It crossed my mind to ponder on whether much can be said about where different categories* of risk prevention are under-resourced. For example it maybe that the globe spends enough resources on preventing natural risks as we have seen them in the past so understand them. It maybe that militarisation of states means that we are prepared for malicious risk. It maybe that we under-prepare for large risks as they have less small scale analogues.
Not sure how useful following that kind of thinking is but it could potentially help with prioritisation. Would be interested to hear if the authors have though through this.
*(The authors break down risks into different categories: Natural Risk /â Accident Risk /â Malicious Risk /â Latent Risk /â Commons Risk, and Leverage Risk /â Cascading Risk /â Large Risk, and capability risk /â habitat risk /â ubiquity risk /â vector risk /â agency risk).
This is excellent. Very well done.
It crossed my mind to ponder on whether much can be said about where different categories* of risk prevention are under-resourced. For example it maybe that the globe spends enough resources on preventing natural risks as we have seen them in the past so understand them. It maybe that militarisation of states means that we are prepared for malicious risk. It maybe that we under-prepare for large risks as they have less small scale analogues.
Not sure how useful following that kind of thinking is but it could potentially help with prioritisation. Would be interested to hear if the authors have though through this.
*(The authors break down risks into different categories: Natural Risk /â Accident Risk /â Malicious Risk /â Latent Risk /â Commons Risk, and Leverage Risk /â Cascading Risk /â Large Risk, and capability risk /â habitat risk /â ubiquity risk /â vector risk /â agency risk).
Thank you for sharing your reaction!
I havenât, but itâs possible that my coauthors have. I generally agree that it might be worthwhile to think along the lines you suggested.