If you mean it is normatively relevant to consequentialists what type of act an act is or what kind of actor is doing it, you are incorrect.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply, but I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply. Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
Seriously, the fact that you can look at someone saying “consequentialists should care less about these rapes because the criminals didn’t intend to break the law” and not laugh them out of the room for the abject idiocy of the claim they made is worrisome to say the least.
His claim above, that I’m addressing, is about the definition of rape (a question which is totally orthogonal to the normative theory of consequentialists/Kantians), not whether consequentialists should “care less [or more]” depending on intent. I don’t have any particular views on the differing definitions of rape, but the claim that intent matters for whether an act is accidentally killing (by giving you a peanut) or murder (by giving you a peanut) or whether or not you are a consequentialist is uncontroversial.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply
You did not do so clearly, since not all moral theories see normativity as purely a matter of evaluating the rightness of actions.
I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good. You also seem to have overlooked the fact that I was talking about consequentialism the moral theory, not the practices of consequentialists, which is what you are talking about.
Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless. If this basic point still eludes your grasp, sorry but I just don’t know what to tell you.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good.
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless.
The claim I make quite clearly (based on this distinction) is that even if intent is not relevant, for the consequentialist, as to the _rightness _of the act, it may still relevant, for the consequentialist, to other questions like what kind of act an act is (e.g. a murder, a rape)
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here, rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
No I’m not, first of all because I have already pointed out that it is entirely false that whether something is rape has to do with intent. Secondly, I’m not “ignoring” your claim, I’m denying that it carries any weight, since my point was that the definition question of whether something is rape doesn’t factor into the consequentialist’s normative considerations.
If you repeat the same thing three times, and each time I tell you “that’s irrelevant, because you’re totally missing the point of what I said,” then in one sense sure I’m ignoring you, in the same sense that I ignore anyone who makes irrelevant points. Just because I haven’t directly told you that the claim is wrong doesn’t mean that your position hasn’t been addressed. Sometimes people just say things that miss the point of the conversation, and this week it’s you.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here,
Why? It’s pretty obvious that what is normatively relevant is, quite simply, relevant. I don’t have to explain why having a reason to do something is relevant in any broader sense. It’s trivially true that normativity encompasses all of our reasons for doing things, and we can’t appeal to anything more basic and foundational than reasons, so whatever grander sense of relevancy you have in mind is nonsensical.
rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
No, I think the burden of argument is on you to tell us why a dispute over definitions, which you’ve already essentially admitted is normatively irrelevant, should concern us.
I not only explicitly distinguished between criteria for rightness (normative) and other evaluations in the first sentence of first my reply, but I pointed out that I had drawn and repeated that explicit distinction in the first two sentences of my second reply. Consequentialists obviously analyse acts (e.g. whether they are rape / murder / making a bank withdrawal) in terms other than whether whether they are utility maximising and they can and do engage in other (moral and non-moral) evaluations (e.g. character evaluations, like that a person is dishonest or viscious or badly motivated).
His claim above, that I’m addressing, is about the definition of rape (a question which is totally orthogonal to the normative theory of consequentialists/Kantians), not whether consequentialists should “care less [or more]” depending on intent. I don’t have any particular views on the differing definitions of rape, but the claim that intent matters for whether an act is accidentally killing (by giving you a peanut) or murder (by giving you a peanut) or whether or not you are a consequentialist is uncontroversial.
You did not do so clearly, since not all moral theories see normativity as purely a matter of evaluating the rightness of actions.
Yes, and I pointed out twice that your repetition of this distinction is just missing the point, so I don’t know why you think that repeating it for a third time without addressing my counterargument is going to do you any good. You also seem to have overlooked the fact that I was talking about consequentialism the moral theory, not the practices of consequentialists, which is what you are talking about.
And, for the third fucking time, these evaluations carry no normative relevance for the consequentialist, so to bring them up here is pointless. If this basic point still eludes your grasp, sorry but I just don’t know what to tell you.
The claim I make quite clearly (based on this distinction) is that even if intent is not relevant, for the consequentialist, as to the _rightness _of the act, it may still relevant, for the consequentialist, to other questions like what kind of act an act is (e.g. a murder, a rape)
You then keep reiterating that it is not normatively relevant, which actually is ignoring my contention, given that I am saying that even if x is not normatively relevant to the consequentialist, it may still be relevant to questions like whether something is a rape.
I don’t know what counter-argument you think I’ve missed, but you need to establish that whether something is part of the consequentialist’s criterion of rightness is relevant here, rather than simply whether something is relevant to whether an act counts as a rape.
No I’m not, first of all because I have already pointed out that it is entirely false that whether something is rape has to do with intent. Secondly, I’m not “ignoring” your claim, I’m denying that it carries any weight, since my point was that the definition question of whether something is rape doesn’t factor into the consequentialist’s normative considerations.
If you repeat the same thing three times, and each time I tell you “that’s irrelevant, because you’re totally missing the point of what I said,” then in one sense sure I’m ignoring you, in the same sense that I ignore anyone who makes irrelevant points. Just because I haven’t directly told you that the claim is wrong doesn’t mean that your position hasn’t been addressed. Sometimes people just say things that miss the point of the conversation, and this week it’s you.
Why? It’s pretty obvious that what is normatively relevant is, quite simply, relevant. I don’t have to explain why having a reason to do something is relevant in any broader sense. It’s trivially true that normativity encompasses all of our reasons for doing things, and we can’t appeal to anything more basic and foundational than reasons, so whatever grander sense of relevancy you have in mind is nonsensical.
No, I think the burden of argument is on you to tell us why a dispute over definitions, which you’ve already essentially admitted is normatively irrelevant, should concern us.