Thanks for writing this. I’m an antirealist and already agree with your conclusions, though I think we may arrive at similar conclusions for somewhat different reasons. I saw that you referenced a few other arguments for moral realism that Bentham didn’t present in the post. At least one criticism I’d make of Bentham’s argument for realism (at least as presented in the EA forum) is how narrow it is. There are plenty of arguments out there Bentham could have made but simply didn’t. In any case, I don’t think any other arguments for moral realism are any good, including the ones you mention.
I don’t think Enoch’s indispensability or wager arguments are persuasive at all. I think Kane B raises some excellent concerns with it in this video, towards the end (though the rest is worth listening to for greater familiarity with the argument). With respect to the form of argument presented in dialog form here, I think the mistake occurs here:
David: Idc. I like it and of course I should do my preferences; if not for my preferences, what else should I do?
I wouldn’t endorse that I “should” act on my preferences. This already involves a notion of normativity that I reject and that I see no good reason to accept. Even if I should, at least as described, whether or not I should would be dependent on my preferences so this wouldn’t get you to realism. Not sure how much this threatens Enoch’s argument as he presents, it, though. He’s concerned with minimizing arbitrariness and several other things you don’t explicitly address. I don’t think any of these other considerations favor realism either, though.
Regarding wagering on moral realism, I’ve addressed this at length here; incidentally, I do so in response to Bentham presenting this argument. I’ve also addressed it more recently here. I don’t think wager style arguments are very good at all, and I think antirealists have pretty straightforward ways to reject them.
Thanks for writing this. I’m an antirealist and already agree with your conclusions, though I think we may arrive at similar conclusions for somewhat different reasons. I saw that you referenced a few other arguments for moral realism that Bentham didn’t present in the post. At least one criticism I’d make of Bentham’s argument for realism (at least as presented in the EA forum) is how narrow it is. There are plenty of arguments out there Bentham could have made but simply didn’t. In any case, I don’t think any other arguments for moral realism are any good, including the ones you mention.
I don’t think Enoch’s indispensability or wager arguments are persuasive at all. I think Kane B raises some excellent concerns with it in this video, towards the end (though the rest is worth listening to for greater familiarity with the argument). With respect to the form of argument presented in dialog form here, I think the mistake occurs here:
I wouldn’t endorse that I “should” act on my preferences. This already involves a notion of normativity that I reject and that I see no good reason to accept. Even if I should, at least as described, whether or not I should would be dependent on my preferences so this wouldn’t get you to realism. Not sure how much this threatens Enoch’s argument as he presents, it, though. He’s concerned with minimizing arbitrariness and several other things you don’t explicitly address. I don’t think any of these other considerations favor realism either, though.
Regarding wagering on moral realism, I’ve addressed this at length here; incidentally, I do so in response to Bentham presenting this argument. I’ve also addressed it more recently here. I don’t think wager style arguments are very good at all, and I think antirealists have pretty straightforward ways to reject them.
Ok, cool. Thanks for the comment and thanks for the recs—I’ll check them out!