Hi OP! Thanks for writing this up. A few comments on the section about Booker’s policy proposal.
1) I agree that journalists should focus more on poverty alleviation in the poorest parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan African countries. Fortunately, Future Perfect (FP) does cover global poverty reduction efforts much more than most mainstream media outlets. Now, you are right that the piece on Booker’s proposal is part of a tendency for FP to focus more on US politics and US poverty alleviation than most EA organisations. However, I think this approach is justified for (at least) two reasons: a) For the foreseeable future, the US will inevitably spend a lot more on domestic social programs than on foreign aid. Completely neglecting a conversation about how the US should approach social expenditure would, I believe, be a huge foregone opportunity to do a lot of good. Yes, a big part of EA is to figure out which general cause areas that should receive most attention. But I believe that EA is also about figuring out what the best approaches are within different important cause areas, such as poverty in the US. I think that FP doing this is a very good thing. b) Part of the intended audience for FP (rightly) cares a lot about poverty in the US. Covering this issue can be a way of widening the FP audience, thus bringing much-needed attention to other important issues also covered by FP, such as AI safety.
2) I personally agree with the “basic moral imperative to get as many people as possible out of poverty” as you call it. But, without getting deep into normative ethics, I think it is fair to say that several moral theories are concerned with grave injustices such as the current state of racial inequity in the United States. Closing the race-wealth gap will only be a “strange thing to focus on” if you assume, with great confidence, utilitarianism to be true.
3) Even if one assumes utilitarianism to be true, there are solid arguments for focusing on racial inequity in the US. Efforts to support people of colour specifically in the US is not just to “fixate” on an arbitrarily selected race. It is to fixate on a group of people who have been systematically downtrodden for most of US history and who until very recently (if not still) have been discriminated against by the government in ways that have kept them from prospering. (For anyone curious about this claim, I strongly encourage you to read this essay for historical context.) I totally agree with you that “unequal racial distribution can have important secondary effects”, and this is why there is a solid case for paying attention to the race-wealth gap, even on utilitarian grounds. You argue that this “should take a backstage” to general poverty alleviation. I actually agree, and that is also how the EA movement is already acting and prioritising. But ‘taking a backstage’ does not have to (and should not) mean being completely neglected, and I for one really appreciate that FP is applying the methods and concepts of effective altruism to a wider range of issues.
Re: #1, the overall distribution of articles on different topics is not particularly impressive. There are other outlets (Brookings, at least) which focus more on global poverty.
I think it is fair to say that several moral theories are concerned with grave injustices such as the current state of racial inequity in the United States. Closing the race-wealth gap will only be a “strange thing to focus on” if you assume, with great confidence, utilitarianism to be true.
I think that arguing from moral theories is not really the right approach here, instead we can focus on the immediate moral issue—whether it is better to help someone merely because they or their ancestors were historically mistreated, holding welfare changes equal. There is a whole debate to be had there, which has plenty of room for eclectic arguments that don’t assume utilitarianism per se.
The idea that it’s not better is consistent with any consequentialism which looks at aggregate welfare rather than group fairness, and some species of nonconsequentialist ethics (there is typically a lot of leeway and vagueness in how these informal ethics are interpreted and applied, and academic philosophers tend to interpret them in ways that reflect their general political and cultural alignment).
I totally agree with you that “unequal racial distribution can have important secondary effects”, and this is why there is a solid case for paying attention to the race-wealth gap, even on utilitarian grounds.
Sure, but practically everything should get attention by this rationale. The real question is—how do we want to frame this stuff? What do we want to implicitly suggest to be the most important thing?
Hi OP! Thanks for writing this up. A few comments on the section about Booker’s policy proposal.
1) I agree that journalists should focus more on poverty alleviation in the poorest parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan African countries. Fortunately, Future Perfect (FP) does cover global poverty reduction efforts much more than most mainstream media outlets. Now, you are right that the piece on Booker’s proposal is part of a tendency for FP to focus more on US politics and US poverty alleviation than most EA organisations. However, I think this approach is justified for (at least) two reasons: a) For the foreseeable future, the US will inevitably spend a lot more on domestic social programs than on foreign aid. Completely neglecting a conversation about how the US should approach social expenditure would, I believe, be a huge foregone opportunity to do a lot of good. Yes, a big part of EA is to figure out which general cause areas that should receive most attention. But I believe that EA is also about figuring out what the best approaches are within different important cause areas, such as poverty in the US. I think that FP doing this is a very good thing. b) Part of the intended audience for FP (rightly) cares a lot about poverty in the US. Covering this issue can be a way of widening the FP audience, thus bringing much-needed attention to other important issues also covered by FP, such as AI safety.
2) I personally agree with the “basic moral imperative to get as many people as possible out of poverty” as you call it. But, without getting deep into normative ethics, I think it is fair to say that several moral theories are concerned with grave injustices such as the current state of racial inequity in the United States. Closing the race-wealth gap will only be a “strange thing to focus on” if you assume, with great confidence, utilitarianism to be true.
3) Even if one assumes utilitarianism to be true, there are solid arguments for focusing on racial inequity in the US. Efforts to support people of colour specifically in the US is not just to “fixate” on an arbitrarily selected race. It is to fixate on a group of people who have been systematically downtrodden for most of US history and who until very recently (if not still) have been discriminated against by the government in ways that have kept them from prospering. (For anyone curious about this claim, I strongly encourage you to read this essay for historical context.) I totally agree with you that “unequal racial distribution can have important secondary effects”, and this is why there is a solid case for paying attention to the race-wealth gap, even on utilitarian grounds. You argue that this “should take a backstage” to general poverty alleviation. I actually agree, and that is also how the EA movement is already acting and prioritising. But ‘taking a backstage’ does not have to (and should not) mean being completely neglected, and I for one really appreciate that FP is applying the methods and concepts of effective altruism to a wider range of issues.
Cheers! :)
Joshua, former Co-President of Yale EA.
Re: #1, the overall distribution of articles on different topics is not particularly impressive. There are other outlets (Brookings, at least) which focus more on global poverty.
I think that arguing from moral theories is not really the right approach here, instead we can focus on the immediate moral issue—whether it is better to help someone merely because they or their ancestors were historically mistreated, holding welfare changes equal. There is a whole debate to be had there, which has plenty of room for eclectic arguments that don’t assume utilitarianism per se.
The idea that it’s not better is consistent with any consequentialism which looks at aggregate welfare rather than group fairness, and some species of nonconsequentialist ethics (there is typically a lot of leeway and vagueness in how these informal ethics are interpreted and applied, and academic philosophers tend to interpret them in ways that reflect their general political and cultural alignment).
Sure, but practically everything should get attention by this rationale. The real question is—how do we want to frame this stuff? What do we want to implicitly suggest to be the most important thing?