Thank you for the questions. I think that the biggest bottleneck right now is that very few people work on the issues we are interested in (listed here). We are trying to contribute to this by hiring a new person, but the problems are vast and there’s a lot more room for additional people. Another issue is lack of policy research that would consider the longer-term implications but would at the same time be very practical. We are happy that in addition to the Future of Life Institute, a few other organizations such as Centre for the Governance of AI, Centre for Long-Term Resilience, and some other ones are contributing more here or starting to do so. I’m not sure about the next 5-10 years, so I’ll leave it to someone else who might have some tentative answers.
Regarding your 2nd question, I think it is an important argument and it’s good that some people are thinking through both the arguments in favor and against working on EU AI governance. That said, there are so many ways for EU AI governance to play a major role regardless of whether it is an AI superpower or not. Some of these are mentioned in the post that you referred to, like the Brussels Effect as well as excellent opportunities for policy work right now. Some other ideas are mentioned in the comments under the post about EU not being an AI superpower, like the importance of experimenting in the EU as well as its role in the semiconductor supply chain. For me personally, I am very well-placed to work on EU AI governance compared to this type of work in the US, China, or elsewhere in the world. Even if in absolute terms other regions were more important, considering how neglected this space is, I think EU matters a lot. And many other Europeans would be much better placed to work on this rather than, say, try to become Americans.
Thank you for the questions. I think that the biggest bottleneck right now is that very few people work on the issues we are interested in (listed here). We are trying to contribute to this by hiring a new person, but the problems are vast and there’s a lot more room for additional people. Another issue is lack of policy research that would consider the longer-term implications but would at the same time be very practical. We are happy that in addition to the Future of Life Institute, a few other organizations such as Centre for the Governance of AI, Centre for Long-Term Resilience, and some other ones are contributing more here or starting to do so. I’m not sure about the next 5-10 years, so I’ll leave it to someone else who might have some tentative answers.
Regarding your 2nd question, I think it is an important argument and it’s good that some people are thinking through both the arguments in favor and against working on EU AI governance. That said, there are so many ways for EU AI governance to play a major role regardless of whether it is an AI superpower or not. Some of these are mentioned in the post that you referred to, like the Brussels Effect as well as excellent opportunities for policy work right now. Some other ideas are mentioned in the comments under the post about EU not being an AI superpower, like the importance of experimenting in the EU as well as its role in the semiconductor supply chain. For me personally, I am very well-placed to work on EU AI governance compared to this type of work in the US, China, or elsewhere in the world. Even if in absolute terms other regions were more important, considering how neglected this space is, I think EU matters a lot. And many other Europeans would be much better placed to work on this rather than, say, try to become Americans.