I don’t accept that I “ought to have eaten the apple.” At the very least, I wouldn’t accept this without knowing what you take that to mean. I don’t think there are any irreducibly normative facts at all, nor do I think there are any such thing as “reasons” independent of descriptive facts about the relation between means and ends. So I don’t know what you have in mind when you say that “you ought to have eaten the apple.” I also don’t know why you epistemically ought to have; why not prudential, or some other normative domain?
Could you perhaps explain what you have in mind by epistemic and moral normativity? There’s a good chance I don’t accept the account you have in mind.
I don’t accept that I “ought to have eaten the apple.” At the very least, I wouldn’t accept this without knowing what you take that to mean. I don’t think there are any irreducibly normative facts at all, nor do I think there are any such thing as “reasons” independent of descriptive facts about the relation between means and ends. So I don’t know what you have in mind when you say that “you ought to have eaten the apple.” I also don’t know why you epistemically ought to have; why not prudential, or some other normative domain?
Could you perhaps explain what you have in mind by epistemic and moral normativity? There’s a good chance I don’t accept the account you have in mind.