This is correct.
And once I accept this conclusion, the most absurd-seeming conclusion of them all follows. By increasing the computing power devoted to the training of these utility-improved agents, the utility produced grows exponentially (as more computing power means more digits to store the rewards). On the other hand, the impact of all other attempts to improve the world (e.g. by improving our knowledge of artificial sentience so we can more efficiently promote their welfare) grows at only a polynomial rate with the amount of resource devoted into these attempts. Therefore, running these trainings is the single most impactful thing that any rational altruist should do. Q.E.D.
If you believed in wildly superexponential impacts from more compute, you’d be correspondingly uninterested in what could be done with the limited computational resources of our day, since a Jupiter Brain playing with big numbers instead of being 10^40 times as big a deal as an ordinary life today could be 2^(10^40) times as big a deal. And likewise for influencing more computation rich worlds that are simulating us.The biggest upshot (beyond ordinary ‘big future’ arguments) of superexponential-with-resources utility functions is greater willingnesss to take risks/care about tail scenarios with extreme resources, although that’s bounded by ‘leaks’ in the framework (e.g. the aforementioned influence on simulators with hypercomputation), and greater valuation of futures per unit computation (e.g. it makes welfare in sims like ours conditional on the simulation hypothesis less important).I’d say that ideas of this sort, like infinite ethics, is reason to develop a much more sophisticated, stable, and well-intentioned society (which can more sensibly address complex issues affecting an important future) that can address these well, but doesn’t make the naive action you describe desirable even given certainty in a superexponential model of value.
FWIW, my own views are more like ‘regular longtermism’ than ‘strong longtermism,’ and I would agree with Toby that existential risk should be a global priority, not the global priority. I’ve focused my career on reducing existential risk, particularly from AI, because it seems like a substantial chance of happening in my lifetime, with enormous stakes and extremely neglected. I probably wouldn’t have gotten into it when I did if I didn’t think doing so was much more effective than GiveWell top charities at saving current human lives, and outperforming even more on metrics like cost-benefit in $.Longtermism as such (as one of several moral views commanding weight for me) plays the largest role for things like refuges that would prevent extinction but not catastrophic disaster, or leaving seed vaults and knowledge for apocalypse survivors. And I would say longtermism provides good reason to make at least modest sacrifices for that sort of thing (much more than the ~0 current world effort), but not extreme fanatical ones.There are definitely some people who are fanatical strong longtermists, but a lot of people who are made out to be such treat it as an important consideration but not one held with certainty or overwhelming dominance over all other moral frames and considerations. In my experience one cause of this is that if you write about implications within a particular worldview people assume you place 100% weight on it, when the correlation is a lot less than 1. I see the same thing happening with Nick Bostrom, e.g. his old Astronomical Waste article explicitly explores things from a totalist view where existential risk dominates via long-term effects, but also from a person-affecting view where it is balanced strongly by other considerations like speed of development. In Superintelligence he explicitly prefers not making drastic sacrifices of existing people for tiny proportional (but immense absolute) gains to future generations, while also saying that the future generations are neglected and a big deal in expectation.
Alexander Berger discusses this at length in a recent 80,000 Hours podcast interview with Rob Wiblin.
Last update is that they are, although there were coronavirus related delays.
I would say no, with no exceptions.
Focusing on empirical results:Learning to summarize from human feedback was good, for several reasons.I liked the recent paper empirically demonstrating objective robustness failures hypothesized in earlier theoretical work on inner alignment.
Side note: Bostrom does not hold or argue for 100% weight on total utilitarianism such as to take overwhelming losses on other views for tiny gains on total utilitarian stances. In Superintelligence he specifically rejects an example extreme tradeoff of that magnitude (not reserving one galaxy’s worth of resources out of millions for humanity/existing beings even if posthumans would derive more wellbeing from a given unit of resources).I also wouldn’t actually accept a 10 million year delay in tech progress (and the death of all existing beings who would otherwise have enjoyed extended lives from advanced tech, etc) for a 0.001% reduction in existential risk.
By that token most particular scientific experiments or contributions to political efforts may be such: e.g. if there is a referendum to pass a pro-innovation regulatory reform and science funding package, a given donation or staffer in support of it is very unlikely to counterfactually tip it into passing, although the expected value and average returns could be high, and the collective effort has a large chance of success.
