Hi Brad, really good post, appreciate it! I’ve got one positive, one question, and one challenge.
Positive: The analysis of which industries are more amenable to Profit for Good seems interesting. It would be great to see more about which are industries are likely best/worst, and especially why (which you have partly done here).
Question: Does this model apply to publicly held companies, or could it be adapted for them? I imagine a large portion of the $100Tn you mentioned is from publicly traded companies. I also assume there’s a competitive advantage to public ownership, (but I only think this because lots of the largest companies seem to do it). However, the model you propose seems to require private/foundation ownership.
Challenge: Even if Profit for Good is advantageous in general, it doesn’t mean that the most impactful Profit for Good is advantageous. For example, the most successful companies might focus on causes the public already cares about, like cancer research (which is probably less impactful than, say, GiveWell). This is especially relevant for causes like ending factory farming. Many interventions raise meat prices (intentionally or unintentionally), which might deter customers, and in the worst case could result in a comparative disadvantage.
Thanks JDLC—really appreciate the thoughtful engagement. Let me address each point:
On industry analysis: You’re right that this deserves more systematic treatment. I’m finishing a research compilation that goes deeper on sector selection, looking at factors like: whether stakeholders have meaningful choice points, whether the PFG commitment can be made visible at those decisions, the strength of stakeholder preferences in that sector, and competitive dynamics. Some of the best opportunities are where stakeholder preference is strongest—ticketing/payments (where everyone resents fees), talent-intensive sectors (where meaning attracts better employees), and values-expressive consumer categories. Happy to share more once that work is complete.
On public companies: Great question. You’re right that the model requires control over profit distribution, which public company fiduciary duties to shareholders make difficult. However:
While foundation ownership is one path, there are other structural options—charitable benefit corporations with enforceable commitments, or even 90%+ charitable ownership with a minority public stake for liquidity and valuation purposes.
Your intuition that public ownership has competitive advantages may be overstated. Many companies go public primarily for liquidity and capital access, not operational advantages. Plenty of highly successful companies (Patagonia, Mars, Chick-fil-A, Cargill) remain private at massive scale.
The path to competing with public companies is to prove the model works first at smaller scale with available capital, then use that evidence to attract larger capital pools (both philanthropic and debt-based) for acquisitions, higher-capital startups, or even taking public companies private. Each stage requires more capital but provides more evidence to justify it.
The $10 trillion figure is global profits across all businesses. Even capturing a fraction through private PFG companies represents transformative philanthropic capital—and if the model works as well as I think it does, the capital will eventually emerge to compete at larger scale.
On the impact alignment challenge: This is the most sophisticated objection and deserves careful thought. You’re right that if PFG systematically advantages popular-but-less-effective causes over high-impact work, we risk building a large system that doesn’t solve the problems that matter most.
But I think the dynamics are more favorable than this concern suggests:
The current baseline is “enrich shareholders.” Right now, stakeholders choosing any product or service are implicitly choosing to enrich investors. In that context, even causes that aren’t the most popular—like ending extreme poverty through evidence-based interventions—still represent a massive improvement over the status quo. People may have warm feelings toward local pet shelters, but “profits end extreme poverty” vs. “profits buy yachts” is still a compelling choice.
You can separate competitive domain from funding domain. A ticketing platform doesn’t need to be about factory farming to fund factory farming abolition. Humanitix competes in event ticketing while funding global health. Newman’s Own sells pasta sauce and funds diverse causes.
EA should lead to set the standards. If EA builds the first wave of successful PFG companies, we define what “Profit for Good” means—rigorous, evidence-based giving to ending extreme poverty, preventing pandemics, reducing animal suffering. First-mover advantage matters for establishing category norms. The alternative is waiting and letting others define PFG as funding popular but less effective causes.
The goal is effective causes with meaningful public appeal. I’m not arguing we should optimize purely for popularity—we should focus on causes that are both highly effective and have genuine public resonance. Ending extreme poverty, reducing animal suffering in factory farms, preventing the next pandemic—these are causes people care about when they understand them, even if they’re not maximally popular. Portfolio approaches (80% global poverty, 20% animal welfare) might also help broaden appeal while maintaining impact focus.
There is a strategic sequencing question worth acknowledging: early PFG successes that prove the model and generate substantial capital may enable later, more ambitious efforts. A PFG company funding global health that captures 10% market share generates more resources and credibility than one funding a more controversial cause that captures 2%. But I think we can find causes in the “effective and appealing” zone rather than having to choose between effectiveness and appeal.
EDIT:
I think actually at current low awareness levels, a bit more serious prolonged levels of stakeholder engagement tend to produce greater advantages. For example, with Humanitix, the relevant stakeholder—an event organizer choosing the platform for tickets- is probably spending more time making this decision than someone choosing a brand of cereal. This is also true with larger contracts like consulting work (see Impact Makers). I anticipate if general awareness and trust of the Profit for Good category increased, you would see a greater effect with lower stakes consumer decisions.
