As in the discussion above, I think you’re being disingenuous by claiming government is “more democratic.”
And if you were Gates, I’d argue that it would be even more democratic to allow the IPCC, which is more globally representative and less dominated by special interests that the US government, to guide where you spend your money than it would to allow the US government to do so. And given how much the Gates foundation engages with international orgs and allows them to guide his giving, I think that “hand it to the US government” would plausibly be a less democratic alternative than the current approach, which seems to be to allow GAVI, the WHO, and the IPCC to suggest where the money can best be spent.
And having Open Phil convene a consensus driven international body on longtermism actually seems somewhat similar to what the CTLR futureproof report co-written by Toby Ord suggests when it says the UK should lead by, “creating and then leading a global extreme risks network,” and push for “a Treaty on the Risks to the Future of Humanity.” Perhaps you don’t think that’s a good idea, but I’m unclear why you would treat it as a reductio, except in the most straw-man form.
Hi David, I wasn’t being disingenuous. Here, you say “I think you’re being disingenuous by claiming government is “more democratic.” In your comment above you say “One way to make things more democratic is to have government handle it, but it’s clearly not the only way.” Doesn’t this grant that having the government decide is more democratic? These statements seem inconsistent.
So, to clarify before we discuss the idea, is your view that all global climate philanthropy should be donated to the IPCC?
I think there is a difference between having a citizen’s assembly decide what to do with all global philanthropic money (which as I understand it, is the implication of the article), and having a citizen’s assembly whose express goal is protecting the long-term (which is not the implication of the article). If all longtermist funding was allocated on the first mechanism, then I think it highly likely that funding for AI safety, engineered pandemics and nuclear war would fall dramatically.
The treaty in the CTLR report seems like a good idea but seems quite different to the idea of democratic control proposed in the article.
Comparing how democratic government is to different things yield different results, because democratic isn’t binary. Yes, unitary action by a single actor is less democratic than having government handle things, and no, having the US government handle things is not clearly more democratic than deferring to the IPCC. But, as I’m sure you know, the IPCC isn’t a funding body, nor does it itself fight climate change. So no, obviously climate philanthropy shouldn’t all go to them.
I think there is a difference between having a citizen’s assembly decide what to do with all global philanthropic money (which as I understand it, is the implication of the article),
No, and clearly you need to go re-read the paper. You also might want to look into the citations Zoe suggested that you read above, about what “democratic” means, since you keep interpreting in the same simplistic and usually incorrect way, as equivalent to having everyone vote about what to do.
The treaty in the CTLR report seems like a good idea but seems quite different to the idea of democratic control proposed in the article.
This goes back to the weird misunderstanding that democratic is binary, and that it always refers to control. First, global engagement and the treaty are two different things they advise the UK government. Second, I’m sure that the authors can say for themselves whether they see international deliberations and treaties as a way to more democratic input, but I’d assume that they would say that it’s absolutely a step in the direction they are pointing towards.
Hi David. We were initially discussing whether giving the money to govts would be more democratic. You suggested this was a patently mad idea but then seemed to agree with it.
Here is how the authors define democracy: “We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)”
You say: “You also might want to look into the citations Zoe suggested that you read above, about what “democratic” means, since you keep interpreting in the same simplistic and usually incorrect way, as equivalent to having everyone vote about what to do.”
equal political power and preference aggregation entails majority rule or lottery voting or sortition. Your own view that equal votes aren’t a necessary condition of democracy seems to be in tension with the authors of the article.
A lot of the results showing the wisdom of democratic procedures depend on certain assumptions especially about voters not being systematically biased. In the real world, this isn’t true so sometimes undemocratic procedures can do better. Independent central banks are one example, as is effective philanthropy.
For context, I have read a lot of this literature on democracy and did my doctoral thesis on the topic. I argued here that few democratic theorists actually endorse these criticisms of philanthropy.
You’re using a word differently than they explicitly say they are using the same word. I agree that it’s confusing, but will again note that consensus decision making is democratic in thes sense they use, and yet is none of the options you mention. (And again, the IPCC is a great example of a democratic deliberative body which seems to fulfill the criteria you’ve laid out, and it’s the one they cite explicitly.)
On the validity and usefulness of democracy as a method of state governance, you’ve made a very reasonable case that it would be ineffective for charity, but in the more general sense that Landemore uses it, which includes how institutions other than governments can account for democratic preferences, I’m not sure that the same argument applies.
That said, I strongly disagree with Cremer and Kemp about the usefulness of this approach on very different grounds. I think that both consensus and other democratic methods, if used for funding, rather than for governance, would make hits based giving and policy entrepreneurship impossible, not to mention being fundamentally incompatible with finding neglected causes.