Your 3 items cover good+top priority, good+not top priority, and bad+top priority, but not #4, bad+not top priority.I think people concerned with x-risk generally think that progress studies as a program of intervention to expedite growth is going to have less expected impact (good or bad) on the history of the world per unit of effort, and if we condition on people thinking progress studies does more harm than good, then mostly they’ll say it’s not important enough to focus on arguing against at the current margin (as opposed to directly targeting urgent threats to the world). Only a small portion of generalized economic expansion will go to the most harmful activities (and damage there comes from expediting dangerous technologies in AI and bioweapons that we are improving in our ability to handle, so that delay would help) or to efforts to avert disaster, so there is much more leverage focusing narrowly on the most important areas. With respect to synthetic biology in particular, I think there is a good case for delay: right now the capacity to kill most of the world’s population with bioweapons is not available in known technologies (although huge secret bioweapons programs like the old Soviet one may have developed dangerous things already), and if that capacity is delayed there is a chance it will be averted or much easier to defend against via AI, universal sequencing, and improvements in defenses and law enforcement. This is even moreso for those sub-areas that most expand bioweapon risk. That said, any attempt to discourage dangerous bioweapon-enabling research must compete against other interventions (improved lab safety, treaty support, law enforcement, countermeasure platforms, etc), and so would have to itself be narrowly targeted and leveraged. With respect to artificial intelligence, views on sign vary depending on whether one thinks the risk of an AI transition is getting better or worse over time (better because of developments in areas like AI alignment and transparency research, field-building, etc; or worse because of societal or geopolitical changes). Generally though people concerned with AI risk think it much more effective to fund efforts to find alignment solutions and improved policy responses (growing them from a very small base, so cost-effectiveness is relatively high) than a diffuse and ineffective effort to slow the technology (especially in a competitive world where the technology would be developed elsewhere, perhaps with higher transition risk).For most other areas of technology and economic activity (e.g. energy, agriculture, most areas of medicine) x-risk/longtermist implications are comparatively small, suggesting a more neartermist evaluative lens (e.g. comparing more against things like GiveWell).Long-lasting (centuries) stagnation is a risk worth taking seriously (and the slowdown of population growth that sustained superexponential growth through history until recently points to stagnation absent something like AI to ease the labor bottleneck), but seems a lot less likely than other x-risk. If you think AGI is likely this century then we will return to the superexponential track (but more explosively) and approach technological limits to exponential growth followed by polynomial expansion in space. Absent AGI or catastrophic risk (although stagnation with advanced WMD would increase such risk), permanent stagnation also looks unlikely based on the capacities of current technology given time for population to grow and reach frontier productivity.I think the best case for progress studies being top priority would be strong focus on the current generation compared to all future generations combined, on rich country citizens vs the global poor, inhabit and on technological progress over the next few decades, rather than in 2121. But given my estimates of catastrophic risk and sense of the interventions, at the current margin I’d still think that reducing AI and biorisk do better for current people than the progress studies agenda per unit of effort.I wouldn’t support arbitrary huge sacrifices of the current generation to reduce tiny increments of x-risk, but at the current level of neglectedness and impact (for both current and future generations) averting AI and bio catastrophe looks more impactful without extreme valuations. As such risk reduction efforts scale up marginal returns would fall and growth boosting interventions would become more competitive (with a big penalty for those couple of areas that disproportionately pose x-risk).That said, understanding tech progress, returns to R&D, and similar issues also comes up in trying to model and influence the world in assorted ways (e.g. it’s important in understanding AI risk, or building technological countermeasures to risks to long term development). I have done a fair amount of investigation that would fit into progress studies as an intellectual enterprise for such purposes.I also lend my assistance to some neartermist EAresearch focused on growth, in areas that don’t very disproportionately increase x-risk, and to development of technologies that make it more likely things will go better.
Robin Hanson argues in Age of Em that annualized growth rates will reach over 400,000% as a result of automation of human labor with full substitutes (e.g. through brain emulations)! He’s a weird citation for thinking the same technology can’t manage 20% growth.”I really don’t have strong arguments here. I guess partly from experience working on an automated trading system (i.e. actually trying to automate something)”This and the usual economist arguments against fast AGI growth seem to be more about denying the premise of ever succeeding at AGI/automating human substitute minds (by extrapolation from a world where we have not yet built human substitutes to conclude they won’t be produced in the future), rather than addressing the growth that can then be enabled by the resulting AI.
