Many elite US universities do this—the Common Application to which my comment indirectly alludes—and law schools did something vaguely similar at least in the mid-2000s (showing my age here). So I am expecting the answer is negative.
Common evaluation would be trickier—e.g., I vaguely remember some universities getting into trouble with allegations that they were divvying up choice applicants rather than competing for them. [Edit: It may have been this—they were apparently colluding about financial aid offers, and reached a settlement with DOJ Antitrust to stop doing this.]
I vaguely remember some universities getting into trouble with allegations that they were divvying up choice applicants rather than competing for them.
This is explicitly the policy in the UK, and (I would guess) almost entirely eliminates offer acceptance uncertainty for Oxford and the other place:
… you can’t apply to Oxford and Cambridge in the same year.
(Disclaimer: I’m not an antitrust lawyer, not that I can give anyone legal advice on the Forum anyway. Also, this is a US perspective.)
The basic principle is that agreements “in restraint of trade” are illegal, with that term interpreted by reference to a “rule of reason” developed through over a century of caselaw. Neither student admissions nor employee hiring are really in the heartland of antitrust, although it has been applied to both in the past.
I don’t see how admissions and hiring are that different when it comes to determining whether use of a common application form would be in restraint of trade (i.e., whether it unreasonably impedes fair competition). I’m also unclear on what a good argument would be for an assertion that using the same first-stage application would unreasonably impede fair competition for employees in the first place. I’d argue that it would promote competition in the market for employees, by making it easier for employees to apply to more potential employers. But I didn’t dig into any caselaw on that.
Are there antitrust concerns with multiple orgs (even if nonprofit) using a common screener?
Many elite US universities do this—the Common Application to which my comment indirectly alludes—and law schools did something vaguely similar at least in the mid-2000s (showing my age here). So I am expecting the answer is negative.
Common evaluation would be trickier—e.g., I vaguely remember some universities getting into trouble with allegations that they were divvying up choice applicants rather than competing for them. [Edit: It may have been this—they were apparently colluding about financial aid offers, and reached a settlement with DOJ Antitrust to stop doing this.]
This is explicitly the policy in the UK, and (I would guess) almost entirely eliminates offer acceptance uncertainty for Oxford and the other place:
Hm I don’t obviously see the analogy with the common app—hiring employees and admitting students seem quite different.
(Disclaimer: I’m not an antitrust lawyer, not that I can give anyone legal advice on the Forum anyway. Also, this is a US perspective.)
The basic principle is that agreements “in restraint of trade” are illegal, with that term interpreted by reference to a “rule of reason” developed through over a century of caselaw. Neither student admissions nor employee hiring are really in the heartland of antitrust, although it has been applied to both in the past.
I don’t see how admissions and hiring are that different when it comes to determining whether use of a common application form would be in restraint of trade (i.e., whether it unreasonably impedes fair competition). I’m also unclear on what a good argument would be for an assertion that using the same first-stage application would unreasonably impede fair competition for employees in the first place. I’d argue that it would promote competition in the market for employees, by making it easier for employees to apply to more potential employers. But I didn’t dig into any caselaw on that.