Even under that definition, I think the aliens sound to me like they intend to eliminate humans, albeit as a means to an end, not an end to itself. If the Armenian genocide happened to be more about securing a strong Turkish state than any sort of Nazi-style belief that the existence of Armenians was itself undesirable because they were someone inherently evil, it wouldnât mean it wasnât genocide. (Not sure what the actual truth is on that.) But yes, I am more bothered about it being abhorrent than about whether it meets the vague legal definition of the word âgenocideâ given by the UN. (Vague because, what is it to destroy âin partâ? If a racist kills one person because of their race is that an attempt to destroy a race âin partâ and so genocide?)
âImportantly, I donât think he says he would invite/âstart the war, only how he would act in a scenario where a war is inevitable.â If someone signed up to fight a war of extermination against Native Americans in 1800 after the war already started, Iâm not sure âthe war was already inevitableâ would be much of a defence.
Weâre just getting into the standard utilitarian vs deontology argument. Singer may just double down and sayâjust because you feel itâs abhorrent, doesnât mean it is.
There are examples of things that seem abhorrent from a deontological perspective, but good from a utilitarian perspective, and that people are generally in favor of. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are perhaps the clearest case.
Personally, I think utilitarianism is the best moral theory we have, but I have some moral uncertainty and so factor in deontological reasoning into how I act. In other words, if something seems like an atrocity, I would have to be very confident that weâd get a lot of payoff to be in favor of it. In the alien example, I think it is baked in that we are pretty much certain it would be better for the aliens to take overâbut in practice this confidence would be almost impossible to come by.
I agree that this is in some sense part of a more general utilitarianism vs intuitions thing.
Are people generally in favour of the bombings? Or do you really mean *Americans*? What do people in liberal democracies like say Spain that didnât participate in WW2 think? People in Nigeria? India? Personally, I doubt you could construct a utilitarian defense of first dropping the bombs on cities rather than starting with a warning shot demonstration at the very least. It is true, I think that war is a case where people in Western liberal democracies tend to believe that some harm to innocent civilians can be justified by the greater good. But itâs also I think true that people in all cultures have a tendency to believe implausible justifications for prima facie very bad actions taken by their countries during wars.
Are people generally in favour of the bombings? Or do you really mean *Americans*? What do people in liberal democracies like say Spain that didnât participate in WW2 think? People in Nigeria? India? Personally, I doubt you could construct a utilitarian defense of first dropping the bombs on cities rather than starting with a warning shot demonstration at the very least.
I donât know about globally, but there are a lot of Chinese people, and they generally support the bombings, which has to take us a fair bit of the the way towards general support. (Iâm not aware of any research into the views of Indians or Nigerians). And the classic utilitarian defense is that there were a limited number of bombs of unknown reliability, so they couldnât be wastedâthough to be honest, asking for warning shots seems a bit like special pleading. Warning shots are for deterring aggression in the first placeânot for after the attacker has already struck, and shows no sign of stopping.
The overwhelming majority of Manhattan Project scientists, as well as the Undersecretary of the Navy, believed there should be a warning shot. It makes total sense from a game theory perspective to do warning shots when you believe your military advantage has significantly increased in a way that significantly change their own calculus.
My point wasnât necessarily that I believe that most people worldwide think the bombing was wrong, but rather that itâs unlikely JackM has access to what âmost peopleâ think worldwide, and that it is plausible for obvious reasons that insofar as he does have a sense of what most Americans think about this, itâs at least very plausible for standard reasons of nationalism and in-group bias that Americans have a more favourable view of the bombings than the world as whole. But âplausibleâ just means that, not definitely true.
As for the fact that they had few bombs: that is true, and I did briefly think it might enable the utilitarian defence you are giving, but if you think things through carefully, I donât think it really works all that well. The reason that the bombings pushed Japan towards surrender* is not, primarily, that it was much harder for Japan to fight on once Hiroshima and Nagasaki were gone, but rather the fear that US could drop more bombs. In other words, the Japanese werenât prepared to risk the US having more bombs ready, or being able to manufacture them quickly. That fear could certainly also have been generated simply by proof that the US had the bomb. I guess you could try and argue a warning shot would have had less psychological impact, but that seems speculative to me.
*There is, I believe, some level of historical debate about how much longer they would have held out anyway, so I am not sure whether the bombings alone were decisive.
That may be fair. Although, if what youâre saying is that the bombings werenât actually justified when one uses utilitarian reasoning, then the horror of the bombings canât really be an argument against utilitarianism (although I suppose it could be an argument against being an impulsive utilitarian without giving due consideration to all your options).
