Hm interesting. It’s plausible this is a way to avoid utility monsterization?
Like hypothetically, let’s say an average high-income life is twice as enjoyable than a low-income life. If that were the case, then using cost-per-QALY might give an advantage to saving high-income lives—they were all set to have a fun life as a rich person until they happened to die from some disease. Whereas the low-income lives were going to have a miserable time anyway, so it “doesn’t matter as much if they die.” I am not endorsing this interpretation—just articulating what using QALYs might imply if we were to use them for comparison purposes.
Hm interesting. It’s plausible this is a way to avoid utility monsterization?
Like hypothetically, let’s say an average high-income life is twice as enjoyable than a low-income life. If that were the case, then using cost-per-QALY might give an advantage to saving high-income lives—they were all set to have a fun life as a rich person until they happened to die from some disease. Whereas the low-income lives were going to have a miserable time anyway, so it “doesn’t matter as much if they die.” I am not endorsing this interpretation—just articulating what using QALYs might imply if we were to use them for comparison purposes.
You can read their GiveWell’s public document on DALYs here
A thing that might be worth noting is that according to GiveWell ~40% of AMF’s value comes from increasing the long-term income of children, not from health outcomes
Interesting. That is not apparently taken into account in the $4500/life figure they publish which is based exclusively on deaths averted.