Thanks JDLCâreally appreciate the thoughtful engagement. Let me address each point:
On industry analysis: Youâre right that this deserves more systematic treatment. Iâm finishing a research compilation that goes deeper on sector selection, looking at factors like: whether stakeholders have meaningful choice points, whether the PFG commitment can be made visible at those decisions, the strength of stakeholder preferences in that sector, and competitive dynamics. Some of the best opportunities are where stakeholder preference is strongestâticketing/âpayments (where everyone resents fees), talent-intensive sectors (where meaning attracts better employees), and values-expressive consumer categories. Happy to share more once that work is complete.
On public companies: Great question. Youâre right that the model requires control over profit distribution, which public company fiduciary duties to shareholders make difficult. However:
While foundation ownership is one path, there are other structural optionsâcharitable benefit corporations with enforceable commitments, or even 90%+ charitable ownership with a minority public stake for liquidity and valuation purposes.
Your intuition that public ownership has competitive advantages may be overstated. Many companies go public primarily for liquidity and capital access, not operational advantages. Plenty of highly successful companies (Patagonia, Mars, Chick-fil-A, Cargill) remain private at massive scale.
The path to competing with public companies is to prove the model works first at smaller scale with available capital, then use that evidence to attract larger capital pools (both philanthropic and debt-based) for acquisitions, higher-capital startups, or even taking public companies private. Each stage requires more capital but provides more evidence to justify it.
The $10 trillion figure is global profits across all businesses. Even capturing a fraction through private PFG companies represents transformative philanthropic capitalâand if the model works as well as I think it does, the capital will eventually emerge to compete at larger scale.
On the impact alignment challenge: This is the most sophisticated objection and deserves careful thought. Youâre right that if PFG systematically advantages popular-but-less-effective causes over high-impact work, we risk building a large system that doesnât solve the problems that matter most.
But I think the dynamics are more favorable than this concern suggests:
The current baseline is âenrich shareholders.â Right now, stakeholders choosing any product or service are implicitly choosing to enrich investors. In that context, even causes that arenât the most popularâlike ending extreme poverty through evidence-based interventionsâstill represent a massive improvement over the status quo. People may have warm feelings toward local pet shelters, but âprofits end extreme povertyâ vs. âprofits buy yachtsâ is still a compelling choice.
You can separate competitive domain from funding domain. A ticketing platform doesnât need to be about factory farming to fund factory farming abolition. Humanitix competes in event ticketing while funding global health. Newmanâs Own sells pasta sauce and funds diverse causes.
EA should lead to set the standards. If EA builds the first wave of successful PFG companies, we define what âProfit for Goodâ meansârigorous, evidence-based giving to ending extreme poverty, preventing pandemics, reducing animal suffering. First-mover advantage matters for establishing category norms. The alternative is waiting and letting others define PFG as funding popular but less effective causes.
The goal is effective causes with meaningful public appeal. Iâm not arguing we should optimize purely for popularityâwe should focus on causes that are both highly effective and have genuine public resonance. Ending extreme poverty, reducing animal suffering in factory farms, preventing the next pandemicâthese are causes people care about when they understand them, even if theyâre not maximally popular. Portfolio approaches (80% global poverty, 20% animal welfare) might also help broaden appeal while maintaining impact focus.
There is a strategic sequencing question worth acknowledging: early PFG successes that prove the model and generate substantial capital may enable later, more ambitious efforts. A PFG company funding global health that captures 10% market share generates more resources and credibility than one funding a more controversial cause that captures 2%. But I think we can find causes in the âeffective and appealingâ zone rather than having to choose between effectiveness and appeal.
EDIT:
I think actually at current low awareness levels, a bit more serious prolonged levels of stakeholder engagement tend to produce greater advantages. For example, with Humanitix, the relevant stakeholderâan event organizer choosing the platform for tickets- is probably spending more time making this decision than someone choosing a brand of cereal. This is also true with larger contracts like consulting work (see Impact Makers). I anticipate if general awareness and trust of the Profit for Good category increased, you would see a greater effect with lower stakes consumer decisions.
