I haven’t had the opportunity to read his book yet, but I’d love to. I don’t have strong opinions on this matter. Bob has studied this so much more than what I’ve been able to read so far. Same goes for your estimates. Here are some thoughts that you can take with a grain of salt:
I’d endorse the fact that sentience (which is necessary for welfare) is an emerging phenomenon, so there is some sort of limit under which an animal is simply not sentient at all, and above which we can consider sentience is present (eventhough the welfare range could be way smaller); and we cannot consider a “neuron” as a fixed parameter, especially for lower invertebrates (see for example this). I currently think that sentience is only possible in bilaterians (I thus exclude sponges and cnidarians, notably), though many are probably not. I think p(sentience) for soil animals is far from negligeable, but I have no idea how welfare compares, and I would not base my estimates on their number of neurons (although it might be a good enough proxy for larger animals).
At the end, the main idea that I wanted this report to portray is that research looking for welfare ranges will look almost exactly the same as research looking for sentience markers, as they are very closely linked (although sentience criteria are more pain-centric while welfare ranges might include more positively-valenced markers, as discussed in the report). So, whatever our current “place-holder” estimates are for sentience or welfare in shrimps, more research will most likely answer both :)
I would not base my estimates on their number of neurons (although it might be a good enough proxy for larger animals).
The graph below illustrates that “individual number of neurons”^0.188 explains pretty well the estimates for the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob’s book. I also do not think the specific proxy matters that much. In allometry, “the study of the relationship of body size to shape,[1]anatomy, physiology and behaviour”, “The relationship between the two measured quantities is often expressed as a power law equation (allometric equation)”. If the sentience-adjusted welfare range is proportional to “proxy 1“^”exponent 1”, and “proxy 1” is proportional to “proxy 2“^”exponent 2”, the sentience-adjusted welfare range is proportional to “proxy 1”^(“exponent 1“*”exponent 2”). So the results for “proxy 1” and exponent “exponent 1“*”exponent 2” are the same as those for “proxy 2” and “exponent 2″.
whatever our current “place-holder” estimates are for sentience or welfare in shrimps, more research will most likely answer both
I very much agree. On the other hand, I think research on sentience criteria mostly decreases the uncertainty about anatomy and behaviour, and I believe there is way more uncertainty in how to go from those to quantitative comparisons of welfare across species.
I haven’t had the opportunity to read his book yet, but I’d love to. I don’t have strong opinions on this matter. Bob has studied this so much more than what I’ve been able to read so far. Same goes for your estimates. Here are some thoughts that you can take with a grain of salt:
I’d endorse the fact that sentience (which is necessary for welfare) is an emerging phenomenon, so there is some sort of limit under which an animal is simply not sentient at all, and above which we can consider sentience is present (eventhough the welfare range could be way smaller); and we cannot consider a “neuron” as a fixed parameter, especially for lower invertebrates (see for example this). I currently think that sentience is only possible in bilaterians (I thus exclude sponges and cnidarians, notably), though many are probably not. I think p(sentience) for soil animals is far from negligeable, but I have no idea how welfare compares, and I would not base my estimates on their number of neurons (although it might be a good enough proxy for larger animals).
At the end, the main idea that I wanted this report to portray is that research looking for welfare ranges will look almost exactly the same as research looking for sentience markers, as they are very closely linked (although sentience criteria are more pain-centric while welfare ranges might include more positively-valenced markers, as discussed in the report). So, whatever our current “place-holder” estimates are for sentience or welfare in shrimps, more research will most likely answer both :)
Thanks for suggesting other funds!
Thanks for the quick thoughts, Guillaume.
The graph below illustrates that “individual number of neurons”^0.188 explains pretty well the estimates for the sentience-adjusted welfare ranges presented in Bob’s book. I also do not think the specific proxy matters that much. In allometry, “the study of the relationship of body size to shape,[1] anatomy, physiology and behaviour”, “The relationship between the two measured quantities is often expressed as a power law equation (allometric equation)”. If the sentience-adjusted welfare range is proportional to “proxy 1“^”exponent 1”, and “proxy 1” is proportional to “proxy 2“^”exponent 2”, the sentience-adjusted welfare range is proportional to “proxy 1”^(“exponent 1“*”exponent 2”). So the results for “proxy 1” and exponent “exponent 1“*”exponent 2” are the same as those for “proxy 2” and “exponent 2″.
I very much agree. On the other hand, I think research on sentience criteria mostly decreases the uncertainty about anatomy and behaviour, and I believe there is way more uncertainty in how to go from those to quantitative comparisons of welfare across species.