Well, if it’s anonymous then it’s not obvious what you are accomplishing (compared to disease treatments etc). If it’s a reciprocation mechanism then I can imagine that working but only if you have an approximately 1:1 or better ratio of marginal donations reciprocated—which doesn’t seem likely to me, but you’ll have to make that judgement on your own.
“2. It makes me more likely to continue to donate”
Or you could just donate based on solid principles and not deny your own ability to make decisions?
“3. Add my name to the list please!”
A list with millions of names on it? It means hardly anything to have a single additional name on it. Every charity can make a list of supporters. Not sure what a $2 donation is needed for though—you’d be much more efficient donating $0.01.
“4. It is a service I use/appreciate or think I should be paying for anyway”
I’m a little confused because you’re making a claim about moral obligations to various people, while you also claim that you’re merely giving because you want to. Egoism and contractualism are two different approaches to morality, and neither is part of effective altruism. If you have other moral beliefs besides robust improvements to issues like poverty etc, or simply don’t care about those things at all, then there’s not much to be said outside of the realm of moral philosophy.
“5. Signal boost a campaign or cause”
Sure, again you’ll have to make those kinds of judgements yourself. If it’s an effective cause though, you might be able to talk to other EAs and see if anyone else will support it, because multiple opinions are important for these judgements. If EAs aren’t convinced then that might be a reason to give more thought to the matter.
“I’m in favor of being cause neutral. I don’t want to get stuck in a giving pattern that may make me ineffective, so flexing my donation muscles in other places seems like a good way to avoid this.”
I don’t understand the logic behind this. If you want to avoid ineffective giving, then give to the most effective causes. If you want to be cause neutral as a general rule, you’ll have to have some separate justification for that because placing arbitrary constraints like that reduce your effectiveness. You can’t maximize cause neutrality and effectiveness at the same time.
“I don’t know everything and you are probably loads smarter than me. If someone says “hey this thing over here is really important” I should lean towards giving it a shot, or investigating further.This cause you have identified could be super duper important and I just don’t know it yet.”
So that would imply supporting the projects which EA-oriented research and decision making has decided to prioritize, right? Because other people, regardless of how smart, aren’t generally using the right values or framework.
“Sometimes ineffective or high-cost things have enormous nu-knowable great outcomes.”
Unexpected outcomes cut both ways. Effective charities can also have even more enormous unknowable great outcomes, and ineffective charities can be even worse than they seem.
“I wouldn’t have spent the money on any other charity. The money I donate to one-off fundraisers and annual memberships is money that I otherwise would have spent on toys for my cats, or a meal out with friends.”
I don’t see how this can be the case unless you artificially and arbitrarily emplace such a mechanism into your decisions. Many people worry about sacrificing luxuries and such towards saving lives, but it’s still less demanding to take money from one philanthropic area and redirect towards another. So, sure spending on suboptimal charities is better than none at all, as long as you recognize that it’s still not as good as other options.
“What about any of you? Do you spend any amount on charities or nonprofits outside of the EA realm?”
No, but if I had such an idea, I wouldn’t ignore it but I would bring it to public discussion and see what everyone thought.
Or you could just donate based on solid principles and not deny your own ability to make decisions?
That is great if that works for you. I think it’s important to recognize that humans aren’t moist robots, and if the path to getting a particular person to donate more to AMF is for them to give to the Make A Wish For Dying Kittens fund, then idonating to MAWFDK is the effective choice.
That’s a really big “if.” Most of the time we just figure out the best thing to do, and then do it because we’re free human beings who can make our own decisions. I’m not accustomed to providing rationalization for biases, that’s just not the way I think. But hey, if it works it works.
I appreciate your advice not to bring divergent opinions “to public discussion [to] see what everyone thought”—your reception may in fact convince me this is an good course of action in the future. I fear this may have fallen into the trap of making EA unwelcoming by coming across as presumptuous or even hostile. I would like to think this wasn’t your intention and you were hoping to have a conversation so I’ll address some of your concerns or assumptions.
A point of clarity: I’m not a strict consequentialist—so there are many things here where we may disagree because I see inherent value in an action taken in good faith in order to test a theory or support a potentially larger good. From your comment I think you would disagree with this.
I would also like to make clear, these donations do not make up a majority of my donation dollars; these instances are exceptions to the rule.
If it’s a reciprocation mechanism then I can imagine that working but only if you have an approximately 1:1 or better ratio of marginal donations reciprocated
I usually find that I get a 1:1 ratio or better. I also know that a $10 donation to AMF is doing much more good, to the point that it will likely more than offset any potential harm my donation did, so there was a net benefit.
Or you could just donate based on solid principles and not deny your own ability to make decisions?
