.
Jane: Why?
Bioethicist lab tech: Because choosing would affect the blue eyed child.
Jane: It seems like they would probably be happy with the outcome since it would mean they get to live a happy life… please can you make an exception?
Bioethicist lab tech: I can’t do that… but, psst—there is a loophole. After you get an embryo implanted, you can get another genetic test done, and then abort them if they’re the wrong eye colour.
Jane: Urgh, that sounds gruesome!
Bioethicist lab tech: Don’t be so dramatic. Once they’re inside you, it’s just birth control.
Jane: Wait, you said choosing an embryo in vitro would be bad because it would affect the child… surely aborting them would also affect them?
Bioethicist lab tech: That’s a misconception common among those who haven’t studied bioethics. Actually, once they’re dead, they can’t be affected, simple as.
Jane: I’m not sure I follow but lets keep going. Then you’d implant the blue eyed one next?
Bioethicist lab tech: Nahh, you might have to do this several times.
Jane: What? I might have to have five abortions according to this absurd scheme? Doesn’t this seem like unnecessary medical procedures with the potential for side effects?
Bioethicist lab tech: Potentially. Also, you’ll have to wait till you get the genetic testing each time to see the eye colour, because I can’t officially tell you which one I chose—that would be too close to embryo selection, regulations don’t allow it.
Jane: That’s crazy! Surely the later in pregnancy, the worse abortion is for the baby?
Bioethicist lab tech: Oh no, it’s permissible at any point. Even if the fetus can feel pain it’s not a person, doesn’t matter one bit, no need for anesthesia. You can get rid of them at any point from week zero to week 40
Jane: Can I get rid of it before week zero?
Bioethicist lab tech: No, are you some kind of monster? That would affect the future person. You have to wait till they’re implanted. Then they’re no longer a future person, just an inconvenience.
I think basically all bioethicists who answered this combination will say that the “loophole” you discovered counts as the same category as embryo selection morally. True it is a version of having an abortion, but it isn’t the central case that the question “is it permissible to have an abortion” brings to mind, and these questions don’t provide fine-grained enough possible answers to nuance your view. Again I think this style of response fails anyway, but it’s difficult to produce a theory that doesn’t involve cramming these different decisions into categories based on things like intention more than the specific range of outcomes without implying funny things in cases like “is it okay to not have a child at all” and “is it okay to select for limblessness in embryos”.
I disagree completely. Using abortion to get rid of daughters and preferentially have sons is a major issue in India and some other countries, and presumably sex counts as a non-medical criteria here. I’m just using the first google hit as a source, but it seems the availability of prenatal sex screening was followed by major changes in the sex ratios in India:
Anecdotes in the article support the view that this was caused by sex-selective abortion, and this was the primary thing abortion was used for:
(The second article I found agrees)
You might be right that this is not a cognitively prominent example for most westerners, but if you are an expert on the subject you should be well aware of it. The question asked is fine grained enough to express your view—if you think it is sometimes or often morally acceptable but not in some major categories like this, you can simply select one of the intermediate responses, rather than going for the extreme one. It’s not like the non-medical-criteria selection question is the only other question conflicting with their abortion response.
I suspect you might be right, and many bioethicists would in fact disapprove of aborting people just because they’re girls. But this gets back to my original point—they are answering the abortion question in a political manner, rather than based on their actual substantive moral commitments as exposed by the less politically charged questions.
I’ve been commenting too much on this post so I’m cutting myself off here, but if you want to continue the dialogue in DMs, feel free to message me.
I guess to elaborate a bit: The non-identity problem means that even choices that intuitively seem very morally dire when it comes to the kind of life you give your child can turn out to be morally neutral if the choice simultaneously changes the identity of the child you bring into existence. Because the results of biting the bullet on this seem so absurd to so many people, most papers in reproductive ethics kind of treat all choices about which child you bring into existence as though they are instead choices being made for the life of a single child. The reasons given vary a good deal, and there is more consensus that this is how you ought to treat these cases than why.