I find that 57% very difficult to believe. 10% would be a stretch. Having intelligent labor that can be quickly produced in factories (by companies that have been able to increase output by millions of times over decades), and do tasks including improving the efficiency of robots (already cheap relative to humans where we have the AI to direct them, and that before reaping economies of scale by producing billions) and solar panels (which already have energy payback times on the order of 1 year in sunny areas), along with still abundant untapped energy resources orders of magnitude greater than our current civilization taps on Earth (and a billionfold for the Solar System) makes it very difficult to make the AGI but no TAI world coherent.Cyanobacteria can double in 6-12 hours under good conditions, mice can grow their population more than 10,000x in a year. So machinery can be made to replicate quickly, and trillions of von Neumann equivalent researcher-years (but with AI advantages) can move us further towards that from existing technology. I predict that cashing out the given reasons into detailed descriptions will result in inconsistencies or very implausible requirements.
She does talk about century plus timelines here and there.
I suspect there are biases in the EA conversation where hedonistic-compatible arguments get discussed more than reasons that hedonistic utilitarians would be upset by, and intuitions coming from other areas may then lead to demand and supply subsidies for such arguments.
“I would guess most arguments for global health and poverty over animal welfare fall under the following:
- animals are not conscious or less conscious than humans- animals suffer less than humans
“I’m pretty skeptical that these arguments descriptively account for most of the people explicitly choosing global poverty interventions over animal welfare interventions, although they certainly account for some people. Polls show wide agreement that birds and mammals are conscious and have welfare to at least some degree. And I think most models on which degree of consciousness (in at least some senses) varies greatly, it’s not so greatly that one would say that, e.g. it’s more expensive to improve consciousness-adjusted welfare in chickens than humans today. And I say that as someone who thinks it pretty plausible that there are important orders-of-magnitude differences in quantitative aspects of consciousness. I’d say descriptively the bigger thing is people just feeling more emotional/moral obligations to humans than other animals, not thinking human welfare varies a millionfold more, in the same way that people who choose to ‘donate locally’ in rich communities where cost to save a life is hundreds of times greater than abroad don’t think that poor foreigners are a thousand times less conscious, even as they tradeoff charitable options as though weighting locals hundreds of times more than foreigners.An explicit philosophical articulation of this is found in Shelly Kagan’s book on weighing the interests of different animals. While even on Kagan’s view factory farming is very bad, he describes a view that assigns greater importance of interests of a given strength for beings with more of certain psychological properties (or counterfactual potential for those properties). The philosopher Mary Anne Warren articulates something similar in her book on moral status, which assigns increasing moral status on the basis of a number of grounds including life (possessed by plants and bacteria, and calling for some status), consciousness, capacity to engage in reciprocal social relations, actual relationships, moral understanding, readinesss to forbear in mutual cooperation, various powers, etc.I predict that if you polled philosophers on cases involving helping different numbers of various animals, those sorts of accounts would be more frequent explanations of the results than doubt about animal consciousness (as a binary or quantitative scale).This would be pretty susceptible to polling, e.g. you could ask the EA Survey team to try some questions on it (maybe for a random subset).
Hi Milan,So far it has been used to back the donor lottery (this has no net $ outlay in expectation, but requires funds to fill out each block and handle million dollars swings up and down), make a grant to ALLFED, fund Rethink Priorities’ work on nuclear war, and small seed funds for some researchers investing two implausible but consequential if true interventions (including the claim that creatine supplements boost cognitive performance for vegetarians).Mostly it remains invested. In practice I have mostly been able to recommend major grants to other funders so this fund is used when no other route is more appealing. Grants have often involved special circumstances or restricted funding, and the grants it has made should not be taken as recommendations to other donors to donate to the same things at the current margin in their circumstances.
There is some effect in this direction, but not a sudden cliff. There is plenty of room to generalize, not an in. We create models of alternative coherent lawlike realities, e.g. the Game of Life or and physicists interested in modeling different physical laws.