First, my current stance around moral realism is something like, “Upon a whole lot of reflection, I expect that myself, and many other likeminded people, will reject a lot of hypotheses about morality is very unlikely to be meaningful, but we might still have some credence in some, at least in terms of how we should optimize our decisions going forward.”
That said, I think this question can get pretty abstract meta-ethics.
I think that it’s fine for us to make a lot of moral statements like, “I think racism is generally pretty bad”, “I don’t see any reasonable evidence for rejecting the importance of animals, vs. humans”, etc, and I think these statements are similar to that.
First, my current stance around moral realism is something like, “Upon a whole lot of reflection, I expect that myself, and many other likeminded people, will reject a lot of hypotheses about morality is very unlikely to be meaningful, but we might still have some credence in some, at least in terms of how we should optimize our decisions going forward.”
That said, I think this question can get pretty abstract meta-ethics.
I think that it’s fine for us to make a lot of moral statements like, “I think racism is generally pretty bad”, “I don’t see any reasonable evidence for rejecting the importance of animals, vs. humans”, etc, and I think these statements are similar to that.