Yeah, I didnât meant to imply you had. This whole Hiroshima convo got us quite off topic. The original point was that Ben was concerned about digital beings outnumbering humans. I think that concern originates from some misplaced feeling that humans have some special status on account of being human.
Even under that definition, I think the aliens sound to me like they intend to eliminate humans, albeit as a means to an end, not an end to itself. If the Armenian genocide happened to be more about securing a strong Turkish state than any sort of Nazi-style belief that the existence of Armenians was itself undesirable because they were someone inherently evil, it wouldnât mean it wasnât genocide. (Not sure what the actual truth is on that.) But yes, I am more bothered about it being abhorrent than about whether it meets the vague legal definition of the word âgenocideâ given by the UN. (Vague because, what is it to destroy âin partâ? If a racist kills one person because of their race is that an attempt to destroy a race âin partâ and so genocide?)
âImportantly, I donât think he says he would invite/âstart the war, only how he would act in a scenario where a war is inevitable.â If someone signed up to fight a war of extermination against Native Americans in 1800 after the war already started, Iâm not sure âthe war was already inevitableâ would be much of a defence.
Weâre just getting into the standard utilitarian vs deontology argument. Singer may just double down and sayâjust because you feel itâs abhorrent, doesnât mean it is.
There are examples of things that seem abhorrent from a deontological perspective, but good from a utilitarian perspective, and that people are generally in favor of. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are perhaps the clearest case.
Personally, I think utilitarianism is the best moral theory we have, but I have some moral uncertainty and so factor in deontological reasoning into how I act. In other words, if something seems like an atrocity, I would have to be very confident that weâd get a lot of payoff to be in favor of it. In the alien example, I think it is baked in that we are pretty much certain it would be better for the aliens to take overâbut in practice this confidence would be almost impossible to come by.
I agree that this is in some sense part of a more general utilitarianism vs intuitions thing.
Are people generally in favour of the bombings? Or do you really mean *Americans*? What do people in liberal democracies like say Spain that didnât participate in WW2 think? People in Nigeria? India? Personally, I doubt you could construct a utilitarian defense of first dropping the bombs on cities rather than starting with a warning shot demonstration at the very least. It is true, I think that war is a case where people in Western liberal democracies tend to believe that some harm to innocent civilians can be justified by the greater good. But itâs also I think true that people in all cultures have a tendency to believe implausible justifications for prima facie very bad actions taken by their countries during wars.
I donât know about globally, but there are a lot of Chinese people, and they generally support the bombings, which has to take us a fair bit of the the way towards general support. (Iâm not aware of any research into the views of Indians or Nigerians). And the classic utilitarian defense is that there were a limited number of bombs of unknown reliability, so they couldnât be wastedâthough to be honest, asking for warning shots seems a bit like special pleading. Warning shots are for deterring aggression in the first placeânot for after the attacker has already struck, and shows no sign of stopping.
The overwhelming majority of Manhattan Project scientists, as well as the Undersecretary of the Navy, believed there should be a warning shot. It makes total sense from a game theory perspective to do warning shots when you believe your military advantage has significantly increased in a way that significantly change their own calculus.
My point wasnât necessarily that I believe that most people worldwide think the bombing was wrong, but rather that itâs unlikely JackM has access to what âmost peopleâ think worldwide, and that it is plausible for obvious reasons that insofar as he does have a sense of what most Americans think about this, itâs at least very plausible for standard reasons of nationalism and in-group bias that Americans have a more favourable view of the bombings than the world as whole. But âplausibleâ just means that, not definitely true.
As for the fact that they had few bombs: that is true, and I did briefly think it might enable the utilitarian defence you are giving, but if you think things through carefully, I donât think it really works all that well. The reason that the bombings pushed Japan towards surrender* is not, primarily, that it was much harder for Japan to fight on once Hiroshima and Nagasaki were gone, but rather the fear that US could drop more bombs. In other words, the Japanese werenât prepared to risk the US having more bombs ready, or being able to manufacture them quickly. That fear could certainly also have been generated simply by proof that the US had the bomb. I guess you could try and argue a warning shot would have had less psychological impact, but that seems speculative to me.
*There is, I believe, some level of historical debate about how much longer they would have held out anyway, so I am not sure whether the bombings alone were decisive.
That may be fair. Although, if what youâre saying is that the bombings werenât actually justified when one uses utilitarian reasoning, then the horror of the bombings canât really be an argument against utilitarianism (although I suppose it could be an argument against being an impulsive utilitarian without giving due consideration to all your options).
I did not use the bombings as an argument against utilitarianism.
Yeah, I didnât meant to imply you had. This whole Hiroshima convo got us quite off topic. The original point was that Ben was concerned about digital beings outnumbering humans. I think that concern originates from some misplaced feeling that humans have some special status on account of being human.