I consider operant conditioning a solid principle and a good way to work towards making increasingly good decisions. I don’t deny my autonomy, but I also am aware that my mind often needs encouragement to function more effectively.
you’d be much more efficient donating $0.01
You are correct. Usually I default to a few dollars because I assume the credit processing system won’t accept anything less. Next time I will try this.
Egoism and contractualism are two different approaches to morality, and neither is part of effective altruism.
I am stating that I feel a contract myself in many of these instances. I also think it is OK to donate out of personal passion—say to the arts. And I completely agree, both of these are not effective altruism. I would even say they only tangentially count as altruism. As I stated I list these here because we traditionally define this allocation of resources as “donations to nonprofits” and are tax exempt. I also list it here because I believe there is space in EA to engage with people who want to continue to donate to things like arts programs or public radio, by encouraging them to realize that these donations aren’t part of your charity work, and if they want to make a difference they should also be giving to effective causes.
Re: Cause neutrality. What I am addressing here is the tendency of donors to become emotionally attached to a cause they donate to. This means that if there is no more room for funding, or if a more effective cause arises they are less likely to shift their donations. My theory is I will be more willing to shift the larger portion of my giving, if necessary, since I am not completely invested in any single cause area.
Unexpected outcomes: Yes I agree that there is also a possibility that the charity is ineffective and even potentially doing harm. I would refer you to my comment about not being a strict consequentalist as well as my statement about giving all charities a reputation check. This is just a personal judgment call.
I don’t see how this can be the case unless you artificially and arbitrarily emplace such a mechanism into your decisions.
I do! :) I budget very carefully, and my allocated charity donations get deducted monthly on a set schedule. The money that I give to secondary ‘ineffective’ causes comes out of my ‘fun money’ budget, so I know very clearly what other things I may have spent that money on.
Hopefully that lends some clarity to my post. I think it is important to be open and welcoming to people who are deeply interested in philanthropy but may not yet have heard of or bought into many of the ideas of EA. To this end I think it is a valuable exercise to think about the intersections of EA thinking and traditional giving, such as the things described above. Creating a bridge between more common giving habits and really effective giving is a useful way of helping people level up their thinking when it comes to philanthropy.
Well then I don’t see this as substantially different than typical cases of people spending less than maximum amounts of money on effective charities; whether it’s material goods or suboptimal charities is not a dichotomy which bothers me. Normally I talk about establishing greater total optimal contributions, and if you’ve deliberately set up a counterfactual to preclude it then I suppose it’s not a discussion that you’re keen to have.
“1. It is my friend’s pet cause”
Well, if it’s anonymous then it’s not obvious what you are accomplishing (compared to disease treatments etc). If it’s a reciprocation mechanism then I can imagine that working but only if you have an approximately 1:1 or better ratio of marginal donations reciprocated—which doesn’t seem likely to me, but you’ll have to make that judgement on your own.
“2. It makes me more likely to continue to donate”
Or you could just donate based on solid principles and not deny your own ability to make decisions?
“3. Add my name to the list please!”
A list with millions of names on it? It means hardly anything to have a single additional name on it. Every charity can make a list of supporters. Not sure what a $2 donation is needed for though—you’d be much more efficient donating $0.01.
“4. It is a service I use/appreciate or think I should be paying for anyway”
I’m a little confused because you’re making a claim about moral obligations to various people, while you also claim that you’re merely giving because you want to. Egoism and contractualism are two different approaches to morality, and neither is part of effective altruism. If you have other moral beliefs besides robust improvements to issues like poverty etc, or simply don’t care about those things at all, then there’s not much to be said outside of the realm of moral philosophy.
“5. Signal boost a campaign or cause”
Sure, again you’ll have to make those kinds of judgements yourself. If it’s an effective cause though, you might be able to talk to other EAs and see if anyone else will support it, because multiple opinions are important for these judgements. If EAs aren’t convinced then that might be a reason to give more thought to the matter.
“I’m in favor of being cause neutral. I don’t want to get stuck in a giving pattern that may make me ineffective, so flexing my donation muscles in other places seems like a good way to avoid this.”
I don’t understand the logic behind this. If you want to avoid ineffective giving, then give to the most effective causes. If you want to be cause neutral as a general rule, you’ll have to have some separate justification for that because placing arbitrary constraints like that reduce your effectiveness. You can’t maximize cause neutrality and effectiveness at the same time.
“I don’t know everything and you are probably loads smarter than me. If someone says “hey this thing over here is really important” I should lean towards giving it a shot, or investigating further.This cause you have identified could be super duper important and I just don’t know it yet.”
So that would imply supporting the projects which EA-oriented research and decision making has decided to prioritize, right? Because other people, regardless of how smart, aren’t generally using the right values or framework.
