So one way of thinking about this is as follows.
Imagine you’re goal is to eat every apple you see. I show you an apple. You acknowledge that it is in fact an apple, and you have seen the apple. I say you should then eat the apple. You refuse to eat the apple.
My view is that you (epistemically) ought to have eaten the apple. There is a normativity about reasons (and logic) that suggest I am justified in saying this. If you reject normativity about epistemic reasons, it seems to me that you don’t have to accept that you ought to have eaten the apple.
Maybe there is something different about epistemic normativity than ethical normativity, or maybe there is something unique about epistemic normativity in the logical domain, but I’m not really sure what that special thing is.
I fail to follow the apple example. Why should I epistemically have eaten the apple? Either I have a true goal (and desire) to eat it or not. If I do, I will not refuse to eat it. If you assume it is a goal, I am assuming it is true, although people don’t generally have those sorts of goals, I think. They look more like… lists of preferences and degree of each preferences. Some are core-preferences difficult to change, while others are very mutable.
If by epistemic normativity you mean something like there are x, y, z reasons we should trust when we want to have proper beliefs about things, what I’d say is that this doesn’t seem normative to me. I personally value truth very highly as an end in itself, but even if I didn’t, truthful information is useful for acting to satisfy your desires, but I don’t see why one has some obligation to do so.I f someone doesn’t follow the effective means to their ends, they’re being ineffective or foolish, but not violating any norm. If you want a bridge to stand, build it this way; otherwise, it falls. But there’s no moral or rational requirement to build it that way—you just won’t get what you want.
I don’t accept that I “ought to have eaten the apple.” At the very least, I wouldn’t accept this without knowing what you take that to mean. I don’t think there are any irreducibly normative facts at all, nor do I think there are any such thing as “reasons” independent of descriptive facts about the relation between means and ends. So I don’t know what you have in mind when you say that “you ought to have eaten the apple.” I also don’t know why you epistemically ought to have; why not prudential, or some other normative domain?
Could you perhaps explain what you have in mind by epistemic and moral normativity? There’s a good chance I don’t accept the account you have in mind.
So one way of thinking about this is as follows. Imagine you’re goal is to eat every apple you see. I show you an apple. You acknowledge that it is in fact an apple, and you have seen the apple. I say you should then eat the apple. You refuse to eat the apple. My view is that you (epistemically) ought to have eaten the apple. There is a normativity about reasons (and logic) that suggest I am justified in saying this. If you reject normativity about epistemic reasons, it seems to me that you don’t have to accept that you ought to have eaten the apple. Maybe there is something different about epistemic normativity than ethical normativity, or maybe there is something unique about epistemic normativity in the logical domain, but I’m not really sure what that special thing is.
I fail to follow the apple example. Why should I epistemically have eaten the apple? Either I have a true goal (and desire) to eat it or not. If I do, I will not refuse to eat it. If you assume it is a goal, I am assuming it is true, although people don’t generally have those sorts of goals, I think. They look more like… lists of preferences and degree of each preferences. Some are core-preferences difficult to change, while others are very mutable.
If by epistemic normativity you mean something like there are x, y, z reasons we should trust when we want to have proper beliefs about things, what I’d say is that this doesn’t seem normative to me. I personally value truth very highly as an end in itself, but even if I didn’t, truthful information is useful for acting to satisfy your desires, but I don’t see why one has some obligation to do so.I f someone doesn’t follow the effective means to their ends, they’re being ineffective or foolish, but not violating any norm. If you want a bridge to stand, build it this way; otherwise, it falls. But there’s no moral or rational requirement to build it that way—you just won’t get what you want.
I don’t accept that I “ought to have eaten the apple.” At the very least, I wouldn’t accept this without knowing what you take that to mean. I don’t think there are any irreducibly normative facts at all, nor do I think there are any such thing as “reasons” independent of descriptive facts about the relation between means and ends. So I don’t know what you have in mind when you say that “you ought to have eaten the apple.” I also don’t know why you epistemically ought to have; why not prudential, or some other normative domain?
Could you perhaps explain what you have in mind by epistemic and moral normativity? There’s a good chance I don’t accept the account you have in mind.