here are some examples, sticking with utilitarianism:
evidence:
people tend to avoid pain, and when asked say that itâs really bad
people tend to seek out pleasure, and when asked say itâs really great
many other goods can be explained in terms of pain and pleasure
inferences:
pleasure is the fundamental good, and pain is the fundamental bad
we should maximise pleasure and minimise pain
i think the evidence here is observations about human (and animal) behaviour, which can be evaluated according to how well they fit reality. the inferences we can evaluate based on whether we think they really follow from the evidence (using, i dunno, logic and reason and that stuff). i donât think you need to presuppose a moral philosophy in order to evaluate these items.
If your standard is âexplains human (and animal) behaviorâ, I think you again canât make moral progress, because you no longer have any reason to deviate from past human behavior. For example, âwe should maximize pleasure and minimize painâ seems terrible at explaining observations like slavery, war, torture, etc.
(For more on this point, see this post, particularly the âMistakes are fundamentalâ section.)
If your standard is âexplains human (and animal) behaviorâ, I think you again canât make moral progress, because you no longer have any reason to deviate from past human behavior. For example, âwe should maximize pleasure and minimize painâ seems terrible at explaining observations like slavery, war, torture, etc.
âhumans seek out pleasure and avoid painâ is universal, so it seems like a good reason to say that pleasure and the avoidance of pain have absolute value. âhumans seek to enslave, war and tortureâ is not universal and so does not seem like a good reason to say that these things have absolute value; and even if it is some weak evidence that these things have value to some people, it is dwarfed by the very strong evidence that their consequences have significant negative value, since nearly everyone tries to avoid being enslaved, tortured, etc.
(caveat: i happen to think value is necessarily relational, but that is perhaps getting too sidetracked.)
here are some examples, sticking with utilitarianism:
evidence:
people tend to avoid pain, and when asked say that itâs really bad
people tend to seek out pleasure, and when asked say itâs really great
many other goods can be explained in terms of pain and pleasure
inferences:
pleasure is the fundamental good, and pain is the fundamental bad
we should maximise pleasure and minimise pain
i think the evidence here is observations about human (and animal) behaviour, which can be evaluated according to how well they fit reality. the inferences we can evaluate based on whether we think they really follow from the evidence (using, i dunno, logic and reason and that stuff). i donât think you need to presuppose a moral philosophy in order to evaluate these items.
If your standard is âexplains human (and animal) behaviorâ, I think you again canât make moral progress, because you no longer have any reason to deviate from past human behavior. For example, âwe should maximize pleasure and minimize painâ seems terrible at explaining observations like slavery, war, torture, etc.
(For more on this point, see this post, particularly the âMistakes are fundamentalâ section.)
thanksâi read christianoâs post.
âhumans seek out pleasure and avoid painâ is universal, so it seems like a good reason to say that pleasure and the avoidance of pain have absolute value. âhumans seek to enslave, war and tortureâ is not universal and so does not seem like a good reason to say that these things have absolute value; and even if it is some weak evidence that these things have value to some people, it is dwarfed by the very strong evidence that their consequences have significant negative value, since nearly everyone tries to avoid being enslaved, tortured, etc.
(caveat: i happen to think value is necessarily relational, but that is perhaps getting too sidetracked.)