Hi Brad, really good post, appreciate it! I’ve got one positive, one question, and one challenge.
Positive: The analysis of which industries are more amenable to Profit for Good seems interesting. It would be great to see more about which are industries are likely best/worst, and especially why (which you have partly done here).
Question: Does this model apply to publicly held companies, or could it be adapted for them? I imagine a large portion of the $100Tn you mentioned is from publicly traded companies. I also assume there’s a competitive advantage to public ownership, (but I only think this because lots of the largest companies seem to do it). However, the model you propose seems to require private/foundation ownership.
Challenge: Even if Profit for Good is advantageous in general, it doesn’t mean that the most impactful Profit for Good is advantageous. For example, the most successful companies might focus on causes the public already cares about, like cancer research (which is probably less impactful than, say, GiveWell). This is especially relevant for causes like ending factory farming. Many interventions raise meat prices (intentionally or unintentionally), which might deter customers, and in the worst case could result in a comparative disadvantage.
Would like to hear your thoughts or pushbacks
Thanks JDLC—really appreciate the thoughtful engagement. Let me address each point:
On industry analysis: You’re right that this deserves more systematic treatment. I’m finishing a research compilation that goes deeper on sector selection, looking at factors like: whether stakeholders have meaningful choice points, whether the PFG commitment can be made visible at those decisions, the strength of stakeholder preferences in that sector, and competitive dynamics. Some of the best opportunities are where stakeholder preference is strongest—ticketing/payments (where everyone resents fees), talent-intensive sectors (where meaning attracts better employees), and values-expressive consumer categories. Happy to share more once that work is complete.
On public companies: Great question. You’re right that the model requires control over profit distribution, which public company fiduciary duties to shareholders make difficult. However:
While foundation ownership is one path, there are other structural options—charitable benefit corporations with enforceable commitments, or even 90%+ charitable ownership with a minority public stake for liquidity and valuation purposes.
Your intuition that public ownership has competitive advantages may be overstated. Many companies go public primarily for liquidity and capital access, not operational advantages. Plenty of highly successful companies (Patagonia, Mars, Chick-fil-A, Cargill) remain private at massive scale.
The path to competing with public companies is to prove the model works first at smaller scale with available capital, then use that evidence to attract larger capital pools (both philanthropic and debt-based) for acquisitions, higher-capital startups, or even taking public companies private. Each stage requires more capital but provides more evidence to justify it.
The $10 trillion figure is global profits across all businesses. Even capturing a fraction through private PFG companies represents transformative philanthropic capital—and if the model works as well as I think it does, the capital will eventually emerge to compete at larger scale.
On the impact alignment challenge: This is the most sophisticated objection and deserves careful thought. You’re right that if PFG systematically advantages popular-but-less-effective causes over high-impact work, we risk building a large system that doesn’t solve the problems that matter most.
But I think the dynamics are more favorable than this concern suggests:
The current baseline is “enrich shareholders.” Right now, stakeholders choosing any product or service are implicitly choosing to enrich investors. In that context, even causes that aren’t the most popular—like ending extreme poverty through evidence-based interventions—still represent a massive improvement over the status quo. People may have warm feelings toward local pet shelters, but “profits end extreme poverty” vs. “profits buy yachts” is still a compelling choice.
You can separate competitive domain from funding domain. A ticketing platform doesn’t need to be about factory farming to fund factory farming abolition. Humanitix competes in event ticketing while funding global health. Newman’s Own sells pasta sauce and funds diverse causes.
EA should lead to set the standards. If EA builds the first wave of successful PFG companies, we define what “Profit for Good” means—rigorous, evidence-based giving to ending extreme poverty, preventing pandemics, reducing animal suffering. First-mover advantage matters for establishing category norms. The alternative is waiting and letting others define PFG as funding popular but less effective causes.
The goal is effective causes with meaningful public appeal. I’m not arguing we should optimize purely for popularity—we should focus on causes that are both highly effective and have genuine public resonance. Ending extreme poverty, reducing animal suffering in factory farms, preventing the next pandemic—these are causes people care about when they understand them, even if they’re not maximally popular. Portfolio approaches (80% global poverty, 20% animal welfare) might also help broaden appeal while maintaining impact focus.
There is a strategic sequencing question worth acknowledging: early PFG successes that prove the model and generate substantial capital may enable later, more ambitious efforts. A PFG company funding global health that captures 10% market share generates more resources and credibility than one funding a more controversial cause that captures 2%. But I think we can find causes in the “effective and appealing” zone rather than having to choose between effectiveness and appeal.
EDIT:
I think actually at current low awareness levels, a bit more serious prolonged levels of stakeholder engagement tend to produce greater advantages. For example, with Humanitix, the relevant stakeholder—an event organizer choosing the platform for tickets- is probably spending more time making this decision than someone choosing a brand of cereal. This is also true with larger contracts like consulting work (see Impact Makers). I anticipate if general awareness and trust of the Profit for Good category increased, you would see a greater effect with lower stakes consumer decisions.