As I mentioned in a top-level comment on this post, I don’t think this is actually true. He never claims so outright.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be “analys[ed]” (i.e. logically entails) “a moral view closely associated with what philosophers call ‘total utilitarianism’.” And in his reply to Avital, he writes that “an integral component” of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is “total impersonalist utilitarianism”. So it looks like the only role the “closely” qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of “longtermism” to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
Dr. David Mathers never actually claimed longtermism is committed total utilitarian, he only extended a critique of total utilitarianism to longtermism, which responds to one of the main arguments made for longtermism
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
Extending critiques of total utilitarianism to longtermism seems fair to me, even if they don’t generalize to all longtermist views.
I’m not sure what exactly you mean by “extending”. If you mean something like, “many longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermism”, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I don’t find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/more explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and it’s not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be “analys[ed]” (i.e. logically entails) “a moral view closely associated with what philosophers call ‘total utilitarianism’.”
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which I’ve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
″ And in his reply to Avital, he writes that “an integral component” of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is “total impersonalist utilitarianism”.
He wrote:
As for the qualifier, I later make the case that an integral component of the sort of longtermism that arises from Bostrom (et al.)’s view is the deeply alienating moral theory of total impersonalist utilitarianism.
That means he’s criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean he’s claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Second, it does not matter much whether Bostrom is a consequentialist; I am, once again, criticizing the positions articulated by Bostrom and others, and these positions have important similarities with forms of consequentialism like total impersonalist utilitarianism.
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Indeed, I would refer to myself as a “longtermist,” but not the sort that could provide reasons to nuke Germany (as in the excellent example given by Olle Häggström), reasons based on claims made by, e.g., Bostrom.
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/impersonalism or similar views.
So it looks like the only role the “closely” qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by “moral view closely associated with what philosophers call ‘total utilitarianism’”, he meant “total impersonalist utilitarianism”, I think you have to assume he didn’t realize (or didn’t think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the “impersonalist” to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.
In one of the articles, he claims that longtermism can be “analys[ed]” (i.e. logically entails) “a moral view closely associated with what philosophers call ‘total utilitarianism’.” And in his reply to Avital, he writes that “an integral component” of the type of longtermism that he criticized in that article is “total impersonalist utilitarianism”. So it looks like the only role the “closely” qualifier plays is to note that the type of total utilitarianism to which he believes longtermism is committed is impersonalist in nature. But the claim is false: longtermism is not committed to total impersonalist utilitarianism, even if one restricts the scope of “longtermism” to the view Torres criticizes in the article, which includes the form of longtermism embraced by MacAskill and Greaves. (I also note that in other writings he drops the qualifier altogether.)
I agree (and never claimed otherwise).
I’m not sure what exactly you mean by “extending”. If you mean something like, “many longtermist folk accept longtermism because they accept total utilitarianism, so raising objections to total utilitarianism in the context of discussions about longtermism can persuade these people to abandon longtermism”, then I agree, but only insofar as those who raise the objections are clear that they are directly objecting to total utilitarianism. Otherwise, this is apt to create the false impression that the objections apply to longtermism as such. In my reply to David, I noted that longtermism is not committed to total utilitarianism precisely to correct for that potential misimpression.
Ok, I don’t find this particularly useful to discuss further, but I think your interpretations of his words are pretty uncharitable here. He could have been clearer/more explicit, and this could prevent misinterpretation, including by the wider audience of people reading his essays.
EDIT: Having read more of his post on LW, it does often seem like either he thinks longtermists are committed to assigning positive value to the creation of new people, or that this is just the kind of longtermism he takes issue with, and it’s not always clear which, although I would still lean towards the second interpretation, given everything he wrote.
This seems overly literal, and conflicts with other things he wrote (which I’ve quoted previously, and also in the new post on LW).
He wrote:
That means he’s criticizing a specific sort of longtermism, not the minimal abstract longtermist view, so this does not mean he’s claiming longtermism is committed to total utilitarianism. He also wrote:
Again, if he thought longtermism was literally committed to consequentialism or total utilitarianism, he would have said so here, rather than speaking about specific positions and merely pointing out similarities.
He also wrote:
Given that he seems to have person-affecting views, this means he does not think longtermism is committed to totalism/impersonalism or similar views.
Total utilitarianism is already impersonalist, from my understanding, so to assume by “moral view closely associated with what philosophers call ‘total utilitarianism’”, he meant “total impersonalist utilitarianism”, I think you have to assume he didn’t realize (or didn’t think) total utilitarianism and total impersonalist utilitarianism are the same view. My guess is that he only added the “impersonalist” to emphasize the fact that the theory is impersonalist.