One reason to think we might not find anything morally valuable that distinct from what we already know about is that our concept of morality is made to fit with the stuff we already know about.
Agreed. It’s possible that we/​our descendants won’t see much value for extending past blissful experiences even when other axes of value are theoretically possible, in the same way that aliens without conscious experiences would not see any particular reason to privilege qualia (even if they could be convinced that it’s real).
One reason to think we might not find anything morally valuable that distinct from what we already know about is that our concept of morality is made to fit with the stuff we already know about.
Agreed. It’s possible that we/​our descendants won’t see much value for extending past blissful experiences even when other axes of value are theoretically possible, in the same way that aliens without conscious experiences would not see any particular reason to privilege qualia (even if they could be convinced that it’s real).