a series of articles in which the author assumes such a commitment.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright. The Current Affairs piece doesnât use the word âutilitarianâ at all, and just refers to totalist arguments made for longtermism, which are some of the most common ones. His wording from the Aeon piece, which Iâve bolded here to emphasize, also suggests otherwise:
To understand the argument, letâs first unpack what longtermists mean by our âlongterm potentialâ, an expression that I have so far used without defining. We can analyse this concept into three main components: transhumanism, space expansionism, and a moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.
I donât think he would have written âclosely associatedâ if he thought longtermism and longtermists were necessarily committed to total utilitarianism.
This leads to the third component: total utilitarianism, which I will refer to as âutilitarianismâ for short. Although some longtermists insist that they arenât utilitarians, we should right away note that this is mostly a smoke-and-mirrors act to deflect criticisms that longtermism â and, more generally, the effective altruism (EA) movement from which it emerged â is nothing more than utilitarianism repackaged. The fact is that the EA movement is deeply utilitarian, at least in practice, and indeed, before it decided upon a name, the movementâs early members, including Ord, seriously considered calling it the âeffective utilitarian communityâ.
The âutilitarianism repackagedâ article explicitly distinguishes EA and utilitarianism, but points out what they share, and argues that criticisms of EA based on criticisms of utilitarianism are therefore fair because of what they share. Similarly, Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism.
Longtermism is also not just the ethical view that some of the primary determinants of what we should do are the consequences on the far future (or similar). Itâs defended in certain ways (often totalist arguments), it has an associated community and practice, and identifying as a longtermist means associating with those, too, and possibly promoting them. The community and practice are shaped largely by totalist (or similar) views. Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ. So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of âlongtermismâ to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
Iâm not sure what exactly you mean by âextendingâ. If you mean something like, âmany longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermismâ, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I donât find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/âmore explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and itâs not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which Iâve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
âł And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ.
He wrote:
As for the qualifier, I later make the case that an integral component of the sort of longtermism that arises from Bostrom (et al.)âs view is the deeply alienating moral theory of total impersonalist utilitarianism.
That means heâs criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean heâs claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Second, it does not matter much whether Bostrom is a consequentialist; I am, once again, criticizing the positions articulated by Bostrom and others, and these positions have important similarities with forms of consequentialism like total impersonalist utilitarianism.
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Indeed, I would refer to myself as a âlongtermist,â but not the sort that could provide reasons to nuke Germany (as in the excellent example given by Olle HäggstrĂśm), reasons based on claims made by, e.g., Bostrom.
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/âimpersonalism or similar views.
So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by âmoral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismââ, he meant âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ, I think you have to assume he didnât realize (or didnât think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the âimpersonalistâ to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.
As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I donât think this is actually true. He never claims so outright. The Current Affairs piece doesnât use the word âutilitarianâ at all, and just refers to totalist arguments made for longtermism, which are some of the most common ones. His wording from the Aeon piece, which Iâve bolded here to emphasize, also suggests otherwise:
I donât think he would have written âclosely associatedâ if he thought longtermism and longtermists were necessarily committed to total utilitarianism.
The âutilitarianism repackagedâ article explicitly distinguishes EA and utilitarianism, but points out what they share, and argues that criticisms of EA based on criticisms of utilitarianism are therefore fair because of what they share. Similarly, Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism.
Longtermism is also not just the ethical view that some of the primary determinants of what we should do are the consequences on the far future (or similar). Itâs defended in certain ways (often totalist arguments), it has an associated community and practice, and identifying as a longtermist means associating with those, too, and possibly promoting them. The community and practice are shaped largely by totalist (or similar) views. Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they donât generalize to all longtermist views.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be âanalys[ed]â (i.e. logically entails) âa moral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismâ.â And in his reply to Avital, he writes that âan integral componentâ of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ. So it looks like the only role the âcloselyâ qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of âlongtermismâ to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
Iâm not sure what exactly you mean by âextendingâ. If you mean something like, âmany longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermismâ, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I donât find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/âmore explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and itâs not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which Iâve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
He wrote:
That means heâs criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean heâs claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/âimpersonalism or similar views.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by âmoral view closely associated with what philosophers call âtotal utilitarianismââ, he meant âtotal impersonalist utilitarianismâ, I think you have to assume he didnât realize (or didnât think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the âimpersonalistâ to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.