My best guess (though very much not a confident guess) is the aggregate of these efforts are net-negative, and I think that is correlated with that work having happened in backrooms, often in context where people were unable to talk about their honest motivations. It sure is really hard to tell, but I really want people to consider the hypothesis that a bunch of these behind-the-scenes policy efforts have been backfiring, especially ex-post with a more republican administration.
The chip and SME export controls seem to currently be one of the drivers of the escalating U.S. and China arms race, the RSPs are I think largely ineffectual and have delayed the speed at which we could get regulation that is not reliant on lab supervision, and the overall EU AI act seems very bad, though I think the effect of the marginal help with drafting is of course much harder to estimate.
Missing from this list: The executive order, which I think has retrospectively revealed itself as being a major driver of polarization of AI-risk concerns, by strongly conflating near-term risk with extinction risks. It did also do a lot of great stuff, though my best guess is we’ll overall regret it (but on this I feel the least confident).
I agree that a ton of concrete political implementation work needs to be done, but I think the people working in the space who have chosen to do that work in a way that doesn’t actually engage in public discourse have made mistakes, and this has had large negative externalities.
Again, really not confident here, and I agree that there is a lot of implementation work to be done that is not glorious and flashy, but I think a bunch of the ways it’s been done in a kind of conspiratorial and secretive fashion has been counterproductive[1].
Ultimately as you say the bottleneck for things happening is political will and buy-in that AI systems pose a serious existential risk, and I think that means a lot of implementation and backroom work is blocked and bottlenecked on that public argumentation happening. And when people try to push forward anyways, they often end up forced to conflate existential risk with highly politicized short-term issues that aren’t very correlated with the actual risks, and backfire when the political winds change and people update.
My best guess (though very much not a confident guess) is the aggregate of these efforts are net-negative, and I think that is correlated with that work having happened in backrooms, often in context where people were unable to talk about their honest motivations. It sure is really hard to tell, but I really want people to consider the hypothesis that a bunch of these behind-the-scenes policy efforts have been backfiring, especially ex-post with a more republican administration.
The chip and SME export controls seem to currently be one of the drivers of the escalating U.S. and China arms race, the RSPs are I think largely ineffectual and have delayed the speed at which we could get regulation that is not reliant on lab supervision, and the overall EU AI act seems very bad, though I think the effect of the marginal help with drafting is of course much harder to estimate.
Missing from this list: The executive order, which I think has retrospectively revealed itself as being a major driver of polarization of AI-risk concerns, by strongly conflating near-term risk with extinction risks. It did also do a lot of great stuff, though my best guess is we’ll overall regret it (but on this I feel the least confident).
I agree that a ton of concrete political implementation work needs to be done, but I think the people working in the space who have chosen to do that work in a way that doesn’t actually engage in public discourse have made mistakes, and this has had large negative externalities.
See also: https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/55267EFF-11A8-4BD6-BE1E-61452A3C48E3
Again, really not confident here, and I agree that there is a lot of implementation work to be done that is not glorious and flashy, but I think a bunch of the ways it’s been done in a kind of conspiratorial and secretive fashion has been counterproductive[1].
Ultimately as you say the bottleneck for things happening is political will and buy-in that AI systems pose a serious existential risk, and I think that means a lot of implementation and backroom work is blocked and bottlenecked on that public argumentation happening. And when people try to push forward anyways, they often end up forced to conflate existential risk with highly politicized short-term issues that aren’t very correlated with the actual risks, and backfire when the political winds change and people update.
See also: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vFqa8DZCuhyrbSnyx/integrity-in-ai-governance-and-advocacy