One thing to consider about (2) is that there are also non-consequentialist reasons to treat non-human animals better than we treat humans (relative to their interests). As one example, because humans have long treated animals unjustly, reasons of reciprocity require us to discount human interests relative to theirs. So that might push the opposite way as discounting animal interests due to moral uncertainty.
″ I think it’s quite plausible that common non-consequentialist positions would support much stronger stances on non-human animals, for example, because they object to acts that constitute active harm and oppression of innocent victims etc. It’s at least partly for this reason that some animal advocates have taken to self-consciously employing deontological criticisms of non-human animal suffering, that they ostensibly don’t themselves believe to be true, as I understand it. ”
One thing to consider about (2) is that there are also non-consequentialist reasons to treat non-human animals better than we treat humans (relative to their interests). As one example, because humans have long treated animals unjustly, reasons of reciprocity require us to discount human interests relative to theirs. So that might push the opposite way as discounting animal interests due to moral uncertainty.
David Moss also mentions this in the Facebook thread:
″ I think it’s quite plausible that common non-consequentialist positions would support much stronger stances on non-human animals, for example, because they object to acts that constitute active harm and oppression of innocent victims etc. It’s at least partly for this reason that some animal advocates have taken to self-consciously employing deontological criticisms of non-human animal suffering, that they ostensibly don’t themselves believe to be true, as I understand it. ”