Re: #1, the overall distribution of articles on different topics is not particularly impressive. There are other outlets (Brookings, at least) which focus more on global poverty.
I think it is fair to say that several moral theories are concerned with grave injustices such as the current state of racial inequity in the United States. Closing the race-wealth gap will only be a “strange thing to focus on” if you assume, with great confidence, utilitarianism to be true.
I think that arguing from moral theories is not really the right approach here, instead we can focus on the immediate moral issue—whether it is better to help someone merely because they or their ancestors were historically mistreated, holding welfare changes equal. There is a whole debate to be had there, which has plenty of room for eclectic arguments that don’t assume utilitarianism per se.
The idea that it’s not better is consistent with any consequentialism which looks at aggregate welfare rather than group fairness, and some species of nonconsequentialist ethics (there is typically a lot of leeway and vagueness in how these informal ethics are interpreted and applied, and academic philosophers tend to interpret them in ways that reflect their general political and cultural alignment).
I totally agree with you that “unequal racial distribution can have important secondary effects”, and this is why there is a solid case for paying attention to the race-wealth gap, even on utilitarian grounds.
Sure, but practically everything should get attention by this rationale. The real question is—how do we want to frame this stuff? What do we want to implicitly suggest to be the most important thing?
Re: #1, the overall distribution of articles on different topics is not particularly impressive. There are other outlets (Brookings, at least) which focus more on global poverty.
I think that arguing from moral theories is not really the right approach here, instead we can focus on the immediate moral issue—whether it is better to help someone merely because they or their ancestors were historically mistreated, holding welfare changes equal. There is a whole debate to be had there, which has plenty of room for eclectic arguments that don’t assume utilitarianism per se.
The idea that it’s not better is consistent with any consequentialism which looks at aggregate welfare rather than group fairness, and some species of nonconsequentialist ethics (there is typically a lot of leeway and vagueness in how these informal ethics are interpreted and applied, and academic philosophers tend to interpret them in ways that reflect their general political and cultural alignment).
Sure, but practically everything should get attention by this rationale. The real question is—how do we want to frame this stuff? What do we want to implicitly suggest to be the most important thing?