Thanks JDLCâreally appreciate the thoughtful engagement. Let me address each point:
On industry analysis: Youâre right that this deserves more systematic treatment. Iâm finishing a research compilation that goes deeper on sector selection, looking at factors like: whether stakeholders have meaningful choice points, whether the PFG commitment can be made visible at those decisions, the strength of stakeholder preferences in that sector, and competitive dynamics. Some of the best opportunities are where stakeholder preference is strongestâticketing/âpayments (where everyone resents fees), talent-intensive sectors (where meaning attracts better employees), and values-expressive consumer categories. Happy to share more once that work is complete.
On public companies: Great question. Youâre right that the model requires control over profit distribution, which public company fiduciary duties to shareholders make difficult. However:
While foundation ownership is one path, there are other structural optionsâcharitable benefit corporations with enforceable commitments, or even 90%+ charitable ownership with a minority public stake for liquidity and valuation purposes.
Your intuition that public ownership has competitive advantages may be overstated. Many companies go public primarily for liquidity and capital access, not operational advantages. Plenty of highly successful companies (Patagonia, Mars, Chick-fil-A, Cargill) remain private at massive scale.
The path to competing with public companies is to prove the model works first at smaller scale with available capital, then use that evidence to attract larger capital pools (both philanthropic and debt-based) for acquisitions, higher-capital startups, or even taking public companies private. Each stage requires more capital but provides more evidence to justify it.
The $10 trillion figure is global profits across all businesses. Even capturing a fraction through private PFG companies represents transformative philanthropic capitalâand if the model works as well as I think it does, the capital will eventually emerge to compete at larger scale.
On the impact alignment challenge: This is the most sophisticated objection and deserves careful thought. Youâre right that if PFG systematically advantages popular-but-less-effective causes over high-impact work, we risk building a large system that doesnât solve the problems that matter most.
But I think the dynamics are more favorable than this concern suggests:
The current baseline is âenrich shareholders.â Right now, stakeholders choosing any product or service are implicitly choosing to enrich investors. In that context, even causes that arenât the most popularâlike ending extreme poverty through evidence-based interventionsâstill represent a massive improvement over the status quo. People may have warm feelings toward local pet shelters, but âprofits end extreme povertyâ vs. âprofits buy yachtsâ is still a compelling choice.
You can separate competitive domain from funding domain. A ticketing platform doesnât need to be about factory farming to fund factory farming abolition. Humanitix competes in event ticketing while funding global health. Newmanâs Own sells pasta sauce and funds diverse causes.
EA should lead to set the standards. If EA builds the first wave of successful PFG companies, we define what âProfit for Goodâ meansârigorous, evidence-based giving to ending extreme poverty, preventing pandemics, reducing animal suffering. First-mover advantage matters for establishing category norms. The alternative is waiting and letting others define PFG as funding popular but less effective causes.
The goal is effective causes with meaningful public appeal. Iâm not arguing we should optimize purely for popularityâwe should focus on causes that are both highly effective and have genuine public resonance. Ending extreme poverty, reducing animal suffering in factory farms, preventing the next pandemicâthese are causes people care about when they understand them, even if theyâre not maximally popular. Portfolio approaches (80% global poverty, 20% animal welfare) might also help broaden appeal while maintaining impact focus.
There is a strategic sequencing question worth acknowledging: early PFG successes that prove the model and generate substantial capital may enable later, more ambitious efforts. A PFG company funding global health that captures 10% market share generates more resources and credibility than one funding a more controversial cause that captures 2%. But I think we can find causes in the âeffective and appealingâ zone rather than having to choose between effectiveness and appeal.
EDIT:
I think actually at current low awareness levels, a bit more serious prolonged levels of stakeholder engagement tend to produce greater advantages. For example, with Humanitix, the relevant stakeholderâan event organizer choosing the platform for tickets- is probably spending more time making this decision than someone choosing a brand of cereal. This is also true with larger contracts like consulting work (see Impact Makers). I anticipate if general awareness and trust of the Profit for Good category increased, you would see a greater effect with lower stakes consumer decisions.