As a moderator: the âbasic background knowledgeâ point is skirting the boundaries of the Forumâs norms; even if you didnât intend to condescend, I found it condescending, for the reasons I note in my other reply.
The initial comment â which claims that Halstead is misrepresenting a position, when âhe understands and disagreesâ is also possible â also seems uncharitable.
I do see this charitable reading as an understandable thing to miss, given that everyone is leaving brief comments about a complex question and there isnât much context. But I also think there are ways to say âI donât think youâre taking position X seriously enoughâ without saying âyou are lying about the existence of position X, please stop lyingâ.
But it is basic background knowledge, and that point needs to be made clear to those less familiar with the topic! This isnât an issue of understanding and disagreeing, as demonstrated by his non-sequitur about COVID if nothing else.
If, for instance, someone who has written about AI more than once argues that the Chinese government funding AI research for solely humanitarian reasons, you have two choices: they are being honest but ignorant (which is unlikely, embarrassing for them and worrying for any community that treats them as an authority) or they are being dishonest (which is bad for everyone). There is no âcharitableâ position here.
I understand and agree with the discourse norms here, but if someone is demonstrably, repeatedly, unequivocally acting in bad faith then others must be able to call that out.
It is basic background knowledge that degrowth literature exists (which John knows), it is not basic background knowledge that we âknowâ that we could implement degrowth without major humanitarian consequences as degrowth has never been demonstrated at global scale. The opposite is not true either (so you might characterize Halstead as over-confident).
Degrowth is not a strategy we could clearly implement to tackle climate challenge (we do not know whether it is politically or techno-economically feasible and one can plausibly be quite skeptical) and we do not know whether it could be implemented without significant humanitarian consequences, a couple of green thinkers finding it feasible and desirable is not sufficient evidence to speak of âknowingâ.
If, for instance, someone who has written about AI more than once argues that the Chinese government funding AI research for solely humanitarian reasons...
I think there are a bunch of examples we could use here, which fall along a spectrum of âbelievabilityâ or something like that.
Where the unbelievable end of the spectrum is e.g. âChina has never imprisoned a Uyghur who wasnât an active terroristâ, and the believable end of the spectrum is e.g. âgravity is what makes objects fallâ.
If someone argues that objects fall because of something something the luminiferous aether, it seems really unlikely that âthey have a background in physics but just disagree about gravityâ is the right explanation.
If someone argues that China actually imprisons many non-terrorist Uyghurs, it seems really likely that âthey have a background in the Chinese governmentâs claims but just disagree with the Chinese governmentâ is the right explanation.
So what about someone who argues that degrowth is very likely to lead to âenormous humanitarian costsâ? How likely is it that âthey have a background in the claims of Hickel et al. but disagreeâ is the right explanation, vs. something like âtheyâve never read Hickelâ or âthey believe Hickel is right but are lyingâ?
Moreover, is it âbasic background knowledgeâ that degrowth would not be very likely to lead to âenormous humanitarian costsâ?
What you think of those questions seems to depend on how you feel about the degrowth question generally. To some people, it seems perfectly believable that we could realistically achieve degrowth without enormous humanitarian costs. To other people, this seems unbelievable.
I see Halstead as being on the âunbelievableâ side and you as being on the âbelievableâ side. Given that there are two sides to the question, with some number of reasonable scholars on each side, Halstead would ideally hedge his language (âdegrowth would likely have enormous humanitarian costsâ rather than âbuilt-in featureâ). And youâd ideally hedge your language (âfails to address reasonable arguments from people like Hickelâ rather than âflatly untrue in a way that is obviousâ).
*****
I cared more about your reply than Halsteadâs comment because, while neither person is doing the ideal hedge thing, your comment was more rude/âaggressive than Halsteadâs.
(I could imagine someone reading his comment as insulting to the authors, but I personally read it as âhe thinks the authors are deliberately making a tradeoff of one value for anotherâ rather than âhe thinks the authors support something that is clearly monstrousâ.)
To me, the situation reads as one person making contentious claim X, and the other saying âX is flatly wrong in a way that is obvious to anyone who reads contentious author Y, stop mischaracterizing the positions of people like author Yâ â when the first person never mentioned author Y.
Perhaps the first person should have mentioned author Y somewhere, if only to say âI disagree with themâ â in this case, author Y is pretty famous for their views â but even so, a better response is âI think X is wrong because of the points made by author Yâ.
*****
Iâd feel the same way even if someone were making some contentious statement about EA. And I hope that Iâd respond to e.g. âeffective altruism neglects systemic changeâ with something like âI think article X shows this isnât true, why are you saying this?â
Iâd feel differently if that person were posting the same kinds of comments frequently, and never responding to anyoneâs follow-up questions or counterarguments. Given your initial comment, maybe thatâs how you feel about Halstead + degrowth? (Though if thatâs the case, I still think the burden of proof is on the person accusing another of bad faith, and they should link to other cases of the person failing to engage.)
