The simulation hypothesis is a plausible way for our physics models to be quite wrong about the world in which the simulation is conducted, and further there would be reason to think simulations would be disproportionately conducted under physical laws that are especially conducive to abundant computation
The main reason for taking the simulation hypothesis seriously is the simulation argument, but that argument needs to assume that our physical models are broadly correct about reality itself and not just the “physics” of the simulation. Otherwise, there would be no warrant for drawing inferences from simulated sense data about the behavior of agents in reality, including whether these agents will choose to run ancestor simulations.
There is some effect in this direction, but not a sudden cliff. There is plenty of room to generalize, not an in. We create models of alternative coherent lawlike realities, e.g. the Game of Life or and physicists interested in modeling different physical laws.
The main reason for taking the simulation hypothesis seriously is the simulation argument, but that argument needs to assume that our physical models are broadly correct about reality itself and not just the “physics” of the simulation. Otherwise, there would be no warrant for drawing inferences from simulated sense data about the behavior of agents in reality, including whether these agents will choose to run ancestor simulations.
There is some effect in this direction, but not a sudden cliff. There is plenty of room to generalize, not an in. We create models of alternative coherent lawlike realities, e.g. the Game of Life or and physicists interested in modeling different physical laws.