″ I think it’s quite plausible that common non-consequentialist positions would support much stronger stances on non-human animals, for example, because they object to acts that constitute active harm and oppression of innocent victims etc. It’s at least partly for this reason that some animal advocates have taken to self-consciously employing deontological criticisms of non-human animal suffering, that they ostensibly don’t themselves believe to be true, as I understand it. ”
David Moss also mentions this in the Facebook thread:
″ I think it’s quite plausible that common non-consequentialist positions would support much stronger stances on non-human animals, for example, because they object to acts that constitute active harm and oppression of innocent victims etc. It’s at least partly for this reason that some animal advocates have taken to self-consciously employing deontological criticisms of non-human animal suffering, that they ostensibly don’t themselves believe to be true, as I understand it. ”