As in the discussion above, I think you’re being disingenuous by claiming government is “more democratic.”
And if you were Gates, I’d argue that it would be even more democratic to allow the IPCC, which is more globally representative and less dominated by special interests that the US government, to guide where you spend your money than it would to allow the US government to do so. And given how much the Gates foundation engages with international orgs and allows them to guide his giving, I think that “hand it to the US government” would plausibly be a less democratic alternative than the current approach, which seems to be to allow GAVI, the WHO, and the IPCC to suggest where the money can best be spent.
And having Open Phil convene a consensus driven international body on longtermism actually seems somewhat similar to what the CTLR futureproof report co-written by Toby Ord suggests when it says the UK should lead by, “creating and then leading a global extreme risks network,” and push for “a Treaty on the Risks to the Future of Humanity.” Perhaps you don’t think that’s a good idea, but I’m unclear why you would treat it as a reductio, except in the most straw-man form.
Hi David, I wasn’t being disingenuous. Here, you say “I think you’re being disingenuous by claiming government is “more democratic.” In your comment above you say “One way to make things more democratic is to have government handle it, but it’s clearly not the only way.” Doesn’t this grant that having the government decide is more democratic? These statements seem inconsistent.
So, to clarify before we discuss the idea, is your view that all global climate philanthropy should be donated to the IPCC?
I think there is a difference between having a citizen’s assembly decide what to do with all global philanthropic money (which as I understand it, is the implication of the article), and having a citizen’s assembly whose express goal is protecting the long-term (which is not the implication of the article). If all longtermist funding was allocated on the first mechanism, then I think it highly likely that funding for AI safety, engineered pandemics and nuclear war would fall dramatically.
The treaty in the CTLR report seems like a good idea but seems quite different to the idea of democratic control proposed in the article.
Comparing how democratic government is to different things yield different results, because democratic isn’t binary. Yes, unitary action by a single actor is less democratic than having government handle things, and no, having the US government handle things is not clearly more democratic than deferring to the IPCC. But, as I’m sure you know, the IPCC isn’t a funding body, nor does it itself fight climate change. So no, obviously climate philanthropy shouldn’t all go to them.
No, and clearly you need to go re-read the paper. You also might want to look into the citations Zoe suggested that you read above, about what “democratic” means, since you keep interpreting in the same simplistic and usually incorrect way, as equivalent to having everyone vote about what to do.
This goes back to the weird misunderstanding that democratic is binary, and that it always refers to control. First, global engagement and the treaty are two different things they advise the UK government. Second, I’m sure that the authors can say for themselves whether they see international deliberations and treaties as a way to more democratic input, but I’d assume that they would say that it’s absolutely a step in the direction they are pointing towards.
Hi David. We were initially discussing whether giving the money to govts would be more democratic. You suggested this was a patently mad idea but then seemed to agree with it.
Here is how the authors define democracy: “We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)”
You say: “You also might want to look into the citations Zoe suggested that you read above, about what “democratic” means, since you keep interpreting in the same simplistic and usually incorrect way, as equivalent to having everyone vote about what to do.”
equal political power and preference aggregation entails majority rule or lottery voting or sortition. Your own view that equal votes aren’t a necessary condition of democracy seems to be in tension with the authors of the article.
A lot of the results showing the wisdom of democratic procedures depend on certain assumptions especially about voters not being systematically biased. In the real world, this isn’t true so sometimes undemocratic procedures can do better. Independent central banks are one example, as is effective philanthropy.
For context, I have read a lot of this literature on democracy and did my doctoral thesis on the topic. I argued here that few democratic theorists actually endorse these criticisms of philanthropy.
You’re using a word differently than they explicitly say they are using the same word. I agree that it’s confusing, but will again note that consensus decision making is democratic in thes sense they use, and yet is none of the options you mention. (And again, the IPCC is a great example of a democratic deliberative body which seems to fulfill the criteria you’ve laid out, and it’s the one they cite explicitly.)
On the validity and usefulness of democracy as a method of state governance, you’ve made a very reasonable case that it would be ineffective for charity, but in the more general sense that Landemore uses it, which includes how institutions other than governments can account for democratic preferences, I’m not sure that the same argument applies.
That said, I strongly disagree with Cremer and Kemp about the usefulness of this approach on very different grounds. I think that both consensus and other democratic methods, if used for funding, rather than for governance, would make hits based giving and policy entrepreneurship impossible, not to mention being fundamentally incompatible with finding neglected causes.
I really appreciate your effort defending a paper containing parts you strongly disagree with from (what you consider) bad arguments!