Before reading the article: The argument I often hear in support of moral realism appeals to moral experience, but moral experience seems totally consistent with moral anti-realism being true. I don’t know what evidence for moral realism would look like even if it were to exist, but that would just mean that there’s no reason to prefer either view (anti-realism vs. realism).
After reading: This Cuneo-style argument that Matthew used in this writing is interesting. I forgot about the bad company argument that I learned about several years ago. Don’t I lose epistemic facts if I lose moral facts? Maybe so. It seems self-refuting to argue that people should be indifferent to purported epistemic facts; if you want people to clearly assess the merits of your argument against taking epistemic facts seriously, you seem to need them to have rationality. I don’t think you’d want them to misrepresent your argument against epistemic facts, use an ad hominem as justification for rejecting it, etc.
(I don’t take myself to be necessarily be disagreeing with you, just addressing the same topic). The problem with moral realism has never been the morality part; it’s the normativity part. This is why I endorse global normative antirealism, i.e., the position that there are no stance-independent normative facts at all, including moral, epistemic, and so on.
Companions in Guilt arguments don’t strike me as compelling at all because I don’t see any more reason to think epistemic realism is true than that moral realism is true. So someone saying that if I want to reject one, I have to reject both doesn’t cause me to pay any cost at all: I already reject both on independent grounds, anyway.
As far as losing epistemic facts: Epistemic antirealists don’t deny there are “epistemic facts,” they only deny that there are stance-independent epistemic facts. Nothing about epistemic antirealism prevents you from thinking there are epistemic facts, or better and worse ways of acquiring true or justified beliefs
I guess my concern is if I said, “This depends on your stance on what counts as an epistemic fact, but you should accept the conclusions of a sound argument,” what prevents someone from saying, “Well, if it’s stance-dependent, then I’m totally justified in accepting unsound arguments.”? It seems a person would be equally as justified in accepting unsound arguments as they do sound ones.
Nothing prevents someone from saying that. But nothing would prevent someone from saying that even if epistemic realism were true.
Let’s say for a moment epistemic realism was false. What would you do? I’d do exactly what I currently do. It’s already important to care about what’s true, and there will be consequences for you if you ignore what’s true. The same is true for everyone else. Nothing would change. I don’t think the truth of epistemic realism would have practical consequences at all.
Before reading the article: The argument I often hear in support of moral realism appeals to moral experience, but moral experience seems totally consistent with moral anti-realism being true. I don’t know what evidence for moral realism would look like even if it were to exist, but that would just mean that there’s no reason to prefer either view (anti-realism vs. realism).
After reading: This Cuneo-style argument that Matthew used in this writing is interesting. I forgot about the bad company argument that I learned about several years ago. Don’t I lose epistemic facts if I lose moral facts? Maybe so. It seems self-refuting to argue that people should be indifferent to purported epistemic facts; if you want people to clearly assess the merits of your argument against taking epistemic facts seriously, you seem to need them to have rationality. I don’t think you’d want them to misrepresent your argument against epistemic facts, use an ad hominem as justification for rejecting it, etc.
(I don’t take myself to be necessarily be disagreeing with you, just addressing the same topic). The problem with moral realism has never been the morality part; it’s the normativity part. This is why I endorse global normative antirealism, i.e., the position that there are no stance-independent normative facts at all, including moral, epistemic, and so on.
Companions in Guilt arguments don’t strike me as compelling at all because I don’t see any more reason to think epistemic realism is true than that moral realism is true. So someone saying that if I want to reject one, I have to reject both doesn’t cause me to pay any cost at all: I already reject both on independent grounds, anyway.
As far as losing epistemic facts: Epistemic antirealists don’t deny there are “epistemic facts,” they only deny that there are stance-independent epistemic facts. Nothing about epistemic antirealism prevents you from thinking there are epistemic facts, or better and worse ways of acquiring true or justified beliefs
It’s objectively good to see you here, Lance!
I guess my concern is if I said, “This depends on your stance on what counts as an epistemic fact, but you should accept the conclusions of a sound argument,” what prevents someone from saying, “Well, if it’s stance-dependent, then I’m totally justified in accepting unsound arguments.”? It seems a person would be equally as justified in accepting unsound arguments as they do sound ones.
Nothing prevents someone from saying that. But nothing would prevent someone from saying that even if epistemic realism were true.
Let’s say for a moment epistemic realism was false. What would you do? I’d do exactly what I currently do. It’s already important to care about what’s true, and there will be consequences for you if you ignore what’s true. The same is true for everyone else. Nothing would change. I don’t think the truth of epistemic realism would have practical consequences at all.
Interesting. I’ll have to think on this. Thanks for your comments!