Some of these things are fundamentally hard to insure against, because of information asymmetries / moral hazard.
e.g. insurance against donor issues would disproportionately be taken by people who had some suspicions about their donors, which would drive up prices, which would get more people without suspicions to decline taking insurance, until the market was pretty tiny with very high prices and a high claim rate. (It would also increase the incentives to commit fraud to give, which seems bad.)
Some of these things are fundamentally hard to insure against, because of information asymmetries / moral hazard.
e.g. insurance against donor issues would disproportionately be taken by people who had some suspicions about their donors, which would drive up prices, which would get more people without suspicions to decline taking insurance, until the market was pretty tiny with very high prices and a high claim rate. (It would also increase the incentives to commit fraud to give, which seems bad.)