As a moderator: the âbasic background knowledgeâ point is skirting the boundaries of the Forumâs norms; even if you didnât intend to condescend, I found it condescending, for the reasons I note in my other reply.
The initial comment â which claims that Halstead is misrepresenting a position, when âhe understands and disagreesâ is also possible â also seems uncharitable.
I do see this charitable reading as an understandable thing to miss, given that everyone is leaving brief comments about a complex question and there isnât much context. But I also think there are ways to say âI donât think youâre taking position X seriously enoughâ without saying âyou are lying about the existence of position X, please stop lyingâ.
But it is basic background knowledge, and that point needs to be made clear to those less familiar with the topic! This isnât an issue of understanding and disagreeing, as demonstrated by his non-sequitur about COVID if nothing else.
If, for instance, someone who has written about AI more than once argues that the Chinese government funding AI research for solely humanitarian reasons, you have two choices: they are being honest but ignorant (which is unlikely, embarrassing for them and worrying for any community that treats them as an authority) or they are being dishonest (which is bad for everyone). There is no âcharitableâ position here.
I understand and agree with the discourse norms here, but if someone is demonstrably, repeatedly, unequivocally acting in bad faith then others must be able to call that out.
It is basic background knowledge that degrowth literature exists (which John knows), it is not basic background knowledge that we âknowâ that we could implement degrowth without major humanitarian consequences as degrowth has never been demonstrated at global scale. The opposite is not true either (so you might characterize Halstead as over-confident).
Degrowth is not a strategy we could clearly implement to tackle climate challenge (we do not know whether it is politically or techno-economically feasible and one can plausibly be quite skeptical) and we do not know whether it could be implemented without significant humanitarian consequences, a couple of green thinkers finding it feasible and desirable is not sufficient evidence to speak of âknowingâ.
I think there are a bunch of examples we could use here, which fall along a spectrum of âbelievabilityâ or something like that.
Where the unbelievable end of the spectrum is e.g. âChina has never imprisoned a Uyghur who wasnât an active terroristâ, and the believable end of the spectrum is e.g. âgravity is what makes objects fallâ.
If someone argues that objects fall because of something something the luminiferous aether, it seems really unlikely that âthey have a background in physics but just disagree about gravityâ is the right explanation.
If someone argues that China actually imprisons many non-terrorist Uyghurs, it seems really likely that âthey have a background in the Chinese governmentâs claims but just disagree with the Chinese governmentâ is the right explanation.
So what about someone who argues that degrowth is very likely to lead to âenormous humanitarian costsâ? How likely is it that âthey have a background in the claims of Hickel et al. but disagreeâ is the right explanation, vs. something like âtheyâve never read Hickelâ or âthey believe Hickel is right but are lyingâ?
Moreover, is it âbasic background knowledgeâ that degrowth would not be very likely to lead to âenormous humanitarian costsâ?
What you think of those questions seems to depend on how you feel about the degrowth question generally. To some people, it seems perfectly believable that we could realistically achieve degrowth without enormous humanitarian costs. To other people, this seems unbelievable.
I see Halstead as being on the âunbelievableâ side and you as being on the âbelievableâ side. Given that there are two sides to the question, with some number of reasonable scholars on each side, Halstead would ideally hedge his language (âdegrowth would likely have enormous humanitarian costsâ rather than âbuilt-in featureâ). And youâd ideally hedge your language (âfails to address reasonable arguments from people like Hickelâ rather than âflatly untrue in a way that is obviousâ).
*****
I cared more about your reply than Halsteadâs comment because, while neither person is doing the ideal hedge thing, your comment was more rude/âaggressive than Halsteadâs.
(I could imagine someone reading his comment as insulting to the authors, but I personally read it as âhe thinks the authors are deliberately making a tradeoff of one value for anotherâ rather than âhe thinks the authors support something that is clearly monstrousâ.)
To me, the situation reads as one person making contentious claim X, and the other saying âX is flatly wrong in a way that is obvious to anyone who reads contentious author Y, stop mischaracterizing the positions of people like author Yâ â when the first person never mentioned author Y.
Perhaps the first person should have mentioned author Y somewhere, if only to say âI disagree with themâ â in this case, author Y is pretty famous for their views â but even so, a better response is âI think X is wrong because of the points made by author Yâ.
*****
Iâd feel the same way even if someone were making some contentious statement about EA. And I hope that Iâd respond to e.g. âeffective altruism neglects systemic changeâ with something like âI think article X shows this isnât true, why are you saying this?â
Iâd feel differently if that person were posting the same kinds of comments frequently, and never responding to anyoneâs follow-up questions or counterarguments. Given your initial comment, maybe thatâs how you feel about Halstead + degrowth? (Though if thatâs the case, I still think the burden of proof is on the person accusing another of bad faith, and they should link to other cases of the person failing to engage.)