I find this topic quite interesting. One objection I have is that the reasoning here seems to treat hypothetical people as if they already exist. For example, at one point the PAV is presented with a choice between.
(1) Amy 1 (2) Bobby 100 (3) Amy 10, Bobby 10
But “Amy” and “Bobby” are, at the moment purely hypothetical, and should not be talked about as if their identity already exists. I think this undermines most of the arguments here. To me, it seems like the actual options are:
(1) create 1 person with welfare 1 (2) create 1 person with welfare 100 (3) Create 2 people with welfare 10
In this case, the addition of option 3 adds nothing to the dilemna: allowing people to choose option 2 over option 1 is already the bullet that narrow PAV’s have bitten.
I think this also beats the sequential argument, by accepting that there is a meaningful difference between the sequential and the non sequential cases, and also in whether you know there will be one or two shots. In one shot non identity, we have choices
(1) create 1 person with welfare 1 or (2) create 1 person with welfare 100
In this case, no matter what happens, someone will come into existence, so it’s better that the one person have higher welfare.
In two shot non-identity where you know in advance what happens, you now have four options:
(1) create 1 person with welfare 1 (2) create 1 person with welfare 100 (3) create no people, or (4) create 2 people, 1 with welfare 1 and 1 with welfare 100.
So in a two shot non-identity where you know in advance what happens, then all options are permissible except option 1, because you had an option with the same number of people but better welfare.
In the case where you don’t know in advance that there will be a two-shot process, then yeah, you can end up in option 1). But I would just call this bad luck.
Imagine if a man was considering whether to have kids, but only had two batches of fertile sperm left, enough for one kid each. however, batch A is defective, and will certainly make the kids blind in one eye, while batch B will create a fully seeing person (ignore how biology actually works here). If he decided to have one kid, then using batch A instead of batch B seems immoral and senseless.
But if he was initially thought that batch B was lost and batch A was all that he had, then I don’t see anything wrong with having the half-blind kid. And if after he had the kid they tell him there was an error at the lab, and they actually found batch B after all, it’s also fine for him to shrug and say he’s happy with having one kid already. It’s bad luck, sure, but there’s no moral contradiction here.
I think my objections still work if we ‘go anonymous’ and remove direct information about personal identity across different options. We just need to add some extra detail. Let the new version of One-Shot Non-Identity be as follows. You have a choice between: (1) combining some pair of gametes A, which will eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 1, and (2) combining some other pair of gametes B, which will eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 100.
The new version of Expanded Non-Identity is then the same as the above, except it also has available option (3): combine the pair of gametes A and the pair of gametes B, which will eventually result in the existence of two people each with welfare 10.
Narrow views claim that each option is permissible in One-Shot Non-Identity. What should they say about Expanded Non-Identity? The same trilemma applies. It seems implausible to say that (1) is permissible, because (3) looks better. It seems implausible to say that (3) is permissible, because (2) looks better. And if only (2) is permissible, then narrow views imply the implausible-seeming Losers Can Dislodge Winners.
Now consider wide views and Two-Shot Non-Identity, again redescribed in terms of combining pairs of gametes A and B. You first choose whether to combine pair A (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 1), and then later choose whether to combine pair B (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 100). Suppose that you know your predicament in advance, and suppose that you choose to combine pair A. Then (your view implies) you’re required to combine pair B, even if that choice occurs many decades later, and even though you wouldn’t be required to combine pair B if you hadn’t (many decades earlier) chose to combine pair A. Now consider a slightly different case: you first choose whether to combine pair C (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 101), then later choose whether to combine pair B. Suppose that you know your predicament in advance, and suppose that you decline to combine pair C. Many decades later, you face the choice of whether to combine pair B. Your view seems to imply that you’re not permitted to do so. There are thus cases where (all else being equal) you’re not even permitted to create a person who would enjoy a wonderful life.
I find this topic quite interesting. One objection I have is that the reasoning here seems to treat hypothetical people as if they already exist. For example, at one point the PAV is presented with a choice between.
But “Amy” and “Bobby” are, at the moment purely hypothetical, and should not be talked about as if their identity already exists. I think this undermines most of the arguments here. To me, it seems like the actual options are:
In this case, the addition of option 3 adds nothing to the dilemna: allowing people to choose option 2 over option 1 is already the bullet that narrow PAV’s have bitten.
I think this also beats the sequential argument, by accepting that there is a meaningful difference between the sequential and the non sequential cases, and also in whether you know there will be one or two shots. In one shot non identity, we have choices
In this case, no matter what happens, someone will come into existence, so it’s better that the one person have higher welfare.
In two shot non-identity where you know in advance what happens, you now have four options:
So in a two shot non-identity where you know in advance what happens, then all options are permissible except option 1, because you had an option with the same number of people but better welfare.
In the case where you don’t know in advance that there will be a two-shot process, then yeah, you can end up in option 1). But I would just call this bad luck.
Imagine if a man was considering whether to have kids, but only had two batches of fertile sperm left, enough for one kid each. however, batch A is defective, and will certainly make the kids blind in one eye, while batch B will create a fully seeing person (ignore how biology actually works here). If he decided to have one kid, then using batch A instead of batch B seems immoral and senseless.
But if he was initially thought that batch B was lost and batch A was all that he had, then I don’t see anything wrong with having the half-blind kid. And if after he had the kid they tell him there was an error at the lab, and they actually found batch B after all, it’s also fine for him to shrug and say he’s happy with having one kid already. It’s bad luck, sure, but there’s no moral contradiction here.
I think my objections still work if we ‘go anonymous’ and remove direct information about personal identity across different options. We just need to add some extra detail. Let the new version of One-Shot Non-Identity be as follows. You have a choice between: (1) combining some pair of gametes A, which will eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 1, and (2) combining some other pair of gametes B, which will eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 100.
The new version of Expanded Non-Identity is then the same as the above, except it also has available option (3): combine the pair of gametes A and the pair of gametes B, which will eventually result in the existence of two people each with welfare 10.
Narrow views claim that each option is permissible in One-Shot Non-Identity. What should they say about Expanded Non-Identity? The same trilemma applies. It seems implausible to say that (1) is permissible, because (3) looks better. It seems implausible to say that (3) is permissible, because (2) looks better. And if only (2) is permissible, then narrow views imply the implausible-seeming Losers Can Dislodge Winners.
Now consider wide views and Two-Shot Non-Identity, again redescribed in terms of combining pairs of gametes A and B. You first choose whether to combine pair A (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 1), and then later choose whether to combine pair B (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 100). Suppose that you know your predicament in advance, and suppose that you choose to combine pair A. Then (your view implies) you’re required to combine pair B, even if that choice occurs many decades later, and even though you wouldn’t be required to combine pair B if you hadn’t (many decades earlier) chose to combine pair A. Now consider a slightly different case: you first choose whether to combine pair C (which would eventually result in the existence of a person with welfare 101), then later choose whether to combine pair B. Suppose that you know your predicament in advance, and suppose that you decline to combine pair C. Many decades later, you face the choice of whether to combine pair B. Your view seems to imply that you’re not permitted to do so. There are thus cases where (all else being equal) you’re not even permitted to create a person who would enjoy a wonderful life.