I came here to make a similar comment: a lot of my p(doom) hinges on things like âhow hard is alignmentâ and âhow likely is a software intelligence explosion,â which seem to be largely orthogonal to questions of how likely we are to get flourishing. (And maybe even run contrary to it, as you point out.)
Fair, but bear in mind that weâre conditioning on your action successfully reducing x-catastrophe. So you know that youâre not in the world where alignment is impossibly difficult.
Instead, youâre in a world where it was possible to make a difference on p(doom) (because you in fact made the difference), but where nonetheless that p(doom) reduction hadnât happened anyway. I think thatâs pretty likely to be a pretty messed up world, because, in the non-messed-up-world, the p(doom) reduction already happens and your action didnât make a difference.
I came here to make a similar comment: a lot of my p(doom) hinges on things like âhow hard is alignmentâ and âhow likely is a software intelligence explosion,â which seem to be largely orthogonal to questions of how likely we are to get flourishing. (And maybe even run contrary to it, as you point out.)
Fair, but bear in mind that weâre conditioning on your action successfully reducing x-catastrophe. So you know that youâre not in the world where alignment is impossibly difficult.
Instead, youâre in a world where it was possible to make a difference on p(doom) (because you in fact made the difference), but where nonetheless that p(doom) reduction hadnât happened anyway. I think thatâs pretty likely to be a pretty messed up world, because, in the non-messed-up-world, the p(doom) reduction already happens and your action didnât make a difference.