“Sometimes ineffective or high-cost things have enormous nu-knowable great outcomes.”
Unexpected outcomes cut both ways. Effective charities can also have even more enormous unknowable great outcomes, and ineffective charities can be even worse than they seem.
“I wouldn’t have spent the money on any other charity. The money I donate to one-off fundraisers and annual memberships is money that I otherwise would have spent on toys for my cats, or a meal out with friends.”
I don’t see how this can be the case unless you artificially and arbitrarily emplace such a mechanism into your decisions. Many people worry about sacrificing luxuries and such towards saving lives, but it’s still less demanding to take money from one philanthropic area and redirect towards another. So, sure spending on suboptimal charities is better than none at all, as long as you recognize that it’s still not as good as other options.
“What about any of you? Do you spend any amount on charities or nonprofits outside of the EA realm?”
No, but if I had such an idea, I wouldn’t ignore it but I would bring it to public discussion and see what everyone thought.
Meta: lots of points worth discussing here, but the tone seemed unnecessarily hostile.
That is great if that works for you. I think it’s important to recognize that humans aren’t moist robots, and if the path to getting a particular person to donate more to AMF is for them to give to the Make A Wish For Dying Kittens fund, then idonating to MAWFDK is the effective choice.
That’s a really big “if.” Most of the time we just figure out the best thing to do, and then do it because we’re free human beings who can make our own decisions. I’m not accustomed to providing rationalization for biases, that’s just not the way I think. But hey, if it works it works.
I appreciate your advice not to bring divergent opinions “to public discussion [to] see what everyone thought”—your reception may in fact convince me this is an good course of action in the future. I fear this may have fallen into the trap of making EA unwelcoming by coming across as presumptuous or even hostile. I would like to think this wasn’t your intention and you were hoping to have a conversation so I’ll address some of your concerns or assumptions.
A point of clarity: I’m not a strict consequentialist—so there are many things here where we may disagree because I see inherent value in an action taken in good faith in order to test a theory or support a potentially larger good. From your comment I think you would disagree with this.
I would also like to make clear, these donations do not make up a majority of my donation dollars; these instances are exceptions to the rule.
I usually find that I get a 1:1 ratio or better. I also know that a $10 donation to AMF is doing much more good, to the point that it will likely more than offset any potential harm my donation did, so there was a net benefit.
I consider operant conditioning a solid principle and a good way to work towards making increasingly good decisions. I don’t deny my autonomy, but I also am aware that my mind often needs encouragement to function more effectively.
You are correct. Usually I default to a few dollars because I assume the credit processing system won’t accept anything less. Next time I will try this.
I am stating that I feel a contract myself in many of these instances. I also think it is OK to donate out of personal passion—say to the arts. And I completely agree, both of these are not effective altruism. I would even say they only tangentially count as altruism. As I stated I list these here because we traditionally define this allocation of resources as “donations to nonprofits” and are tax exempt. I also list it here because I believe there is space in EA to engage with people who want to continue to donate to things like arts programs or public radio, by encouraging them to realize that these donations aren’t part of your charity work, and if they want to make a difference they should also be giving to effective causes.
Re: Cause neutrality. What I am addressing here is the tendency of donors to become emotionally attached to a cause they donate to. This means that if there is no more room for funding, or if a more effective cause arises they are less likely to shift their donations. My theory is I will be more willing to shift the larger portion of my giving, if necessary, since I am not completely invested in any single cause area.
Unexpected outcomes: Yes I agree that there is also a possibility that the charity is ineffective and even potentially doing harm. I would refer you to my comment about not being a strict consequentalist as well as my statement about giving all charities a reputation check. This is just a personal judgment call.
I do! :) I budget very carefully, and my allocated charity donations get deducted monthly on a set schedule. The money that I give to secondary ‘ineffective’ causes comes out of my ‘fun money’ budget, so I know very clearly what other things I may have spent that money on.
Hopefully that lends some clarity to my post. I think it is important to be open and welcoming to people who are deeply interested in philanthropy but may not yet have heard of or bought into many of the ideas of EA. To this end I think it is a valuable exercise to think about the intersections of EA thinking and traditional giving, such as the things described above. Creating a bridge between more common giving habits and really effective giving is a useful way of helping people level up their thinking when it comes to philanthropy.
Well then I don’t see this as substantially different than typical cases of people spending less than maximum amounts of money on effective charities; whether it’s material goods or suboptimal charities is not a dichotomy which bothers me. Normally I talk about establishing greater total optimal contributions, and if you’ve deliberately set up a counterfactual to preclude it then I suppose it’s not a discussion that you’re keen to have.