It is much less clear whether this person would think they’ve made a mistake in allocating more of themselves away from EA, either at t2-now (they don’t regret they now have a family which takes their attention away from EA things), or at t1-past (if their previous EA-self could forecast them being in this situation, they would not be disappointed in themselves). If so, these would not be options that their t1-self should be trying to shut off, as (all things considered) the option might be on balance good. I am sure there are cases where ‘life gets in the way’ in a manner it is reasonable to regret. But I would be chary [...]
You discuss a case where there is regret from the perspective of both t1 and t2, and a case where there is regret from neither perspective. These are both plausible accounts. But there’s also a third option that I think happens a lot in practice: Regret at t1 about the projected future in question, and less/no regret at t2. So the t2-self may talk about “having become more wise” or “having learned something about myself,” while the t1-self would not be on board with this description and consider the future in question to be an unfortunate turn of events. (Or the t2-self could even acknowledge that some decisions in the sequence were not rational, but that from their current perspective, they really like the way things are.)
The distinction between moral insight and failure of goal preservation is fuzzy. Taking precautions against goal drift is a form of fanaticism and commonsense heuristics speak against that. OTOH, not taking precautions seems like not taking the things you currently care about seriously (at least insofar as there are things you care about that go beyond aspects related to your personal development).
Unfortunately I don’t think there is a safe default. Not taking precautions is tantamount to making the decision to be okay with potential value drift. And we cannot just say we are uncertain about our values, because that could result in mistaking uncertainty with underdetermination. There are meaningful ways of valuing further reflection about one’s own values, but those types of “indirect” values, where one values further reflection, they can also suffer from (more subtle) forms of goal drift.
You discuss a case where there is regret from the perspective of both t1 and t2, and a case where there is regret from neither perspective. These are both plausible accounts. But there’s also a third option that I think happens a lot in practice: Regret at t1 about the projected future in question, and less/no regret at t2. So the t2-self may talk about “having become more wise” or “having learned something about myself,” while the t1-self would not be on board with this description and consider the future in question to be an unfortunate turn of events. (Or the t2-self could even acknowledge that some decisions in the sequence were not rational, but that from their current perspective, they really like the way things are.)
The distinction between moral insight and failure of goal preservation is fuzzy. Taking precautions against goal drift is a form of fanaticism and commonsense heuristics speak against that. OTOH, not taking precautions seems like not taking the things you currently care about seriously (at least insofar as there are things you care about that go beyond aspects related to your personal development).
Unfortunately I don’t think there is a safe default. Not taking precautions is tantamount to making the decision to be okay with potential value drift. And we cannot just say we are uncertain about our values, because that could result in mistaking uncertainty with underdetermination. There are meaningful ways of valuing further reflection about one’s own values, but those types of “indirect” values, where one values further reflection, they can also suffer from (more subtle) forms of goal drift.