Won’t people be motivated to disapprove vote orgs in all cause areas but their preferred one? That would seemingly reduce approval voting to FPTP as between cause areas in effect.
Well, the top 3 charities will get chosen, so there’s no benefit to you only selecting 1 option alone unless you really do believe only that 1 charity ought to get funded. I think AV may be more robust to these concerns than some think,[1] all I think all voting systems will have these edge cases.
I also may be willing simply bite the bullet here and trade-off a bit of strategic voting for legibility. But again, I don’t think approval is worse than this than many other voting methods.
But my fundamental objection is that this is primarily a normative problem, where we want to be a community who’ll vote honestly and not strategically. If GWWC endorse approval voting, then when you submit your votes there could be a pop-up with “I pledge not to vote strategically” or something like that.
I don’t think any voting system is immune to that—Democracy works well because of the norms it spreads and trust it instills, as opposed to being the optimal transmission mechanism of individual preferences to a social welfare function imho.
Thanks. I assume there will be at least 3 orgs for each cause area.
If we can assume the forum is a “community who’ll vote honestly and not strategically,” approval voting would work—but we shouldn’t limit the winners to three in that case. Proportional representation among all orgs with net positive approval would be the fullest extent of the community’s views, although some floor on support or cap on winners would be necessary for logistical reasons.
Won’t people be motivated to disapprove vote orgs in all cause areas but their preferred one? That would seemingly reduce approval voting to FPTP as between cause areas in effect.
Well, the top 3 charities will get chosen, so there’s no benefit to you only selecting 1 option alone unless you really do believe only that 1 charity ought to get funded. I think AV may be more robust to these concerns than some think,[1] all I think all voting systems will have these edge cases.
I also may be willing simply bite the bullet here and trade-off a bit of strategic voting for legibility. But again, I don’t think approval is worse than this than many other voting methods.
But my fundamental objection is that this is primarily a normative problem, where we want to be a community who’ll vote honestly and not strategically. If GWWC endorse approval voting, then when you submit your votes there could be a pop-up with “I pledge not to vote strategically” or something like that.
I don’t think any voting system is immune to that—Democracy works well because of the norms it spreads and trust it instills, as opposed to being the optimal transmission mechanism of individual preferences to a social welfare function imho.
or here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7539-3_2
Thanks. I assume there will be at least 3 orgs for each cause area.
If we can assume the forum is a “community who’ll vote honestly and not strategically,” approval voting would work—but we shouldn’t limit the winners to three in that case. Proportional representation among all orgs with net positive approval would be the fullest extent of the community’s views, although some floor on support or cap on winners would be necessary for logistical reasons.