I am tempted to write an even lengthier explanation for why I think it matters, but I’ll try to keep it shorter. The sense in which I am talking about what most people think is with respect to what they mean by what they say when they make moral claims. And I take what people mean by what they say to be relevant to the assessment of the meaning of ordinary moral language. So, if, for instance, most people speak, think, or act like moral antirealists, or at least not like realists, this would be relevant to the respective plausibility of realism and antirealism in various ways.
At least one way this would be relevant is that it would undercut claims from moral realists that moral realism is a “common sense” view. Many moral realists appeal to the presumptively realist features of moral discourse. If they are mistaken about this, then this undercuts at least some appeals to a presumption in favor of moral realism. Others claim that people generally experience morality in ways more in line with realism. If this isn’t true, this would undercut such claims as well.
Generally speaking, then, realists often appeal to a presumption in favor of realism predicated on the allegedly realist-features of ordinary moral discourse, realist features of ordinary moral experience, and so on. This is sometimes leveraged to shift the burden of proof onto antirealists. Antirealists are described as having “radically skeptical” views, for instance.
If it turns out that realist inclinations and realist construals of moral claims are idiosyncratic, not representative of ordinary thought and language, and largely parochial features of the way academic philosophers are inclined to speak and think, this would undercut these sorts of appeals.
I don’t think moral realism relies on presumptive arguments, but they fairly common. A couple quick comments related to this:
First, I think the most plausible interpretation of Bentham’s remarks about how things seem, what’s counterintuitive, and especially the claim that views contrary to his are “crazy” hints at least a bit in the direction that Bentham doesn’t merely mean to report how things seem to him, or that he’s simply reporting his own proprietary use of moral language. The notion that those who disagree are “crazy” carries connotations that anyone who doesn’t react the way he does is making an error of some kind. But if he is just reporting how things seem, I do wonder why he so often opts to describe contrary views or intuitions as “crazy.”
Second, realists may dispute whether what people “think” is relevant to what those people mean, or relevant to the armchair analysis of the meaning of moral sentences. In that case, I’d likely disagree with whatever account of language and/or whatever methodological approach they’re taking to addressing these questions, in which case any positions they take that are downstream of this disagreement rely on contested views about language, meaning, and methods. In that case, what people think is indirectly relevant insofar as its relevant to my views, at least, and if they don’t agree that what people think is relevant then we disagree on a more fundamental matter.
There’s a lot more I could say, e.g., about the descriptive metaethics project of the 20th century and the seemingly close historical connection between ordinary moral language and judgment and the typical construal of metaethical positions, but I’ll leave it there for now. I’d be happy to discuss the matter more with you any time!
> Arguments are invitations; if the premises don’t speak to you, you’re free to decline the invitation. But that no more makes it a “bad argument” than does failing to appeal to you (or even a majority of people) mean that a party is a “bad party”.
My reasons for thinking Bentham’s arguments are bad are not exclusively based on the fact that appeals to how things seem may or may not reflect how they seem to me or to people in general. I present a variety of other objections in the post I referenced, and it is this set of objections taken together that are the basis for my claim that Bentham’s arguments are not good.
As far as them not being sophisticated: I stand by that. Bentham does not present well-developed arguments as far as cases for moral realism go. His arguments aren’t very clear or well-organized, he doesn’t unpack what he means by much of what he says, he doesn’t bring up many of the standard or some of the more obscure arguments one might bring up in favor of moral realism (so we don’t get much of a cumulative case that appeals to multiple independent arguments), and he doesn’t do much to anticipate or respond to the kinds of objections one might receive from antirealists. In short, his arguments are narrow and underdeveloped. I say this as someone who regularly reads his blog and has seen him present far more compelling arguments on other topics (even though I frequently disagree with him). So I know Bentham is more than capable of making a stronger case than he has here.
I am tempted to write an even lengthier explanation for why I think it matters, but I’ll try to keep it shorter. The sense in which I am talking about what most people think is with respect to what they mean by what they say when they make moral claims. And I take what people mean by what they say to be relevant to the assessment of the meaning of ordinary moral language. So, if, for instance, most people speak, think, or act like moral antirealists, or at least not like realists, this would be relevant to the respective plausibility of realism and antirealism in various ways.
At least one way this would be relevant is that it would undercut claims from moral realists that moral realism is a “common sense” view. Many moral realists appeal to the presumptively realist features of moral discourse. If they are mistaken about this, then this undercuts at least some appeals to a presumption in favor of moral realism. Others claim that people generally experience morality in ways more in line with realism. If this isn’t true, this would undercut such claims as well.
Generally speaking, then, realists often appeal to a presumption in favor of realism predicated on the allegedly realist-features of ordinary moral discourse, realist features of ordinary moral experience, and so on. This is sometimes leveraged to shift the burden of proof onto antirealists. Antirealists are described as having “radically skeptical” views, for instance.
If it turns out that realist inclinations and realist construals of moral claims are idiosyncratic, not representative of ordinary thought and language, and largely parochial features of the way academic philosophers are inclined to speak and think, this would undercut these sorts of appeals.
I don’t think moral realism relies on presumptive arguments, but they fairly common. A couple quick comments related to this:
First, I think the most plausible interpretation of Bentham’s remarks about how things seem, what’s counterintuitive, and especially the claim that views contrary to his are “crazy” hints at least a bit in the direction that Bentham doesn’t merely mean to report how things seem to him, or that he’s simply reporting his own proprietary use of moral language. The notion that those who disagree are “crazy” carries connotations that anyone who doesn’t react the way he does is making an error of some kind. But if he is just reporting how things seem, I do wonder why he so often opts to describe contrary views or intuitions as “crazy.”
Second, realists may dispute whether what people “think” is relevant to what those people mean, or relevant to the armchair analysis of the meaning of moral sentences. In that case, I’d likely disagree with whatever account of language and/or whatever methodological approach they’re taking to addressing these questions, in which case any positions they take that are downstream of this disagreement rely on contested views about language, meaning, and methods. In that case, what people think is indirectly relevant insofar as its relevant to my views, at least, and if they don’t agree that what people think is relevant then we disagree on a more fundamental matter.
There’s a lot more I could say, e.g., about the descriptive metaethics project of the 20th century and the seemingly close historical connection between ordinary moral language and judgment and the typical construal of metaethical positions, but I’ll leave it there for now. I’d be happy to discuss the matter more with you any time!
My reasons for thinking Bentham’s arguments are bad are not exclusively based on the fact that appeals to how things seem may or may not reflect how they seem to me or to people in general. I present a variety of other objections in the post I referenced, and it is this set of objections taken together that are the basis for my claim that Bentham’s arguments are not good.
As far as them not being sophisticated: I stand by that. Bentham does not present well-developed arguments as far as cases for moral realism go. His arguments aren’t very clear or well-organized, he doesn’t unpack what he means by much of what he says, he doesn’t bring up many of the standard or some of the more obscure arguments one might bring up in favor of moral realism (so we don’t get much of a cumulative case that appeals to multiple independent arguments), and he doesn’t do much to anticipate or respond to the kinds of objections one might receive from antirealists. In short, his arguments are narrow and underdeveloped. I say this as someone who regularly reads his blog and has seen him present far more compelling arguments on other topics (even though I frequently disagree with him). So I know Bentham is more than capable of making a stronger case than he has here.